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Résumé 
 
Dans la plupart des pays occidentaux, les notes sont majoritairement utilisées 
pour évaluer la performance et rendre compte de la réussite scolaire des individus. 
Dans cette perspective, elles sont non seulement un indicateur de succès ou 
d!échec, mais aussi de la valeur comparative des individus. Dans cette thèse nous 
proposons de tester l!effet des notes lorsque celles-ci sont utilisées dans des 
contextes bien spécifiques de coopération. En effet, si les notes et la comparaison 
sociale sont pratique courante, les étudiants sont souvent encouragés et amenés à 
coopérer en groupe. Cependant, à notre connaissance, point d!études n!ont testé 
l!effet des notes sur la coopération; études qui seraient pourtant légitimes étant 
donné la tendance existante en milieu éducatif à encourager les pratiques 
coopératives. C!est précisément ce que proposent de faire les chapitres 
expérimentaux de cette thèse. Le premier (Chapitre 4) teste l!effet des notes au 
regard de leur capacité à accentuer à la fois la visibilité et la comparaison sociale. 
Deux expériences investiguent l!effet des notes et tentent de démêler ce qui, de la 
visibilité individuelle, de la comparaison sociale ou des deux, pourrait affecter un 
biais motivationnel qui réduit la propension à coopérer: la propension à préférer les 
informations qui confirment les choix de l!individu. Les résultats montrent qu!en 
situation coopérative, les notes accroissent ce biais comparativement à des 
situations où seule la visibilité individuelle est soulignée, suggérant de plus que les 
notes produisent une focalisation des individus sur une comparaison sociale 
compétitive. Le second (Chapitre 5) teste l!effet des notes sur les interactions 
coopératives des individus, précisément sur le partage d!information. Deux 
expériences montrent que dans un contexte de travail en groupe coopératif, les notes 
entravent le bon partage des informations entre individus, les amenant à faire de la 
rétention d!information. Enfin, le troisième (Chapitre 6) investigue l!effet des notes sur 
un autre indicateur de coopération en groupe: la coordination interindividuelle. Les 
résultats montrent que les notes réduisent la coordination des individus et les mènent 
à avoir des comportements de dominance négative entre eux. En somme, les notes 
entravent la coopération et réduisent les comportements coopératifs entre individus. 
Enfin, nous discutons des implications pour le milieu éducatif. 
Mots clés: notes, coopération, comportements, motivations-mixtes, visibilité. 
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Abstract 
 
In western societies, grades are to date the most widespread means by which 
achievement and performance are assessed in educational contexts. Grades are 
used for their capacity to provide individuals with a clear indicator of success or 
failure, in particular in comparison to others; in this respect, we study their impact on 
particular work contexts requiring cooperation. Indeed, students are often exhorted to 
cooperate and work in groups, while at the same time assessed with grades and 
focused on inter-individual comparison. However, to the best of our knowledge, no 
work has investigated the effects of grades on cooperation and on indicators of 
cooperation, a central question to be addressed given its significance for educational 
trends encouraging cooperative practices, and which we propose to explore in the 
experimental parts of this thesis. The first experimental chapter, Chapter 4, 
investigates the effect of grades with regards to their capacity to highlight individual 
visibility and at the same time social comparison. It tries to disentangle which of 
these facets could affect a motivated bias likely to reduce cooperation, namely 
individuals! preference for information confirming their own choice. In two 
experiments, results showed that a graded-cooperative situation increased this 
preference effect in comparison to other conditions where only individual visibility was 
manipulated, and furthermore increased individuals! perception of a competitive 
atmosphere. Chapter 5 investigates the effect of grades on direct cooperative inter-
individual interactions, namely on group information sharing. Two experiments 
showed that grades hindered informational communication between individuals, 
leading them to withhold crucial task-information. Finally, Chapter 6 investigates the 
effects of grades on another indicator of group cooperation, namely inter-individual 
coordination. Results indicated that showcasing grades at the onset of a cooperative 
task necessitating inter-individual coordination decreased group performance and 
elicited more negative dominant behaviours amongst participants. Together these 
results provide evidence that grades hamper group cooperation. We conclude by 
discussing implications for the practice of grading in Education. 
 
Keywords: grades, cooperation, behaviours, mixed-motives, visibility. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
… Somewhere in a university locker room: Mister J., a promising basketball player, 
will be on the field tonight to play a very important game with his team. Nevertheless 
he seems to be torn between two issues: not only is the game important because his 
team winning is a must, he also knows that he will be observed and evaluated during 
the game, as a national sport-selector will be there to evaluate his play on the court 
to consider the possibility for Mister J. to join a basketball team of national level. 
Mister J., knowing he will be observed and evaluated, wonders whether he should 
put himself forward during the game, mainly looking to score, or whether he should 
balance that personal interest with providing assists and focusing more on 
contributing to a cooperative team-play.  
… Somewhere in a classroom: the teacher has gathered Tom and his classmates in 
groups to work on a common project for which they have different yet complementary 
resources at disposal (documents, arguments, etc.). The teacher explains that during 
group work they will need to share those resources with one another in order to 
successfully complete their project. Moreover, the teacher will also grade students on 
their individual contributions to the project. Indeed, during group working hours, the 
teacher will drop by each group to observe and evaluate members based on their 
input to the group work. Tom, knowing he will be graded, starts wondering whether 
he should give his precious resources to genuinely cooperate with others on the 
project, or whether he should try to use them more strategically and at critical 
moments of group work to show how important his contribution is to the group work 
and thus put himself forward when the teacher comes to check on them. 
 
How will Mister J. and Tom react to what appears to be a double-bind 
situation? Indeed, whether in the basketball game setting or in the group work project 
setting, the double-bind aspect of the situation is partly due to the fact that 
cooperation is an imposed requirement, embedded in the way group work is 
structured between individuals. In both cases, group members are bound together by 
the necessity to exchange the different resources possessed and by the fact that they 
are given a same goal to fulfil. In other words, Tom and Mister J. are tied to their 
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fellow members regarding the work to achieve in a positive goal interdependence 
which characterizes cooperative structures; D. W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 2009a). 
Hence, in those examples, cooperation is a must in order to reach a collective and 
optimal outcome. However, the expectation of being individually assessed during 
group work might raise self-interests that could make it tempting for members not to 
cooperate (the overall situation of two co-existing opposed motives resulting in what 
is called a “mixed-motives conflict” situation, Drolet & Morris, 2000, p.26).  
Thus, could it be that the expectation of an individual grade triggers an 
individual motive that contradicts the cooperation motives implied by the cooperative 
requirements of the setting? Indeed, in practice, grades are commonly used to rank 
and compare outputs (Marshall & Weinstein, 1984), to which students are socialized 
since school benches. But because grades are individually attributed in this special 
cooperative group context, they might focus individuals on each of their own outputs 
and not on the group!s common output (introducing either a negative goal 
interdependence among members, which characterizes competitive structures, or an 
individualistic independence; D. W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 2009a). Therefore, we 
asked ourselves to what extent, in this particular group setting where individuals are 
tied together in the achievement of their work, individual grades (or their expectation) 
could interfere and hamper group cooperation? A question to which the work 
conducted in this thesis will try to answer as following.  
Chapter 1 reviews grades as assessment tools, present their different 
components and investigates the different processes that could be enhanced when 
grades are expected. Chapter 2 presents groups as information processors and 
decision makers. It furthermore presents cooperative group work (structure, 
advantages) to identify the behaviours and benefits that should be at stake if 
cooperative group work was to be endangered. Chapter 3 presents three 
experimental paradigms and tasks used in the present work to observe group 
cooperation. Last but not least, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 successively experiment the 
effect of grades on variables accounting for group cooperation, at the following 
different levels: at intra-individual level, on information sharing group level and on 
inter-individual coordination.  
 
 15 
  
CHAPTER 1. 
GRADES AS ASSESSMENT TOOLS 
 
 
 
 
1.1 The double-edged effect of grades 
 
In educational settings, grades (e.g. score scales, letters, percentile score) are 
widespread assessment tools that can be used with two different purposes. They can 
either be used to compare different students! scores on a given task and thus gauge 
their work against one another (called, “norm-referenced” assessment), or they can 
be used to compare the work of a student against a given standard (called “criterion-
referenced” assessment, Brookhart, 2004). For instance, in most Swiss educational 
settings, the scale on which work is evaluated ranges from 0 to 6, and the standard 
that one needs to reach to pass is 4. In most French educational settings, the 
common scale to grade students! work ranges from 0 to 20, and the standard that 
one needs to reach in order to pass an exam would be to score 10 out of 20. Whilst 
grades can have two different assessment purposes, they engender sometime 
positive and sometime negative effects. Grades are found to be good predictors of 
results to achievement tests or personality tests (De Ketele, 1993), but also to 
undermine students! intrinsic motivations to learn (defined as the motivation to 
undertake a task without any constraint and with the aim of improving learning and 
mastery, see Butler 1987; Kohn, 1993 in McClam & Sevier, 2010), to trigger 
individuals! adoption of performance avoidance goals (i.e. the goal of avoiding to be 
outperformed by others; Pulfrey et al., 2011) and to activate the anxiety behind the 
motive of avoiding failure (Atkinson & Litwin, 1960). Grades are also deleterious for 
performance in comparison to the performance achieved when students are 
evaluated with written comments (Butler & Nisan, 1986). Moreover, Butler (2006) has 
shown that an anticipated evaluation which has the goal to assess students relative 
to others (as do grades when used as a norm-referenced assessment) led individuals 
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to view task-achievement as an opportunity to show one!s superior ability relative to 
others, i.e. undertaking a task with the goal of showing one!s superior ability relative 
to others, or to avoid being inferior to others, which is called ability goals or 
performance goals, as opposed to mastery goals14 (Butler, 2000). Such a finding is 
particularly problematic because, in turn, ability goals are associated with superior 
performance only if task achievement requires rote learning (e.g. in multiple choice 
examinations, Harackiewicz et al., 1997) or if it requires putting into practice familiar 
skills (Barron & Harackiewicz, 2001). But whenever the task requires problem solving 
or divergent thinking, the adoption of ability goals becomes deleterious for 
performance (Utman, 1997, in Butler, 2000).  
If grades do affect individual performance (positively or negatively), the focus 
of the present thesis is rather to determine whether they can affect group 
cooperation. Precisely, the focus will be to investigate whether grades can affect 
variables that are known to be strong indicators of cooperation. We will start by 
describing some important mechanisms elicited by grades, such as visibility and 
comparison processes. We will then use these mechanisms to describe which effects 
could be expected when grades are triggered in cooperative group settings. 
 
1.2 Disentangling different types of visibility elicited by grades 
 
Visibility due to public handing out of grades  
A first type of visibility is found in relation to grades in the literature, that relates 
to the potential that grades have to render social comparison information visible, or 
else said, the information on which one compares relative to others (e.g. the score or 
grade obtained on a test). More precisely, Monteil and Huguet (2002) distinguish the 
situations in which grades are handed out publicly (e.g. when grades are given in 
front of a classroom) from those in which they are handed out anonymously. On the 
one hand, if grades are given publicly, the social comparison information is visible. 
For example, the score obtained by one person is visible and accessible to the rest of 
the audience. Thus, the visibility of the social comparison information increases the 
                                                
14 Other labels have been used to describe the same distinction: mastery vs. performance goals  (Darnon, Butera, 
& Harackiewicz, 2007; Darnon, Dompnier, Gilliéron, & Butera, 2010); learning vs. performance goals (Dweck, 
1986); task vs. ego orientation (Nicholls, 1989).  
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chances of the audience to undertake comparison (i.e. social comparison, Festinger, 
1954) by gauging the different pieces of information that are rendered visible by this 
public handing out of grades. We note by extension, that the visibility of the social 
comparison information is therefore potentially at stake whenever grades are 
expected to be given in the open of a group setting.  
How does visibility interact with social comparison to affect performance? An 
experiment conducted by Monteil (1988, study 1) manipulated first whether 
evaluation was either visible (students expected to be verbally tested in front of the 
rest of the classroom) or anonymous (students taking a written test). Second, they 
manipulated the presence /absence of social comparison. When present, the 
experimenter told students publicly that half of them belonged to a high level of 
achievement (level 2) while the other half belonged to a low level of achievement 
(level 4). When absent, the experimenter told students publicly that the two halves 
had the same level of achievement. During the experiment, students attended a 
course, and were then individually evaluated on a 10-item questionnaire. What is 
interesting to our concern is that results showed that the visibility of evaluation 
affected the performance of students only when social comparison was made salient 
but not in absence of comparison. Moreover, visibility affected performance 
differently depending on the students! level of achievement, high or low: under 
visibility condition, high achievers! performance was better than under anonymous 
condition. The reverse was observed with low achievers performing worse under 
visibility than anonymous conditions. More to the point, the effect of visibility on high 
achievers was replicated (Monteil, 1988, study 2) in an identical experiment where 
only high achievers participated and where social comparison information (the 
previous high vs. low achievement distinction) was instead manipulated by giving a 
success (vs. failure) bogus feedback to students performing a first task before 
answering the questionnaire. The interest was to see whether the positive effect of 
visibility was only due to the personal competence of individuals (being high-
achievers). Although the replication was not tested on low-achievers (which could 
have made it a full replication), the results of this second study showed that visibility 
is deleterious for individual performance even for high-achievers, those who carry the 
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reputation and the history of being high achievers, when they received a bogus 
failure feedback before performing.  
 
Thus, two important points stem from those studies. Firstly, the fact that 
visibility of evaluation affected performance only when social comparison was made 
salient, it points to the fact that social comparison is rather essential to trigger the 
effects of visibility of evaluation. Secondly, that visibility of the social comparison 
information affected students differently depending on their actual level of 
achievement (study1, for high and low achievers) or on their bogus level of 
achievement (study 2, for high-achievers). Visibility resulted in a debilitating effect for 
low achievers (study1) and for high-achievers when they received a bogus failure 
feedback (study 2). This suggests that the deleterious effect of visibility of the social 
comparison information is not dependent on the objective reputation that individuals 
have (i.e. the one that is defined in terms of objective level of measured 
performance). Rather, the effect is dependent on the competence that they are given 
to perceive, which suggests that visibility of social comparison information is 
deleterious precisely when it emphasizes the weakness of a student to deal with a 
task. This weakness could furthermore be interpreted as reflecting his own low-
competence or incompetence regarding the task to achieve, but mostly, as compared 
with others. 
 However, is visibility of evaluation the only type of visibility triggered and 
concerned by the situation of a public/anonymous handing out of grades? How about 
the situations in which they are not given publically? Do they imply that no visibility at 
all is triggered? More relevant to the effects of grades on cooperation, does 
anonymity imply that grades are a mere evaluation tool with no consequences for 
people!s performance?  
 
Social visibility 
We report here another kind of visibility that can be distinguished from the 
public handing out of grades. Indeed, the visibility of individuals at work can be 
highlighted even when grades are given anonymously or when they are not given at 
all (i.e. absence of grades). It is the type of visibility that is at stake when individuals 
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are under the observation of a watchful audience during their task-achievement (or, is 
under the observation of others; Merton, 1968). In that sense, being observed implies 
that one is visible during task-accomplishment. This social visibility has been widely 
used and investigated in social facilitation-inhibition literature (e.g., Zajonc, 1965; 
Bond & Titus, 1983; Mullen, Bryant, & Driskell, 1997; Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, & 
Salomon, 1999), especially in the use of the audience-effect paradigm that 
investigates the effects on individual performance of knowing that an audience is 
watching while one is performing a task. In that paradigm, others are present but are 
not actively taking part in the task, and visibility is at stake because the experimenter 
brings individuals! attention to the fact that they will be observed during their task-
achievement. Hence, being observed implies a certain degree of visibility for 
individuals who are performing.  
 
Several ways of manipulating social visibility, and hence of highlighting it, have 
been used in the social-facilitation literature. Either, for example, when individuals 
learned that a peer will be there to observe them while performing (Blascovitch et al., 
1999) and to monitor them (Borden, Hendrick, & Walker, 1976 in Mullen, Bryant, & 
Driskell, 1997). Or, for example, when individuals learn that present spectators will be 
there, however without any interest in watching them perform (Cottrell et al., 1967; 
Zajonc & Sales, 1966; Cottrell, Wack, Sekerak, & Rittle, 1968). It is worth noting that 
visibility does not yield the same effects on performance depending on whether it 
stems from a rather evaluative presence (e.g., when individuals know that they are 
visible because they are being monitored) or from a rather non-evaluative presence 
(e.g., when they know they are visible but little attention is paid to the performance). 
When visibility seemed to stem from a non-evaluative presence, it produced positive 
and facilitating effects, namely an amelioration of quantity and quality of performance 
on simple tasks, on variables such as the time needed to complete an extended 
behaviour and the proportion of errors obtained on a given task (Bond & Titus, 1983), 
or producing a challenge pattern of cardiovascular activity enhancing performance on 
well-learned tasks (Blascovitch et al., 1999). Conversely, when visibility seemed to 
stem from a rather evaluative presence, the reverse effect was obtained, with 
visibility producing negative and inhibitory effects, namely a threat pattern of 
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physiological reactivity associated with an impairment of performance on unlearned 
tasks (Blascovitch et al., 1999).  
However, individual visibility in social facilitation literature relates to individual 
situations of performance and does not involve individual visibility elicited in groups 
settings, mostly used by studies investigating social loafing phenomenon 
(Ringelmann, 1913). This phenomenon describes “the decrease in individual effort 
that occurs when individuals work within a cooperative group rather than alone” (in 
Kravitz & Martin, 1986, p. 936); a phenomenon that is observed when working on 
tasks requiring either physical (e.g., Williams, Harkins, & Latané, 1981) or cognitive 
efforts (e.g., Petty, Williams, & Latané, 1977). In this literature, increasing the visibility 
of individuals who are working in a group setting is an efficient way to reduce loafing 
and is done by making individual contributions identifiable. For example, Williams et 
al. (1981, experiment 2) ran a study where participants were asked to shout: alone or 
in groups, with or without microphones to identify their individual inputs. Results 
showed that when set in groups, individuals who knew that their inputs to group work 
would be identifiable and traceable back to them, invested more effort in shouting 
than when their individual inputs were not identifiable.  
 
As one can see, different definitions of visibility have so far emerged from our 
investigation of the previous social psychological literature and all seem to be 
relevant to our quest of trying to understand why grades could be expected to affect 
cooperation. However, if they are all relevant, they are so for different theoretical and 
experimental purposes. Thus, in order to best experimentally investigate the effects 
of grades in comparison to different types of visibility that can be elicited, it was 
important to try to take the different types of visibility into account and compare them 
to a “graded and visibility” condition where grades would be manipulated. The 
underlying idea being to show that an increased individual visibility (whichever the 
type) is not deleterious per se but that it might become so when it is increased 
through the use of grades.  
 
Firstly, stemming from the idea that grades have the capacity to increase the 
visibility of an individual during task-achievement, we have analysed visibility as 
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defined in the Social Facilitation-Inhibition (SFI) literature. In this literature, called 
social visibility, visibility is defined as the visibility of an individual at work that is 
emphasized by the presence of a co-actor or by the presence of a watchful audience. 
Thus, visibility seems to be deleterious for an individual!s task-achievement, and to 
disturb his attention, only when the presence of a watchful other has a potential 
evaluative purpose (with a negative component linked to a kind of threat perception). 
Therefore, if we wish to test grades! effect on individual level, we need to rely on how 
individual visibility was operationalized in SFI literature. The rational would be to 
manipulate visibility in order to show that grades might have a deleterious effect 
because they have this evaluative facet that increases individual!s social visibility, 
whereas overruling the possibility that other visibility situations that do not hold this 
facet will be deleterious. Accordingly, in studies run at an individual level (Chapter 4), 
we chose to operationalize visibility in terms of either mere presence (i.e., a person is 
present during the task to be achieved), or visibility (i.e., a person is present during 
the task and is interested in watching the individual achieve). 
 
Secondly, stemming from the idea that grades have the capacity to increase 
the visibility of individuals (of their work, their competence, or what they are worth) in 
comparison to others, we have considered the distinction brought by the studies of 
Monteil (1981, 1988) to be highly relevant to understand what effects could grades 
produce when expected in the open of a group setting. Monteil!s work has the 
particularity of addressing the type of visibility that is exacerbated in a situation of 
evaluation, the one generally encountered in a school setting. He addresses visibility 
with the interchangeable use of two different terms: (a) the term “social visibility of 
comparison” or Visibilité sociale de la comparaison (i.e. the visibility that stems from 
a social comparison that is undertaken or about to be undertaken), and (b) the term 
“visibility of evaluation”. Visibility in Monteil!s terms (since different visibilities are 
used equivalently) impacts differently an individual!s performance depending on 
whether evaluation takes place in public (in a group; in front of others) or in a private 
setting. Moreover, it is important to note that the effects of a public evaluation appear 
in these experimental procedures by merely letting individuals think that they will be 
evaluated publicly. Thus, it is the mere expectation of a public evaluation that 
 22 
produces the effects obtained in the studies that we have mentioned earlier. Hence, 
Monteil!s conceptualization of the visibility (and its effects) as being triggered by the 
expectation of a feedback given to students regarding the performance, behaviour or 
status, was particularly useful to help us form expectations about the effect(s) of 
grades when these are expected in the open of a group setting. Precisely, Monteil 
found that visibility of the comparative information accentuated the salience of social 
comparison. Thus, if we wish to test grades! effect in a group setting, one would need 
to distinguish: a condition where individuals are graded and visible, from a condition 
where individuals know that they are only visible without being assessed nor 
compared. Indeed, if on the one hand working in a group setting naturally provides a 
favourable context to the rise of social comparison; on the other hand, Monteil!s 
studies pointed to the fact that all social comparisons made salient did not 
necessarily impair performance. More to the point, haven!t we got evidence from the 
literature on social loafing that increasing individual visibility and making individual 
contributions identifiable in a group setting has the positive effect of increasing 
individuals! inputs and efforts to a task undertaken collectively? Therefore, if we 
ultimately wish to test the effects of grades in a (cooperative) group setting, we need 
to rely on Monteil!s definition of visibility of evaluation and distinguish it from the 
emphasis of inter-individual social comparison by comparing a graded condition to 
one where only visibility would be manipulated without any comparative component. 
Thus, we operationalized visibility in our group studies (Chapter 5) following the 
visibility definition of Monteil. 
Taken together, these elements suggest that increasing individual visibility 
seems to be deleterious for task achievement only when linked to a social 
comparison that emphasizes a possible weakness of the individual, or when visibility 
is increased by means of an evaluative presence that induces a threat pattern 
reaction. But, do all pressuring and evaluative situations that increase individual 
visibility necessarily lead to negative effects, or could there be exceptions? To 
answer this question we will investigate the concept of accountability. As we will see 
next, this concept is of particular interest because its definition includes an evaluative 
component and its experimental manipulation is based on increasing the visibility of 
individuals (precisely, their standpoint). Hence, accountability is interesting to 
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compare to a grades condition because it implies both visibility and evaluation, but an 
evaluation that is not normative (i.e. that is not focused on comparing one!s work to 
that of others).  
 
            1.3 Disentangling accountability from Grades  
 
Individual accountability, in its broad sense, is about being responsible for an 
outcome, or being responsible for one!s share of work in a cooperative setting (e.g. in 
cooperative learning methods, D.W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 1989; D.W. Johnson & 
R. Johnson, 2002). Given the various fields where individual accountability has been 
investigated, we will here focus on results obtained in psychological research, which 
has examined the effect(s) of individual accountability as producing self-critical and 
effortful thinking on different variables reflecting cognitive processes, such as, 
attribution, judgment accuracy, or attitude formation and change. Green, Visser and 
Tetlock (2000, p. 1380) define individual accountability as “the social pressure to 
justify one!s views to someone else”. This definition is quite interesting as it captures 
a pressure component that is part of individual accountability, a pressure triggered by 
the fact that the individuals have to justify or account for their point of view in front of 
an audience. Thus, we had different reasons to think that individual accountability 
was worth being compared to grades. First, because individual accountability induces 
a pressure, it seemed to provide a broad evaluative setting. Second, because, 
although factors used to manipulate individual accountability have varied a lot, one 
has been consistently used: the extent to which the point of view held by participants 
is made visible to an audience, which is interesting to our concern as we have until 
now tried to ascertain whether grades can have deleterious effects because they 
enhance the visibility of individuals at work. Third, because although individual 
visibility is part of individual accountability and that this latter holds a pressure-like 
component, this concept has nevertheless resulted in positive outcomes on cognitive 
processes. Those effects are however obtained under some specific conditions that 
we will shortly develop.  
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Accountability beneficial for cognitive variables  
 
As we mentioned, accountability has been shown to positively affect variables 
of cognitive nature by overall reducing judgmental biases. For instance, in 
impression-formation paradigm, it has reduced primacy effect by increasing 
individuals! attention to all evidences available, including contradictory evidences, 
and has led individuals to modify their initial impression in responses to those 
contradictory evidences (Tetlock, 1983b). In an essay-attribution paradigm, holding 
individuals accountable has allowed to reduce the over-attribution effect (Jones, 
1979; also called, fundamental error attribution, Ross, 1977) in comparison to 
individuals who were not held accountable (Tetlock, 1985b). Finally, accountability 
has increased the complexity of judgmental processes in an attribution of 
responsibility paradigm, by allowing accountable individuals to reduce their tendency 
to make extreme attributions of responsibility and punishment in comparison to non-
accountable individuals (Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998).  
Hence, given the previous point, individual accountability is interesting to 
consider because it seems to reduce reasoning biases and to promote a more 
effortful way of thinking, although pressure and individual visibility are at stake, which 
is to some extent similar to grades. However, it is worth noting an important 
difference: contrary to individual accountability, grades imply a type of evaluation that 
can be viewed as normative --that focuses on comparison of one!s work with that of 
others-- which in turn can sometimes be cognitively paralyzing (as it will be 
developed in a subsequent section dedicated to social comparison). Indeed, 
accountability only results in high effortful thinking under a specific combination of 
factors, which we will now investigate with the report of two studies. We note that we 
precisely selected studies conducted in the realm of controversial issues (i.e., where 
different point of views can arise on a same topic) because a controversial issues 
setting is more similar to the setting of a cooperative group work in which different 
point of views can confront one another, and where efficient cooperative group work 
necessitates from individuals to be able to thoroughly investigate the different point of 
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views, which in turn basically requires individuals to be able to take into account 
different (or alternative) perspectives to their own. 
 
Accountability, a socially pressuring factor 
 
As Lerner and Tetlock (1999) noted, individual accountability does not always 
result in positive effects on thinking. More particularly, individuals made accountable 
do not always cope with the pressure of being accountable in the same way. Some 
individuals use low-effort coping strategies, such as using conformity (i.e. when 
individuals made accountable simply decide to shift their point of view towards the 
point of view of the audience to whom they expect to have to justify their point of 
view; Tetlock, 1983a; Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger, 1989). Some use defensive 
bolstering (i.e. when individuals made accountable allocate most of their time and 
energy in terms of mental efforts to justifying their point of view). This defensive 
reaction occurs, for instance, when individuals are committed to the point of view to 
which they have been made accountable (Tetlock et al., 1989). Others use high-effort 
coping strategies, such as pre-emptive self-criticism (Tetlock 1983a): a 
multidimensional and flexible way of thinking, in comparison to a rigid and one-sided 
perspective way of thinking. Hence, it is precisely for this positive and cognitively 
enhancing effect that individual accountability is capable of producing, 
notwithstanding its pressure component, that we got interested in comparing it to 
grades. 
In the first experiment by Tetlock (1983a), the aim was to investigate whether 
accountability would lead accountable-individuals to more complex thinking when 
facing a controversial issue and having to account for their point of view to another 
person. The main result obtained is that accountability—compared with an 
anonymous, no-accountability condition—led individuals to more complex thinking, 
but only when the point of view of the other remained unknown to accountable-
individuals (in comparison to when the other!s point of view was known).  
In the second study by Tetlock et al. (1989), the aim of the authors was to test 
the hypotheses of the social contingency model of judgment and choice (Tetlock, 
1983a) that predicted the three different coping strategies that we have previously 
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cited (conformity, defensive bolstering, and, the only positive coping strategy on 
which we chose to focus, pre-emptive self-criticism). Their expectations, for 
participants made accountable, were that pre-emptive self-criticism would occur only 
when participants ignore the point of view of the person to whom they were made 
accountable and are unconstrained by past commitment. Defensive bolstering would 
occur when individuals are committed to the positions to which they are made 
accountable. Whereas conforming to the point of view of others would occur 
whenever participants know the others! point of view, and are unconstrained by past 
commitment. To our interest, being individually accountable engendered a positive 
type of coping strategy (i.e., pre-emptive self-criticism), only when accountable 
individuals did not commit to an attitudinal stand (i.e., asked to defend a point of 
view) and when the point of view of the other remained unknown. This may have 
happened because no normative social comparison could take place. In this case, 
accountable individuals were the only ones who tried to anticipate potential critics 
and objections from the persons to whom they were made accountable, engaging in 
a more complex and flexible way of thinking.15  
To sum up, these studies (Tetlock, 1983a; Tetlock, et al., 1989) suggest that 
individual accountability, manipulated by increasing the visibility of the point of view 
supported by a person, resulted in a socially pressuring situation (Lerner & Tetlock, 
1999) for individuals (leading to different coping strategies). Nevertheless, this 
socially pressuring situation was able to engender positive effects. Thus, in 
comparison to grades that also increase individual visibility, as well as normative 
social comparison, individual accountability provides another pressure-like evaluation 
concept where individual visibility is increased and yet can result in positive 
outcomes. 
 
One last important point. One should note that the concepts of accountability 
are various even though we already restrained the field of the literature in which we 
investigated it. A variation that we subsequently propose to outline and discuss in line 
                                                
15 In the other cases, individuals made accountable, either simply shifted their viewpoint toward the viewpoint 
of the person to whom they were accountable (when they did not commit to an attitudinal stand first), or engaged 
in self-justification (when they had committed to an attitudinal stand first)- “with thinking of as many reasons as 
they could for why they were right and potential critics were wrong” (p. 638). 
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with our experimental needs to show that in comparison to grades, all conditions that 
exhibit individual visibility are not necessarily deleterious. Precisely, we found that 
individual accountability in its widest definition is about being responsible for one!s 
share of work or outcome in a cooperative setting (D.W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 
1989; D.W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 2002). But we also found more accurate 
definitions of it, such as “the pressure to justify one!s causal interpretation to others” 
(Tetlock, 1985, p. 227), or similarly as “the social pressure to justify one!s views to 
someone else” (Green, Visser & Tetlock, 2000, p. 1380). And that it also exists under 
the form of group accountability; indeed some authors suggest that in order to 
increase responsibility among group members and to intensify cooperation, both 
individual and group accountability should be at stake (D.W Johnson, & R. Johnson, 
2005a; 2009a). However, our interest is to find situations where solely individual 
visibility is highlighted in order to compare it to a grading situation that also highlights 
individual visibility and to be able to draw inferences and conclusions based on this 
comparison.  
Therefore, a first choice was made to focus on the manipulation of an 
individual form of accountability. Hence, under its individual form, we retained the 
most accurate definition of accountability, that of being the pressure to justify one!s 
point of view to others, as under this form accountability would operate on an 
individual level in the same way where grades operate when they are expected 
individually. In this case, individual accountability leads to a pressuring situation and 
is generally experimentally manipulated by announcing that individuals will have to 
justify their viewpoint to another person and hence making the point of view of the 
accountable person visible and identifiable to that other person. Accordingly, a 
second choice was made to experimentally manipulate individual accountability 
through the scope of the demand made to participants to justify to another person 
which triggers that having to justify will mean that their point of view is visible to that 
person. In that sense, individual accountability enhances individual visibility in a 
pressure-like situation, nevertheless without necessarily hampering the outputs of 
individuals. Under those conditions, referring to individual accountability will allow us 
to get closer to our goal, which is to make sure and prove that all situations that 
accentuate individual visibility are not necessarily deleterious, in comparison to 
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situations where grades are expected and which should be the only ones where 
individual visibility is increased and results in deleterious outputs for cooperation. 
Therefore, it seems that increasing the visibility of one!s point of view (or one!s 
work) is not deleterious, including when the increase comes along with an evaluative 
pressure (i.e. as it is the case in the manipulation of individual accountability that we 
retained). But grades also elicit individuals! visibility. We thereafter develop the 
heuristic explanatory mechanism on which we rely to think that, it is however possible 
for grades to trigger deleterious effects. In the up-coming paragraph, we develop the 
idea that grades can potentially be expected to be deleterious for cooperation, not 
only because they enhance individuals! visibility but because, as they are normative 
comparative tools of work assessment (Brookhart, 2004), they have the capacity to 
activate normative comparison among individuals, which can be self-threatening. 
Next, we develop this idea and review social comparison literature in order to 
investigate when comparison with others can be deleterious (and when it is not), and 
when social comparison is threatening for the self (and when it is not). 
 
1.4 Social comparison and grades  
 
Moreover, browsing social comparison literature will enable to determine if 
grades, when viewed as norm-referenced assessment tools (Brookhart, 2004), could 
engender negative effects because they enhance a threatening type of social 
comparison between individuals who expect them. 
 
Social comparison theory: two major types of comparison 
According to social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), individuals have an 
inherent need (i.e. a drive) to evaluate their own opinions and abilities. In other 
words, they have a drive to obtain accurate self-evaluation. But in the absence of any 
available clear and objective indices against which to test and gauge their opinions or 
abilities, individuals usually compare them to those of others (i.e., interpersonal 
comparison). But to whom do individuals compare? Social comparison theory states 
that individuals compare to those who are close to them in their abilities, opinions, be 
they those who are slightly better than them, which means that they compare to a 
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target of comparison that is superior to them (called upward social comparison, 
Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988; for review, see also Collins, 2000), or those who are 
slightly worse than them (called downward social comparison, Wills, 1981). Yet, if 
there are two major types of social comparison available for individuals to engage 
into, which one is more beneficial to them?  
 
Self-enhancing downward social comparison. The use of downward 
comparison has been shown to enhance individuals! self-esteem. Evidence coming 
from research conducted in the field of health psychology has given support to the 
positive and beneficial effect of using downward social comparison, for instance in 
medical environments, where comparing to a worse-off patient has been shown to 
improve the subjective well-being of cancer patients, a way found to help them cope 
with their own state of health (Wood, Taylor, & Lichtman, 1985). 
  
Self-enhancing upward social comparison. Upward social comparison can be 
self-enhancing in the case, for instance, where comparison to a superior other is 
used as a way for individuals to find hope and inspiration (Wood, 1989). Two factors 
explain when it can be the case. The first factor to take into account is called “the 
processing mindset”. It refers to whether individuals who, comparing to a superior 
target, perceive more similarities than dissimilarities with the target (i.e. comparing to 
someone who is slightly better than us is more enhancing than comparing to 
someone who is way better than us; the first type of comparison leading to 
assimilation effects; the later leading to contrast effects, Morse & Gergen, 1970; 
Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2004a, b; Muller & Fayant, 2010). The second factor 
to also take into account is the goal that one pursues while achieving a task, which 
impacts the way individuals perceive the higher target of comparison. As Muller and 
Fayant (2010, p. 622) mention, “when looking to master the task (Harackiewicz, 
Barron, & Elliot, 1998), individuals no longer see others as a comparison other (as 
standards against which to compare) but as a source of information that could be 
useful to improve the task (Butler, 1992; Darnon, Muller, Schrager, Pannuzo, & 
Butera, 2006)”. Those two factors allow understanding when and why upward social 
comparison can be self-enhancing.  
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Deleterious effects of upward social comparison  
 
However, upward social comparison can also lead to negative outcomes, such 
as decreasing individuals! self-esteem (Morse & Gergen, 1970), triggering more 
envy, fear and jealousy on self-reported emotional variables (Tesser & Collins, 1988; 
Muller & Fayant, 2010). Comparison also induces more negative affects when the 
target has a similar level of performance (called lateral comparison, Kulik & Gump, 
1997; Muller & Fayant, 2010). A possible explanation regarding why upward 
comparison is sometimes deleterious for the performance of individuals, could be that 
this comparison triggers intrusive thoughts (called, ruminative thoughts; see Self-
Regulation theory, Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1990; Martin & Tesser, 1996; Muller & 
Butera, 2007) that interfere in task-achievement. Those thoughts are described as 
related to the ability of individuals to reach the level of the “higher” person with whom 
comparison is made, because intrusive thoughts are triggered whenever this ability is 
questioned. This later happens when individuals! progression towards that desired 
level is endangered (Brunstein & Golwitzer, 1996), or when individuals fail to reach 
given standards (Muller & Butera, 2007). The point is that those ruminative 
thoughts16 will interfere with task-achievement because they consume some of the 
individuals! attention, that same attention which otherwise would have been allocated 
to the task.  
 
  
1.5 A threat to competence concern beneath deleterious social comparison?  
 
In the following section, we put forward the concept of threat to competence as 
put forward in the Model representing the Dynamics of conflict, depending on 
perception of competence and threat to the self (Quiamzade, Mugny, & Butera, 
2013). Also, we will refer to the concept of self-evaluation threat as used by Muller 
and Butera (2007) and Buchs et al., (2010), in order to understand the mechanism 
behind a deleterious social comparison, and to be able to see whether grades could 
                                                
16 But ruminative thoughts can also be useful (see, Taylor & Schneider, 1989). 
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trigger the same social comparison mechanism between individuals who expect 
them. This will help us orient our expectations regarding their effects in a cooperative 
group setting. Nevertheless, we need to point out that threat, as a concept, will not be 
manipulated in the core experimental work of this thesis (although future work should 
investigate its role), but used as a heuristic explanatory concept. It seemed to us that 
threat to competence is of key importance to understand why and when a social 
comparison is or is not potentially deleterious, because it allows understanding 
whether the social comparison process elicited by the expectation of grades could be 
a particularly threatening one that affects cooperative group work. Indeed, in 
comparison to a group where grades would not be expected, expecting to receive 
grades could make salient among individuals of the group that a given standard of 
performance needs to be furthermore met during this group work. Thus, in the 
absence of information relative to the level of competence of the other group 
members regarding the task to achieve, others could become the new standards of 
performance against which a member of the group would be tempted to compare. In 
this context, this latter type of social comparison, as we will see subsequently with 
the studies of Muller and Butera (2007) and Buchs et al. (2010), could well lead to 
trigger a threatening and deleterious social comparison. On the whole, the context in 
which we wish to investigate the effect of grades has a complex structure that the 
concept of threat to competence helps understanding. 
 
Effects of social comparison in conflicting situations: the importance of 
competence or perceived competence in aptitude tasks 
 
Aptitude tasks are for example problem solving under uncertainty (e.g., Hidden 
profile tasks, Toma & Butera, 2009), or developmental tasks (e.g., The Cooperative 
Game, Doise & Mugny, 1981). Those tasks have particular inherent characteristics, 
which namely have to be perceived as such by individuals, in order to be categorized 
as aptitude tasks: they have one correct demonstrable answer, that yet does not 
appear as obvious from the early moments where individuals take the task in hand; 
along are others potential answers, that are however incorrect; finally, being able to 
solve an aptitude task (or not being able to) implies from a social point of view that 
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the individual has attained a given level of competence (or hasn!t got the right 
competences) to be able to solve it. Thus, taking into account the perspective of work 
on social comparison in conflicting situations, more precisely in aptitude tasks 
(Quiamzade, Mugny, & Butera, 2013), is of relevance to the present work because 
we think that the setting of our graded-cooperative group will be prone to threatening 
social comparison processes. Why?   
 
Firstly, we think that social comparison will be particularly salient because the 
expectation of grades will enhance comparability among individuals of the group. 
Secondly, as grades serve the social function of being diagnostic of the competence 
of individuals (i.e., used for rank-ordering individuals and signalling the most 
competent ones), we think that if individuals expect to be graded during a task-
achievement (even if the task does not fully respond to the definition of aptitude 
tasks) there is a probability for a competence threat to emerge. Moreover, it is 
important to note (although we will develop this later in a dedicated section) that 
cooperative group work is about both having to work in one same structure (the 
group), and being confronted with other persons who do not always share the same 
resources or information and/or points of view, and yet having to deal with those 
discrepancies for the sake of providing a more complete and rich group work. This 
view of cooperative group work, in terms of inter-individual confrontations, as well as 
aiming at reaching a better output, mirrors the definition of aptitude tasks.  
 
But first, in order to manage to take others! conflicting points of view into 
consideration, individuals have to be able or inclined to decentre from their own 
perspective to take in consideration other ones (i.e., perspective taking, a form of 
decentring effect by opposition to a focusing effect that is a more egocentric). It is 
therefore important to see how individuals can be affected in their necessity to 
decentre, when they process information coming from others and when the social 
comparison process is taking place in a situation where others hold conflicting points 
of view. Hence before going any further, let us see what precisely “perspective 
taking” is. 
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Perspective taking is a decentring process17 concerning information exchange 
that is “proved to stimulate individual change towards more accurate judgments” (in 
Butera & Buchs, 2005, p. 195) and that is beneficial for the learning processes and 
for cognitive development (D.W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 1995). Decentring is 
especially needed when one person faces another holding a contradicting point of 
view on a given task (i.e. social cognitive conflict); it is in this situation that the social 
cognitive conflict perspective (Doise & Mugny, 1984) has investigated decentring, 
and precisely, how different social comparison processes related to the competence 
of individuals (upward, downward, or lateral comparison) can affect the propensity of 
children to decentre (or to use decentring) during a problem- solving situation. They 
observed that children confronted with a source of influence are more entitled to 
decentre and abandon their egocentric mode of problem solving when the source of 
influence has a competence that is either equal to theirs (lateral social comparison) 
or lower (downward social comparison). Moreover, they stick to their egocentric 
mode of task resolution, and thus decentre less when the source of influence is of 
higher competence (upward social comparison) than themselves or when the 
differential of competence is not clearly established or signalled, which can be the 
case when individuals work with others for the first time without necessarily knowing 
their level of competence (Quiamzade, Mugny, & Butera, 2013).  
 
Specifically, in the domain of hypothesis testing, decentring is a chore 
mechanism to be studied as it can overcome focusing effects such as the 
confirmation bias (Buchs & Butera, 2005). Confirmation bias (Wason, 1960), namely 
the tendency for individuals to test their hypothesis by using confirmatory rather than 
disconfirmatory strategies (Gorman & Carlson, 1989), is a type of process that 
prevents individuals from taking in consideration alternative solutions. Thus, this bias 
                                                
17 Initially, decentring as well as egocentrism, were known to be key development mechanisms of the intellect, in 
the early stages of childhood, described by the Piagetian approach of human development (cf. Inhelder & Piaget, 
1958; Piaget, 1963; in Butera & Buchs, 2005). Egocentrism is a stage in early childhood where infants are 
centred on their own world and are, for instance, incapable of taking another person’s perspective (for a short 
introduction to the two concepts, see Butera & Buchs, 2005). As Butera and Buchs (2005) explain in the 
literature review of their chapter, beyond the developmental stage to which egocentrism and decentring are 
related, the two mechanisms can be found in adult life. They can be approached under the name of “Perspective 
Taking” (in the case of Decentring) or, under the name of “Focusing” (in the case of Egocentrism), which in 
adult life are prone to be affected by influences interplay. We will focus on taking the example of perspective 
taking (or decentring).  
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can be particularly problematic in cooperative group situations where the whole point 
of being in a group is precisely to consider the different resources and conflicting 
points of view held by the persons of the group because this confirmation bias was 
shown to be enhanced under competitive incentives (vs. cooperative incentives, 
Toma, Gilles, & Butera, 2011). In the context of conflicting situations under 
uncertainty (i.e. when solution to the task is highly unpredictable), such as the one 
described by Butera, Mugny, & Tomei (2000, Study 1) it is important to note that 
upward social comparison (i.e. when confronted to a highly competent source that 
can potentially threaten one!s competence) led individuals to use more confirmation 
and less disconfirmation than in control condition where no comment was made 
relative to the competence of the source. In other words, when faced with a highly 
competent source, individuals make use of the confirmation strategy, and thus focus 
more. On the other side when confronted with a novice source (i.e. a low-status 
source that does not threaten one!s own competence), more disconfirmation is 
observed than in the control condition; in other words when the competence of the 
individual is not at stake, individuals are more open to take other!s perspective and 
thus decentre. Interestingly, those studies have concluded that social comparison 
asymmetry between individuals is probably deleterious because it is perceived by 
individuals of lower competence as an infringement or a threat to their own 
competence. This later is precisely due to happen in aptitude tasks where individuals 
perceive that there is only one correct solution and where the solution to the task is 
diagnostic of the competence of the individual (i.e. information constraint). Whereas 
such social comparison asymmetry will not be necessarily problematic when it is not 
viewed as threatening (i.e. information dependence, see Quiamzade, Mugny & 
Butera, 2013, Chapter 6), it this situation upward social comparison can be inspiring. 
Back to focusing effects, an interpretation that the authors put forward to interpret 
why individuals defensively react by focusing more on their own point of view (or the 
validation of this point of view, also called confirmation bias; Wason, 1960; Frey, 
1986; Frey & Schulz-Hardt, 2001) and why they decentre less (Butera & Buchs, 
2005). As we will see next, threat can also come from evaluative situations (termed, 
self-evaluation threat; Muller & Butera, 2007) where individuals feel threatened even 
when they do not know what the performance level of those to whom they compare 
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is, and hence, that social comparison is not clearly established. As we will next see, 
even if only potentially at the individual!s disadvantage, social comparison may 
induce a feeling of threat in individuals. 
 
Threat manipulation through social comparison. Muller and Butera!s (2007) 
main hypothesis was that what is threatening in social comparison, whatever the type 
of standard provided for individuals to compare their performance to, whether 
interpersonal (Experiment 1), or normative (Experiment 2), is realizing that one!s 
score is below that standard of comparison. Moreover, that being in doubt regarding 
one!s own score should also be threatening for one!s self-evaluation (such as when 
participants are not given any information on the co-actor!s score). The argument 
behind that latter expectation is that, in absence of a standard against which to 
compare, individuals will be incapable of evaluating their own score, incapable of 
being reassured about what their score is worth, and thus incapable of fulfilling the 
individual basic need for an accurate self-evaluation (Festinger, 1954). In their 
experiments, the authors manipulated two independent variables. Firstly, the physical 
presence/absence of a co-actor, played by a confederate, while participants were 
achieving the task. Secondly, they manipulated self-evaluation threat through 
different types of social comparison: Upward vs. Downward vs. Without social 
comparison. In upward social comparison, participants got the feedback that their 
score was below a given standard. In downward social comparison, their score was 
above that standard. In absence of social comparison, participants were given no 
information. Interestingly, what differed between the two experiments is the nature of 
the standard of performance to which individuals were led to compare their scores to. 
Either, in Experiment 1, participants compared their score to the score of a 
confederate (i.e. an inter-personal standard of performance to compare to), or in 
Experiment 2, participants compared their score to the mid-point of a scale (i.e. a 
normative standard of performance to compare to). This difference is interesting to 
note because it allows investigating whether the types of comparison triggered by the 
use of one standard of performance or the other, leads to the same effects, or to 
different ones. Precisely, it allows investigating whether a social comparison is 
threatening, particularly when inter-personal comparison is at stake, or whether this 
 36 
can also be the case when comparison is made in relation to a standard that is 
normative.  
In both experiments, the authors expected a condition that is threatening to 
produce attentional focusing, which given the specificity of the dependent variable of 
the task was expected to produce lower conjunctive error rates18 (see Muller & 
Butera, 2007, p. 197-198). Thus, if a threat is perceived, a focusing effect should be 
observed. Results of Experiment 1 showed that both the Upward Social Comparison 
condition and the Mere Co-Action condition induced more attentional focusing in 
comparison to both the Downward Social Comparison condition and the Control 
condition. 
 
In Experiment 2 (comparison to the mid-point of a scale), the authors! main 
hypothesis was that if what is problematic in a social comparison is the threat it 
induces on an individuals! self-evaluation because it highlights that the score of 
individuals failed meeting a given standard, then a threat should appear whatever the 
nature of the standard, as long as it triggers in individuals the same threat: failing or 
the possibility of failing. Thus, a threat should occur including if it is not stemming 
from an interpersonal social comparison, such as when it stems from a normative 
type of social comparison (i.e., when comparison is made relative to attaining a 
normative standard of performance). Note that, although, the manipulation of the co-
actor!s physical presence was maintained, in experimental conditions where the co-
actor was present, individuals were not given any information on the co-actor!s score; 
thus individuals were only given information (or not given any, in the without social 
comparison conditions) on their scores regarding them attaining or not the normative 
middle scale standard of performance. 
 
In addition to Experiment 1, they observed two important things. First, that self-
evaluation threat occurred including when the comparison was made against a 
                                                
18 The conjunctive error rate is the error made by participants on conjunctive items (vs. non-conjunctive items) 
on a task allowing detection of the illusory conjunctive effect (Treisman, 1988) known to be a perceptual effect 
of attention allocation. In a task where participants are asked to detect the presence of a symbol “$”, several 
pictures are presented. Pictures either contain Conjunctive items, which are pictures containing separate 
characteristics, such as the “S” alone or the “!” of the symbol “$”. The error on those items would be to see the 
symbol $ when only its characteristics “S” or “!”are present (for more details, see Muller et al., 2004, p. 660). 
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normative standard of performance. Second, that even when participants were not 
given any information regarding the score of the co-actor and as long as the co-actor 
is present during task achievement, the co-actor will remain a source of comparison 
for participants, and hence a source of potential self-evaluation threat. Therefore, 
even when individuals knew that they scored higher than the normative standard of 
performance, a potential self-evaluation threat remained possible due to the mere 
presence of the co-actor whose score is unknown. Hence, the experimental condition 
where attentional focusing was the lowest, was the one where participants knew they 
had scored higher than the normative standard of performance and where no co-
actor was present to cast doubt on their own (potential) evaluation, and hence could 
not induce a self-evaluation threat.  
Taken together, the results from Muller and Butera (2007, Experiment 1, 
Experiment 2) are real add-up values to our main wish to investigate the effect(s) of 
using individual grading in the setting of a (cooperative) group work. Indeed, in a 
group setting, individuals do not necessarily know the performance level of other 
members, and yet, they have to work with them, while simultaneously expecting an 
individual grade. Hence, in this setting, others become a potentially threatening 
standard of performance against which one could compare (or, be compared to). We 
therefore think that it is possible that in a group setting, the mere expectation of 
grades raises the possibility that a potentially threatening self-evaluation could occur 
for individuals.  
 
Threat measurement in peer learning situations. In their research on peer 
learning, Buchs et al. (2010, Main Experiment) refer to threat to competence in terms 
of “evaluative pressure”(p. 427) 19  and have measured it with a self-reported 
questionnaire in a specific socio-cognitive conflict situation of cooperative peer 
learning in dyads. Hence, in the main experiment, Buchs et al. (2010), approached 
the concept of threat as the means by which individuals perceive confrontations and 
have the need to outperform others during their interaction. In a peer-learning 
                                                
19 It should be noted that if the evaluative pressure in relation with competence concerns is quite close to the 
explanation in terms of competence threat that was put forward in socio-cognitive research (Mugny et al. 2003), 
this measurement of threat is nevertheless a quite indirect measure (not a pure measure of perceived competence 
threat) that is part of a broader indicator of perceived competition.  
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context, authors tested how particular contextual cues (such as: information 
dependence) could affect the overall interactions that individuals had when set to 
work in dyads. The quality of these interactions was measured with variables such as 
perceived student interactions, perceived quality of the relationships, reported 
involvement in information transmission, reported information processing strategies, 
perceived degree of confrontation, and perceived competition and other learning 
outcomes.  
Participants were given material to be studied during the experiment, and in 
each dyad roles were distributed and counter-balanced. Participants were either 
asked to play the role of summarizer (i.e., having to read and summarize a text in 
order to later explain it to the listener) or to endorse the role of listener (i.e., having to 
listen to the summarizer, asking questions, spotting errors or inconsistencies in their 
transmission of information). For this work, participants were either provided with 
identical information vs. complementary information; and were either allowed to use 
discussion aids (i.e., individuals asked to take notes) or not (i.e., individuals not 
allowed to use any material for back up; for more details on the procedure, see 
Buchs et al., 2010, p. 425). What is interesting for us is that results obtained showed 
that when individuals worked on identical information (with discussion aids), they 
perceived greater confrontations (in comparison to when they worked without 
discussion aids) during interactions, confrontation to which they have reacted by 
trying to outperform others. Thus, Buchs et al. (2010) results allow to understand the 
role that a threat to competence can play in undermining learning and interactions in 
a context of peer-dyad learning when precisely individuals of the dyad are given 
similar information to work and interact on.  
  
Taken together, the results obtained by Muller and Butera (2007) and Buchs et 
al. (2010) show that a social comparison is threatening whenever individuals have 
the opportunity to realize that their competence was (or could be) lower than any 
other standards of performance to which they compare (Muller & Butera, 2007). 
Regarding our graded cooperative group situation where individuals are set to work 
on one same problem to solve, grades could enhance among group members a 
deleterious social comparison. This could happen because in this situation, 
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individuals expecting to be graded find themselves facing the possibility that they 
could be outperformed by others, which has been found to result in a threatening 
social comparison. For the time being, we now suggest to turn and to delimit the 
cooperative group settings in which we think it could be particularly interesting to 
investigate the effect of grades in order to capture strong indicators of cooperation. 
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CHAPTER 2.  
GROUPS AND ASSESSMENT 
 
 
 
2.1 Groups, masters in decision-making and information sharing: an illusion? 
 
The tendency that people have to refer to groups when it comes to taking 
decisions or solving problems, as opposed to when individuals work alone, comes 
from the fact that groups are viewed as potential soils allowing to obtain better 
decision-quality because of all the potential diverse resources and pieces of 
information that lies among group members (Hill, 1982; Kerr & Tindale, 2004; 
Laughlin, Hatch, Silver & Boh, 2006). Furthermore, because individuals set to work in 
groups are expected to cooperate when making decisions (Wittenbaum, 
Hollingshead, & Botero, 2004) and thus are expected to take advantage of the 
underlying diversity of resources that individuals have. Hence, group work would 
allow reaching products of better quality that individuals alone wouldn!t have been 
capable of reaching (Winquist & Larson, 1998). One explanation for this strength 
(Hill, 1982), or this “potential” strength (because it yet is to be exploited) is the 
heterogeneity and thus the richness of individuals! preferences that could be found in 
one single group, but also the diverse resources that are held by individuals prior to 
entering the group, and from which work achieved in group could benefit. Hence, if 
this heterogeneity is well shared and used, it will allow to stimulate divergent thinking 
during group work, and to bring into light scattered resources that individuals of the 
group do not equally possess (Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, Frey & Schulz-
Hardt, 2002; Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch, Kerschreiter & Frey, 2006).  
 
Yet, whereas past researches that praise the benefits of group-work have 
relied on the assumption that individuals in groups cooperate, it is only recently that 
literature on group work has started doubting the inherent cooperative soul of 
individuals who find themselves working in a group structure. Thus, the present 
thesis work subscribes to the research trend that puts into perspective the 
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assumption that individuals working in groups necessarily cooperate, adopt 
cooperative intentions and behaviours, by trying to understand whether grades could 
be a factor that reduces cooperation among members set to work in groups.. 
 
Alas, groups are not always up to the expectation of being fully balanced and 
well-informed decision makers (Stasser & Titus, 1985; Stasser & Titus, 2003), and 
social psychology has long been a discipline that investigates conditions under which 
group decisions are impaired (Gigone & Hastie, 1997; Stasser & Titus, 1985; 1987; 
Wittenbaum, 2000). Two factors have been found to play a role in impairing group 
work, and which would therefore be of importance to take into consideration when 
addressing the question of grades! effect on cooperative group work.  
The first factor is the reluctance that individuals have to positively evaluate 
information coming from others (Butera & Mugny, 1995; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; 
Edwards & Smith, 1996; Fischer, Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2008; Jonas et al., 2001; 
Koehler, 1993; Kunda, 1990; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Ross & Lepper, 1980; 
Schulz-Hardt et al., 2000). Researchers have questioned whether this reluctance that 
occurs at the level of information evaluation is due to a cognitive bias (Greitmeyer & 
Schulz-Hardt, 2003) or a more deliberate and oriented strategic behaviour (Kunda, 
1990; Toma et al., 2011).  
The second factor is the reluctance that individuals have to exchange and put 
in common the different and scattered information they have. Researchers have 
wondered whether this reluctance that occurs at the level of information exchange 
results from a group phenomenon reaction (i.e. where information that is not equally 
possessed by all group members can be a threat for group consensus, Janis, 1982; 
and therefore neglected during group information exchanges) or more recently, 
whether it could be a strategically oriented and motivated behaviour (Toma & Butera, 
2009). Thus we wonder whether grades could be part of the situational factors that 
affect group work. We will develop more those two factors in Chapter 3 of this 
introduction (sections 3.1, 3.2), along with the paradigms that have been used to 
study them, and the appropriate experimental materials to use in order to investigate 
how those factors might fluctuate depending on contextual variations. 
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2.2 Using Social Interdependence to give cooperative impulses to group work 
 
In the early roots of Social Interdependence theory, groups are viewed as 
“dynamic wholes in which the interdependence among members (can) vary” (Koffka, 
1935; Deutsch, 1968; Deutsch & Krauss, 1965; D.W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 2009a, 
p. 366). The basic assumption on which this theory relies is that “the structure of the 
goals of the people in the situation determines how participants interact and the 
interaction patterns determine the outcomes of the situation (Deutsch, 1949a, 1962; 
Johnson, 1970; D.W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 1989)”, in D.W. Johnson and R. 
Johnson, (2005a p. 292). Moreover, the way goals are structured will affect the type 
of interaction among individuals, and the latter, will in turn affect the outcomes of the 
group. Accordingly, Morton Deutsch (1949a; 1962) distinguished two types of social 
interdependence: (1) positive social interdependence among individuals, which 
occurs when individuals are positively linked to one another in the attainment of their 
goal (i.e., individuals cannot attain their goal unless others attain it as well) and which 
is the basis of cooperation among individuals; the reverse is (2) negative social 
interdependence, which occurs when individuals are negatively linked to one another 
in their goal attainment (i.e., if individuals attains their goal, others will not attain it) 
and is for instance descriptive of a situation of competition.  
Thus, positive social interdependence is known to result in overall increased 
achievement and productivity (cf. Hagman & Hayes, 1986; Jensen, 1996; Jensen, 
Johnson, & Johnson, 2002; Matsui, Kakuyama, & Onglatco, 1987; Scott & 
Cherrington, 1974; Slavin & Tanner, 1979; Wodarski, Hamblin, Buckholdt, & Ferritor, 
1973; D.W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 2009a), and to engender promotive actions (i.e., 
actions undertook by individuals that increase the likelihood of each other!s success 
in achieving the joint goal), such as mutual help and assistance, exchange of needed 
resources, effective communication, and constructive management conflict (Deutsch, 
1949a; D.W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 2005a). 
 
Yet, if this positive interdependence links individuals in a positive and 
complementary manner regarding their goal attainment, it is not sufficient to build an 
efficient cooperation among individuals. Indeed, cooperation establishment requires 
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structuring other elements that are at stake in inter-individual interactions (D.W. 
Johnson & R. Johnson, 2005a), such as resources, rewards and task-
interdependence among individuals. These elements are included in two broader 
types of interdependence: The first type refers to outcome interdependence which 
comprises both the way individuals are tight together in the pursuit of their goal (as 
previously exposed), and the way the reward system is elaborated to consolidate 
individuals! goal achievement (positive vs. negative reward interdependence). The 
second type refers to means interdependence, which comprises (at least) the way 
resources are structured among individuals of the group (e.g., positive resource 
interdependence is when individuals have complementary information that they need 
to share to achieve a given task), and to task-interdependence (e.g., positive task-
interdependence is when the task requires for its achievement complementary 
actions from individuals in order to be achieved). 
 
Yet, if it is understood that group work can be structured cooperatively, all 
authors do not converge on the exact factors that are needed in order to have this 
cooperation efficiently established (Buchs, Butera, & Mugny, 2004; Buchs, Gilles, 
Dutrevis, & Butera, 2011). However, we can note a general agreement on the 
importance of establishing a positive social interdependence among individuals of the 
group (Deutsch, 1949; D.W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 2009a). The latter is done by 
structuring group work, first, through positive resource interdependence among 
individuals of the group, permitted by dividing resources among individuals of the 
group and making sure their resources are complementary; in this case, individuals 
would be dependent on one another!s resources to achieve the work. Second, by 
establishing a positive goal interdependence, and by setting individuals with one 
common goal to achieve (e.g., solving a reasoning task or successfully achieving a 
coordination task). Third, by structuring group work through task-interdependence: 
where the task itself offers a positive resource and goal interdependence. Hence, 
those factors allow raising a basic cooperative group structure (other factors are still 
questioned and investigated, mainly in the field of cooperative learning20).  
                                                
20 For instance, whether positive reward interdependence is also needed (cf. Buchs, Gilles, Dutrevis & Butera, 
2011, p.136-137; Buchs, Butera & Mugny, 2004). Recent developments in the field of cooperative learning have 
added to the basic cooperative structure, the importance of raising individual but also group accountability 
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Thus, if this positive social interdependence (of resources and goal to achieve) 
among the individuals of a group is what makes their strength in terms of group 
cooperation, it could well be that it also turns out to be their weakness, in certain 
circumstances. Indeed, when individuals are strongly made positively interdependent 
to achieve a task, the work cannot be achieved and the same goal attained unless all 
individuals contribute to it (e.g. giving and sharing their own resources), this 
interdependence is furthermore reinforced when the task itself requires the 
intervention of all the members to be successfully achieved. Likewise, being 
positively interdependent in such a case also means, that if only one individual does 
not cooperate (whatever the motive for not cooperating), then group cooperation fails 
and the whole advantage of group work under such cooperative impulse fails with it 
too.  
Thus, if we hold that grades will be responsible for cooperation failure in 
groups! settings, there are tasks that could allow us to observe it on variables of 
different natures, which all account for cooperative behaviours: whether at group 
information sharing level and individual cognitive level (hidden profile tasks, Stasser 
& Titus, 1985), or at interactive coordination group level (Doise & Mugny, 1997). 
Those tasks that we will shortly present (Chapter 3) all have one thing in common: 
they have basic cooperative structures that provide precisely a cooperative group 
context for individuals to merge in, thus allowing to observe cooperation, but also--if 
this structure is impaired--a lessened cooperation.  
But what are the benefits that one could expect to stem from establishing 
cooperation among individuals of a group? As we will develop hereunder, research 
has shown that cooperation (in comparison to competitive or individualistic group 
functioning; D.W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 1989, D.W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 2005a) 
leads to various benefits and better outcomes, in terms of task processing, task-
achievement, as well as in terms of the quality of inter-individual relationships. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
(Johnson & Johnson, 2005a; Tetlock, 1985). That is, by assessing the performance of each member and giving 
them back individual and group results “to compare against a standard of performance” (D. W. Johnson & R. 
Johnson’s, 2009a, p.368) in order to increase responsibility forces between group members. 
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2.3 Cooperation vs. competition: the benefits of cooperation 
 
Benefits of cooperation at level of task processing and of inter-individual 
relationships 
 
At task-processing level, cooperation leads individuals to engage in more 
effortful reasoning and critical cognitive thinking, to persist in efforts even when 
individuals are facing difficult tasks, and to have overall positive attitudes regarding 
task-accomplishment (D.W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 2002; D.W. Johnson & R. 
Johnson, 2009a). Furthermore, in studies investigating group information processing, 
cooperation (in comparison to competition) has been found to increase the exchange 
of the overall amount of information related to task-achievement among individuals, 
particularly to increase the exchange of information that is crucial for group-task 
achievement (Toma & Butera, 2009, experiment 1, 2); and to reduce confirmation 
bias (Toma et al., 2011, Study1).  
 
On inter-individual relations, cooperation is known to enhance more liking and 
positive relations among the interactants, which in turn increases group 
cohesiveness and individuals! efforts to achieve their goals (D.W. Johnson & R. 
Johnson, 2006 in Johnson & Johnson, 2005a). Cooperation is also known to favour 
social support among individuals, whether support regarding task-oriented needs or 
personal needs. Such a social support has in turn been found to lead to greater 
achievement and productivity (D.W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 2005a). Hence, it is 
noteworthy that the beneficial effects of cooperation found on inter-individual relations 
are also found to affect individuals! attitudes and behaviours oriented towards task-
achievement. This highlights an interesting aspect of groups to take into 
consideration when looking to study and to make observations on groups. Given that 
groups function at two different levels (Oberlé & Drozda-Senkowska, 2006), obtaining 
complete observations of what happens in a group would require to take those two 
levels of group functioning in consideration: on the one side, the level which 
comprises all behaviours and attitudes that group members put towards task 
achievement, and on the other side, the level which comprises emotions, the quality 
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of relations among group members, or to put in broader terms, the relational aspect 
of groups.  
To sum up, we have seen so far that individuals working in groups do not 
necessarily and spontaneously cooperate, and that it is important to encourage 
cooperative behaviour among group members given the benefits of cooperation. 
Does the latter mean, that when given all conditions to cooperate, members of the 
group will necessarily and ineluctably cooperate? To answer that question, we unfold 
in the next sub-section what literature has labelled, the case of mixed-motives 
situations. 
 
2.4 When cooperation is hybrid: the case of mixed-motives situations 
 
The assumption that individuals set to work in groups will automatically 
cooperate and adopt cooperative behaviours with other group members has recently 
been reconsidered in social psychology literature on decision-making (De Dreu et al., 
2008; Toma & Butera, 2009). This assumption has been in part reconsidered 
because researchers have highlighted the possibility, that although being given a 
common goal to work towards and being asked to cooperate, individuals join group 
work with their own motives, which can be in contradiction with the cooperative 
stream given to group work (De Dreu et al., 2008), resulting in a mixed-motives 
situation (Davis, Laughlin, & Komorita, 1976; Drolet & Moris, 2000). Those mixed-
motives could be particularly dilemmatic for individuals when they are in contradiction 
with one another and request from the individuals to balance whether to cooperate or 
to follow one!s own personal motive.  
Indeed, if Deutsch!s (1949) theory of social interdependence is based on the 
assumption that individuals pursue one goal at a time (either cooperative, 
competitive, or individualistic), the boundaries between a cooperative and a 
competitive situation in everyday life are not always that clear. Indeed individuals will 
more often find themselves facing situations that result in a mixture between 
cooperative and competitive or individualistic demands than a purely cooperative or 
competitive demands (Kelley & Thibaut, 1969; Davis, Laughlin, & Komorita, 1976). 
Thus, according to De Dreu et al. (2008, p. 32) “the vast majority of group work on 
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decision making has not taken into account the fact that competitive incentives are 
also present (in cooperative group situations) (Stasson, Kameda, & Davis, 1997; 
Wittenbaum, Hollingshead, & Botero, 2004)”. An example of such mixed-motives 
situation would be, for instance, a situation where individuals are set to cooperate in 
groups with other group members in order to achieve a joint outcome (common 
cooperative goal) while simultaneously holding another personal motive at an 
individual level (individual competitive goal such as wanting to impress the boss by 
being better than others during group work) and therefore behaving accordingly in 
order to be the one who takes credit for the group!s successful outcome. Hence, we 
wondered whether the complex cooperative-graded group situation that we wish to 
presently investigate through the experimental work of this thesis could be a mixed-
motives situation, and how the model proposed by De Dreu et al. (2008) could help 
us make previsions for our hypotheses. In the next sub-section, we will present how 
mixed-motives are viewed in this model, and how it can help us to understand our 
complex cooperative-graded group situation. 
 
Groups as motivated processors of information: a presentation of the MIP-G 
model  
Recently, De Dreu et al. (2008) have raised the question of mixed-motives 
situations in groups, naming them “mixed-motive interdependence” (p. 31) in the 
development of their model of Motivated Information Processing-Groups (see Figure 
1). In their paper, authors extend the view of groups as being motivated and strategic 
information processors (Wittenbaum et al., 2004) and not only as being mere 
information processors (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997). To our interest, authors 
explain that individuals facing a mixed-motives group situation will choose to 
emphasize one motive (i.e. to cooperate) or the other (i.e. to compete) according to 
their individual tendency to be a rather pro-self motivated person or to be pro-socially 
motivated (see below for more details), which in turn will differently affect social 
judgment and decision making processes, both at individual and group level.  
 
Hence, in their model, they distinguish between two global types of motivation. 
On one hand, epistemic motivation, which concerns broadly the motivation to 
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thoroughly achieve a task and which, when highly triggered results in a deep and 
systematic processing of available information. On the other hand, the inner social 
motivations of individuals, which they define as being: “the individual!s preferences 
for a particular outcome distribution between self and others” (p.32 in De Dreu et al., 
2008) and which they split into pro-self or pro-social motivations. Pro-self motivation 
comprises the motivation of individuals to follow competitive and purely individualistic 
goals, and pro-social motivation comprises the motivation of individuals to follow 
cooperative and altruistic goals. Hence, a pro-self motivated individual would want to 
maximize his/her own outcome whether (or not) at the expense of others; which 
transposed to a group situation, would mean at the expense of other group members. 
A pro-socially motivated individual would have at heart to obtain an outcome that is 
even for all, making sure that in a decision-making moment, the decision would have 
taken into account all the individuals! point of views. Hence, according to the authors 
a pro-self motivated individual would view decision-making group processes as “a 
competitive game in which power and personal success are key”, whereas a pro-
socially motivated individual view it as “a collaborative game, in which fairness, 
harmony, and joint welfare are key” (De Dreu et al., 2008, p. 32).  
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Figure 1. Overview of the motivated information processing in groups (MIP-G) 
model (taken from De Dreu et al., 2008, p. 25) 
 
Thus, depending on which motivation is triggered at individual level, the MIP-G 
model posits that individuals will tend to react to the mixed-motives situation by being 
either cooperative (when pro-social motivation is triggered) or competitive (when pro-
self motivation is triggered), which will affect decision making-related processes both 
at individual and group level. This should lead to the same results as the effects 
provoked by inducing cooperation versus competition, whether at individual or group 
level. 
Overall, regarding information processing, pro-self motivated (in comparison to 
pro-social motivated) individuals should be more concerned with:  
a) The advocacy bias, which is the tendency that individuals have to defend 
their own point of view and thus to prefer information that supports their point of view 
(Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Luthgens, & Moscovici, 2000; Stasser & Titus, 1985). This 
!"#$%&'(&)*('+,-.'*&
/+'0"112*3&
42-1&2*&)*('+,-.'*&
/+'0"112*3&
5'02-6&7'.8-.'*&
9/+'1"6(&81:&/+'1'02-6;&
<#21$",20&7'.8-.'*&
9='>&81:&?23%;&
)*('+,-.'*&
!211",2*-.'*&-*@&
)*$"3+-.'*&
AB-62$C&'(&D+'B#&
EB@3,"*$&-*@&
!"0212'*&
7",F"+&)*#B$&
)*@21#"*1-F262$C&
!"0212'*&G+3"*0C&
!"#$%&'()(*&+,-.).-$/*&'()(*&
H&
 51 
tendency in turn will affect the information that individuals will process. For example, 
pro-self oriented individuals looking to defend their point of view so the group can 
choose it will tend to share more the positive than the negative features with others 
regarding their favourite alternative, whereas they will tend to share more the 
negative than the positive features of alternatives supported by other group 
members.  
b) Information misrepresentation especially when individuals tend to maximize 
personal gains instead of joint outcomes (O!Connor & Carnevale, 1997; Steinel & De 
Dreu, 2004) whereas pro-socially motivated individuals should be more inclined to 
pass on accurate information (Toma & Butera, 2009).  
c) Developing a stronger ownership bias (i.e. the individual tendency to quickly 
develop ownership of ideas, for instance, because having spent a lot time/energy on 
their development, Abelson, 1986). This ownership bias has been corroborated by 
Toma, Bry, and Butera, (2013), who indeed have primarily shown that giving a 
competitive goal for individuals led them to stronger ownership bias than when giving 
them a cooperative goal.  
According to our aim of investigating the effects of grades in such a 
cooperative group setting, we wonder whether we could provide experimental 
evidence to, and thus hold true the assumption that grades could input a motivation 
at individual level that will be in contradiction with the cooperative demands of the 
task, and therefore impair cooperative group work. Before turning to the presentation 
of the experimental tasks and paradigms that could offer good conditions to observe 
cooperation, we suggest discussing hereunder the link between socio-cognitive and 
mixed-motive conflicts. 
 
2.5 Discussing the link between socio-cognitive and mixed-motive conflicts 
 
In the present subsection, we suggest to investigate the link between the 
paradoxical context of mixed-motives (e.g. the graded-cooperative situation), where 
two conflicting motives could be expected to trigger, and the reaction at individual 
level to this context in terms of decentring. In other words, we offer to try analysing 
the link between socio-cognitive conflict and mixed-motive conflict.  
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On the one hand, socio-cognitive conflict typically stems from situations where 
two or more persons, working together on a same problem to solve, realise that they 
do not have the same point of view over the given issue or over the way to handle its 
resolution (Doise & Mugny, 1997). Initially, and historically speaking, socio-cognitive 
conflict has been studied with a developmental-constructivist perspective (Piaget, 
1975), where the conflict is investigated with a focus on the individual level even if it 
is clear that conflict can only occur and be solved “in relation to the other”. The other 
(his view point or his answer) is the triggering factor of the conflict but also the 
triggering factor allowing the conflict resolution. In this setting, different individual 
motivations (e.g. pursuing performance goals, as it is the case when pure competition 
motivation is at stake vs. pursuing mastery goals, as it is the case when pure 
cooperation motivation it at stake) can lead individuals to focus on different elements 
of the socio-cognitive conflict. For example, Darnon et al., (2006) show that pursuing 
performance goals will mainly lead individuals to focus on the comparison of the 
different competence levels of the individuals involved in the socio-cognitive conflict, 
leading to a relational regulation of the conflict which itself has a limited efficiency as 
it is built on the affirmation of self-competence. Whereas, pursuing mastery goals will 
mainly lead individuals to focus on the comparison of the different alternative 
answers, leading to an epistemic regulation of the conflict and an integration of 
others! perspective.  
On the other hand, the term mixed-motive conflict (De Dreu et al., 2008) refers 
to a mixed-motive group situation where individuals have to deal simultaneously with 
cooperative demands and the incentive of doing well personally. Initially, mixed-
motive situations were studied to show that group work does not only rime with 
cooperation, and that in a group work setting, individuals can be sharing different, 
competitive or individualistic motives. Thus, technically speaking, it is important to 
keep in mind that the term mixed-motive situation was used to refer to the mixed-
motive structure stemming from group tasks and to outline that those latter are not 
necessarily cooperative (Davis, Laughlin, & Komorita, 1976). Thus the focus is 
primary on cooperative group-structured situations and on the study of the possible 
declinations of such non-pure cooperative group-structured situations and their 
effects. 
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To make it clear, although the two terms seem to be similar, they definitely 
refer to two distinct concepts. In other words, in comparison to the socio-cognitive 
conflict, mixed-motive conflict is less focused on studying the conflict at an individual 
(socio-cognitive) level, and is rather interested in studying the more general picture 
where individual and group levels intersect. Thus, notwithstanding this difference of 
level of analysis, is it possible to consider that one type of conflict (e.g., mixed-motive 
conflict) can affect the way the other conflict (e.g., socio-cognitive conflict) will be 
resolved? Precisely, is it possible to imagine that, from an individual perspective, 
individuals who find themselves in a mixed-motive situation (as compared to a purely 
cooperative situation), thus facing a mixed-motive conflict, and simultaneously finding 
themselves facing a socio-cognitive conflict, could be led to solve this socio-cognitive 
conflict differently than if they were only in a cooperative situation? Put differently, if 
as previously mentioned, a way for the individual to solve a socio-cognitive conflict is 
to decentre from one!s own view point to fully consider and grasp another!s point of 
view and take in consideration the arguments that sustain it (Butera & Mugny, 2001; 
Kruglanski, Thompson, & Spiegel, 1999), one can wonder to which extent this 
decentring could be made when the individual is animated by mixed-motives by 
comparison to a purely cooperatively and motivated-structured situation. Thus, from a 
broader point of view, this is what we suggest to investigate when we wonder 
whether grades expected in a cooperative setting could affect the preference effect, 
which is a measure of individual focusing. 
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CHAPTER 3.  
THE PRESENT WORK: PARADIGMS AND TASKS USED TO EXPERIMENTALLY 
OBSERVE COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOURS 
 
 
 
With the purpose of studying the effects of grades on group cooperation, we 
subsequently present three experimental paradigms allowing the investigation of 
cooperation: the Hidden Profile paradigm (used in Chapters 4 and 5), and the 
Cooperative Game (used in Chapter 6).   
 
3.1 Making use of Hidden Profile tasks to observe inter-individual cooperation 
in group information exchange  
  
A hidden profile task can be defined as a “two- or multiple-alternative group 
discussion task(s) that contain(s) a correct or best alternative and in which the 
information about these alternatives is distributed among the group members such 
that no group members can detect the best alternative on the basis of his or her 
individual information set alone (cf. Stasser, 1992; Winquist & Larson, 1998)”, in 
Greitmeyer and Schulz-Hardt (2003; p. 322). Overall, a typical hidden profile task 
takes place in two phases and concerns a decision-making problem to be solved 
(choosing among different alternatives: the best candidate for a university position, 
Stasser & Titus, 1985; Cruz, Henningsen, & Williams, 2000; the most appropriate 
medical diagnostic, Larson et al., 1996; or the person responsible for a crime, 
Stasser & Stewart, 1992; Stewart, Billings, & Stasser, 1998). Thus different 
alternatives are possible but only one is correct.  
In its typical form, a hidden profile task is composed by two phases. During a 
first phase, where participants are set to work individually on the problem, they are 
provided with a subset of information to decide which alternative to choose for the 
problem. Each individual sub-set of information contains information equally 
distributed to all, hence all individuals have the same information (called, shared or 
common information), and information unequally distributed to all, hence each 
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individual has information that others do not have (called, unshared or unique 
information). Thus, at this individual stage, each subset of information leads 
individuals to choose a sub-optimal alternative.  
During a second phase, participants are asked to leave their subset 
information sheet and to merge with others into a group to work on the decision-
making problem. They learn that they did not have all the same information regarding 
the problem to solve; they are therefore asked to discuss the case again in groups 
and jointly agree on the best alternative to choose.  
What is typical of a hidden profile, and which gives its name to the task, is that 
it is only if individuals manage to cooperate and bring into group discussion the 
different unshared information previously received that they will be able to uncover 
the profile that had been hidden from them from the start, because all unshared 
information pointing to it was scattered among the different individuals. Thus, 
combining the unshared information together will point to the optimal alternative; and 
on the reverse, not taking the unshared information into account will ineluctably lead 
to a biased group decision. 
Hidden profile tasks were first used by Stasser and Titus (1985) to investigate 
group information processes, and typically represent a situation whereby groups can 
lead to taking better decisions than individuals would have taken alone, but only if 
group members manage to take advantage of group discussion, to cooperate and to 
use the various unshared information that each holds (Winquist & Larson, 1998). 
Indeed, Stasser and Titus! (1985) argument was based on the theory of persuasive 
arguments (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977), thanks to which they claimed that new 
information brought in group discussion (in comparison to already known information) 
should be spotted and used by the overall group because the novel characteristic of 
a piece of information makes it more persuasive than already known information. As 
previously mentioned, the major result obtained by these authors is that groups 
mentioned significantly more shared than unshared information, which given the task 
characteristics systematically ended in groups making the wrong decision.  
 
Why did that occur? We now unfold three explanations (at the level of group 
interactions) that have been advanced by researchers to account for groups! failure 
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to pull unshared information and to uncover hidden profile tasks (for more detailed 
explanations, cf. thesis work of Vasiljevic, 2010). According to the CIS model 
(Collective Information Sampling model) set forth by Stasser and Titus (1987), if 
unshared information is less exchanged during group discussion, it is because 
unshared information is held by a fewer number of persons than shared information. 
Thus, the higher the number of members who hold a certain piece of information 
previous to group discussion, the higher the probability for this information to be 
mentioned by the group during discussion. Other researchers, Schittekate and Van 
Hiel (1996), have tested another explanation, in terms of one type of information 
being perceived by group members as more reliable than the other. According to 
them, if shared information is more exchanged than unshared information during 
group discussions, it is because hearing several members mentioning the same 
information (i.e. shared information) makes this information look more reliable than 
others (and also more understandable, Larson & Harmon, 2007). Being mentioned 
several times by different members gives this information a social validity. On the 
contrary, unshared information, because fewer members mention it, cannot be 
socially validated nor can it be presumed to be reliable on this basis; this is why 
groups are reluctant to mention it during discussion (Parks & Cowlin, 1996). Lately, 
Toma and colleagues (Toma, 2007; Toma & Butera, 2009; Toma, Vasiljevic, Oberlé, 
& Butera, 2012) have investigated whether this defective information sharing during 
group discussions can be caused by motivational factors, such as setting members 
to work under cooperative or competitive instructions, and they have shown that the 
under-exploitation of unshared information can be a strategic behaviour given that 
information sharing during group discussions differs whether set in a cooperative or 
competitive setting. Thus, we will now present the task they have used, along with its 
special features that give the task its characteristic of allowing observation of 
information sharing during group discussions as a strategic behaviour. Hence, it is for 
this characteristic that we wished to use their task. 
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The road accident investigation case (Toma & Butera, 2009): a hidden profile 
task to test motivated information sharing in groups 
 
Regarding information exchange in groups, Toma and Butera (2009) posit, 
that it is possible that the unwillingness of groups to take unshared information in 
consideration during group discussions when solving hidden profile tasks, depends 
on whether group members pursue a competitive goal (i.e. set by negative goal 
interdependence) or cooperative goal (i.e., set by positive goal interdependence) 
through the achievement of the task. Precisely, they put forward the general 
hypothesis that competition (in comparison to cooperation) will lead individuals to 
strategically share information during group discussions, which will lead group 
members to withhold unshared information intentionally. In order to test this 
motivated and strategic aspect of information sharing in groups, they built and 
pretested for that occasion a hidden profile task inspired from Stasser and Stewart 
(1992) with supplementary special features (see Figure 2 below). 
 
 
Figure 2. Information distribution and initial preferences in the “hidden profile” 
paradigm (taken from Toma et al., 2012, p. 678) 
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Figure 2. La distribution de l’information et les préférences initiales dans le
paradigme « profil caché » (selon Toma & Butera, 2009)
d’informations sur la décision2. Elle consistait à discuter en groupe à partir
des informations que chaque membre avait reçues, pour trouver parmi
2Premièrement, la tâche était transparente afin de permettre aux membres du groupe d’identifier avec exactitude
les informations uniques et les informations communes. Une étude pilote avait montré qu’en indiquant aux
participants l’emplacement de deux types d’informations, ils étaient capables d’identifier avec précision quelles
étaient les informations communes et quelles étaient les informations uniques. De plus, une autre étude pilote
avait montré la capacité des participants à identifier la supériorité de valeur informationnelle de l’information
unique comparée à celle de l’information commune pour résoudre la tâche. Comme la tâche permettait aux
participants d’identifier l’emplacement et la valeur des informations, logiquement elle devait faciliter le partage
de l’information critique pour la découverte du profil caché.
Deuxièmement, les informations uniques qui orientaient chaque participant vers des préférences
sous-optimales, permettaient – si elles étaient partagées – l’infirmation de ces préférences initiales erronées. Par
exemple l’information unique « la personne responsable est un homme » orientait celui qui la détenait vers le
suspect « Monsieur X » mais infirmait la préférence initiale d’un autre membre qui par sa propre information
unique avait été orientée sur « Madame Y ». Trois études pilotes avaient mis en évidence qu’il était possible
d’orienter les trois membres du groupe vers trois solutions différentes, alors qu’une quatrième étude pilote avait
montré que par la prise en compte des informations uniques, il était possible de prendre la bonne décision.
L’année psychologique/Topics in Cognitive Psychology, 2012, 112, 665-695
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This hidden-profile task is to be “played” by groups of three participants and, 
similarly to classical hidden profiles, is divided in two phases: the individual pre-
decisional phase and the group discussion phase. The cover story is about a road 
accident case, with 4 persons or suspects involved (Madame Y, Mister Z, Mister X 
and his son). In order to discriminate between them, the subset of information given 
to each member included each 3 unshared items of information that were critical in 
allowing identification of a suspect by directing each member to a different suspect 
(either Madame Y, Mister X or Mister Z), but if taken together the 9 items of unshared 
information would allow for designating only one suspect (the son of Mister X). The 
remaining information that was equally shared contained 19 items of shared 
information that described the circumstances of the accident and a brief presentation 
of the suspects involved.  
 
Two main task features of the road accident Hidden Profile-task  
 
This task had two main and special features that were pre-tested by the 
authors and that we now present. The first feature is task transparency, which refers 
to the fact that Toma and Butera (2009) had pre-tested in two pilot studies and shown 
that within the sub-set of information received, participants could identify exactly 
where each type of information (shared vs. unshared) was located, and that 
participants could discriminate well between the value of the two types of information, 
recognizing the superior value of the unshared items of information in allowing 
identification of the suspects, in comparison to the shared items of information, 
whose value was recognized as being descriptive of the facts that took place. This 
task-transparency feature is of central importance as it allows inferring that 
individuals act deliberately when spreading or withholding unshared information with 
others. 
The second feature was that the task required “the use of unshared 
information under the form of initial preferences confirmation” (Toma & Butera, 2009, 
p. 797). Technically speaking, each set of unshared items provided to each different 
member was pre-tested to make sure that it did indeed and undoubtedly direct each 
individual holding it to a different sub-optimal suspect Mister X, Mister Z or Madame 
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Y (see Pilots 1 to 3, in the appendix of Toma & Butera, 2009), and that if individuals 
were given all the items of unshared information, they could correctly uncover the 
optimal solution, the son of Mister X (see Pilot 4, in the appendix of Toma & Butera, 
2009). This feature is different from previous hidden profile tasks (e.g., Stasser & 
Stewart, 1992) where individual sub-optimal differences did not differ among 
members. Precisely, this second and last feature has its own importance, because 
the authors highlight that each sub-set of items of unshared information held by one 
individual is capable of overruling the sub-optimal decision of another. For instance, if 
one member is oriented to Madame Y, and that another member has an unshared 
item stating that the person responsible for the car accident is a man, than this later 
member can infer that Madame Y is not the guilty person. The fact that when all 
unshared information is out at once they allow individuals to easily reject the sub-
optimal profiles and hence to unveil the hidden profile remaining, could be a feature 
that makes it difficult once unshared information is out in the group for members to 
intentionally avoid or deny the obviousness of the last profile unveiled. 
 
With these two special task features in mind, Toma and Butera (2009) inserted 
the manipulated goal instructions at the onset of group work, either by telling the 
group that its objective during the session was to find the person responsible for the 
car accident (cooperation instructions through positive goal interdependence) or, by 
telling that its objective during session was to find the person responsible for the car 
accident but that is was important to be the first one to find the guilty person 
(competition instructions through negative goal interdependence). Thus, the coding of 
group discussions showed, regarding information exchange during group 
interactions, that when set to work cooperatively, groups spread and used 
significantly more items of unshared information than groups set to work 
competitively did. This result was replicated in the second experiment (Experiment 2, 
Toma & Butera, 2009). Those results confirm that group information sharing can be 
affected by motivation factors such as the goal with which the group is set to work, 
and that indeed, cooperation is beneficial for bringing unshared crucial information 
into group discussions and to spread them during that group work opportunity.  
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Another study by Toma et al. (2012) corroborates this view of unshared 
information pooling as resulting from motivated factors. In their study they used the 
same task, the same goal manipulation, but manipulated the level of expertise 
assigned to group members. But first let!s see why they added expertise assignment 
manipulation to their experiment, as it will help us understand why the researchers 
expected it to highlight the motivated and deliberate aspect that information sharing 
processes could put on in groups. Experts are defined as such, either because they 
have more information than others on a given topic or domain of expertise, or 
because they have more competence or experience than others on a given task 
(Wittenbaum, 1998, 2000). Expertise affects information sharing in hidden profiles, 
and leads groups to pay more attention to unshared information (see Stasser & Titus, 
2003). For instance, telling group members that some in the group are experts in 
domains that are related to their unshared information promotes the exchange of 
unshared information and increases the discovery of the hidden profile in Hidden 
Profile tasks (Stasser, Stewart & Wittenbaum, 1995; Stasser, Vaughan, & Stewart, 
2000). This happens because experts have the capacity to distinguish relevant 
information from irrelevant one (Shanteau, 1992). Furthermore, the “expert” status 
assigned to a member regarding a given task gives that member a higher status 
within the group; Wittenbaum (1998, 2000) shows that high status individuals do not 
have the general tendency to refer to shared information more in group discussions 
but rather tend to use unshared information more, because they are more confident 
with their unshared information in comparison to non experts.  
 
In their experiment Toma et al. (2012) found that expertise assignment had a 
positive effect on the usually biased information sharing in hidden profile discussion 
groups only in cooperative groups because, they suggest, members consider 
expertise as a major resource to dig in for the sake of task achievement (Bottger & 
Yetton, 1988). On the contrary, in competitive groups, these authors found that 
expertise had a negative effect on unshared information spreading. According to 
them, if in competition group members share less unshared information it is because 
competition “makes people more focused on standing out in the comparison of 
competences with others. In other words, the threat that competition poses to one!s 
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own competence may restrict experts when pooling their unshared information, and 
may impair members! motivation to repeat the already-mentioned information” (p. 3, 
in Toma et al, 2012).  
 
In summary, these studies have highlighted that information sharing and the 
reluctance to spread unshared information during group discussion in hidden profiles 
can be motivated by the cooperative or competitive goal that groups are given to 
pursue at the onset of group work. We also have confirmation at the level of hidden 
profiles that giving the groups cooperative instructions helps discussing more 
unshared information. But is groups! tendency to “under-exchange” unshared 
information only due to a group process?  
 
3.2 Making use of Hidden Profile tasks to observe the intra-individual 
preference for consistent information effect 
 
In this sub-section, we will briefly give a range of explanations advanced by 
different researchers to account for groups! failure to pull unshared information and 
uncover hidden profile tasks, but this time with an explanation based on an intra-
individual cognitive level process (i.e. preference for consistent vs. inconsistent 
information). As we will argue, first considered as a cognitive bias, this process is 
now studied as an interesting indicator of the cooperative/competitive motivations 
that individuals can have to decentre from/focus on, their own point of view. More 
precisely, this process can be viewed as an indicator of the cooperative/competitive 
motivation that impacts individuals! appreciation of the diagnostic value of new 
information coming from others; an appreciation that differs when information is 
consistent or inconsistent with one!s point of view. 
 
If groups are bad at unveiling hidden profile tasks and at pooling unshared 
information, a possible explanation is that this is due to group discussions being 
focused on debating over the pre-decisional preferences of individuals instead of 
thoroughly analysing the information that members have in their possession. It is this 
idea that some researchers have put forward with the “preference negotiation model” 
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(Gigone & Hastie, 1993, 1997; Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, Frey, & Schulz-
Hardt, 2002). They sustain that if shared information is mentioned more often than 
unshared information, and if overall, the distribution of information prior to group work 
still affects decision outcome while statistically controlling for discussion of 
information, then this happens because collective group decisions are not based on 
members discussing available information but rather on members trying to negotiate 
the importance of their own individual pre-decisional preference in the final group 
decision. Hence, a group decision would stem from a combination of individual pre-
decisional preference of members and not from the thorough investigation and 
weighing of each item of information available. In this configuration, information is 
only used to back up individual pre-decisional preferences when group work starts. 
 
Intra-individual preference for consistent information. However, researchers 
have highlighted another explanation based on an intra-individual level. The idea is 
that individuals will refuse to take unshared information in consideration during group 
discussions and fail to uncover hidden profiles (Gigone & Hastie, 1997; Stasser & 
Titus, 1985, 1987; Wittenbaum, 2000), not necessarily because of a group process 
failure, but because of the involvement of an intra-individual mechanism occurring 
even in absence of group process dysfunctions. This mechanism stems from 
individuals! tendency to display an individual preference confirmation (e.g., Schulz-
Hardt, Frey, Luthgens, & Moscovici, 2000; Schulz-Hardt, Jochims, & Frey, 2002). 
Precisely, they show that once members opt for a solution (a sub-optimal alternative 
choice in hidden profiles), they will then have a tendency to evaluate all new 
incoming information that is consistent with their sub-optimal alternative more 
favourably than information that is inconsistent with it. Thus, this intra-individual 
failure or bias regarding information evaluation is called preference consistent-
information evaluation effect, and explains why individuals in groups are less prone to 
revise their first (though suboptimal) choice made. For Greitmeyer and Schulz-Hardt 
(2003), this bias is cognitive but non-intentional, whereby it can occur also when 
individuals are not instructed about others! sub-optimal preferences. This bias could 
be due to the allocation of a different amount of cognitive resources when analysing 
consistent and inconsistent information. Information that is consistent with one!s 
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previous choice is accepted at face value, whereas inconsistent information is more 
thoroughly analysed as it implies that one!s choice is wrong. However, even if 
inconsistent information manages to survive a critical analysis, the authors suggest 
that it will still be judged to be of lower quality and hence be evaluated as less 
important than consistent information.  
Interestingly, other researchers (Toma et al., 2011) have held a different 
argument, according to which this intra-individual preference mechanism is not 
necessarily cognitive, but that it could be intentional and motivated. Such a motivated 
mechanism could fluctuate depending on the goal with which individuals are set to 
solve the task (competitive vs. cooperative goal) and depending on the presence (or 
not) of dissent within the fictitious group discussion where individuals learn about the 
individual preferences of the other fictitious members. In order to test this idea, Toma 
et al. (2011) have built and pre-tested a task, which was inspired from the one used 
by Greitmeyer and Schulz-Hardt (2003), and used the car accident cover story of 
Toma and Butera (2009). 
 
 Description of the task. Similar to the car accident case in Toma and Butera 
(2009), participants had to find the guilty person in a car accident investigation. The 
same car accident script was used, distribution of shared and unshared items of 
information, and the same potential suspects. But, whereas in Toma and Butera 
(2009) the material was adapted to group interaction, in Toma et al. (2011) the 
material was adapted for individual assessment. 
The role-play story had participants pretend they worked as police inspectors 
with two other individuals in order to identify the party responsible for the car 
accident. A hidden profile was created by distributing three different critical clues to 
the participants and to the two other fictitious group members in a way that created 
an initial dissent: The naïve participant was oriented toward Mr X, while the fictitious 
participants were attributed Mrs Y and Mr Z as initial preferences. All participants 
were asked to express their initial preference (Mr X), and then they were informed 
that they did not possess the entire information, and that for this reason, they would 
be provided with supplementary information given by the two other participants. Goal 
interdependence and dissent manipulations were introduced at this point. 
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Participants were led to imagine that both their goal and that of the fictitious members 
was either to grant the group success (positive goal interdependence, i.e., 
cooperation) or to ensure the individual success (negative goal interdependence, i.e., 
competition) in the car accident investigation. It was also explained that a successful 
end of investigation would provide them all (cooperation) or only one of them 
(competition) with a very promising promotion. With regard to dissent, participants 
were either told that others! initial preferences were respectively Mrs Y and Mr Z 
(dissent, participants are oriented towards an initial preference for Mr X), or no 
information was provided (no dissent). Subsequently, participants received six items 
of information supposedly coming from the two other individuals, three were 
consistent and three were inconsistent with their initial preference (Mr X). Participants 
were asked to evaluate the items of information with regard to their importance in 
contributing to an optimal decision. And were asked to make a final decision based 
on all the information. Precisely, they were asked to come up with the best decision. 
The participants were free to take as much time as they needed for each phase, but 
they were not allowed to return to the previous phases. To test their idea, Toma and 
Butera (2011) manipulated in two experiments the type of goal given to the individual 
at the onset of the fictitious group discussion and the presence or absence of dissent.   
 
Taken together, their studies jointly and consistently indicated that the 
individual preference confirmation effect appeared only in competition and dissent 
conditions. Such a result was observed on both measures of the individual 
preference-consistent information effect: individuals exhibited a greater preference 
for consistent than inconsistent information coming from the others fictitious 
members, and made more confirmatory decisions. Mediation-moderation analysis 
furthermore showed that preference for consistent-information mediated the 
confirmatory decisions of participants. Finally, results on a measure of self-
enhancement (Study 2) showed that if participants in competition were all motivated 
by self-enhancement (in comparison to cooperation and control conditions), yet self-
enhancement motivation positively predicted individual preference for consistent-
information only in the dissent condition, whereas self-enhancement motives 
negatively predicted individual preference for consistent-information in the no dissent 
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condition. This latter distinction adds proof to the idea that individuals! preference for 
consistent-information is typically a motivated behaviour, which occurs when 
competition is raised, and which is especially (positively) predicted by self-
enhancement motivations when dissent is at stake. 
 
To summarize, it is important to make some clarifications. If the paradigm and 
the measurements to investigate the preference effect are indeed set at an individual 
level, the preference effect is nevertheless diagnostic of the cooperative or 
competitive motivations that individuals can have towards others (Toma et al., 2011). 
Moreover, in terms of comparison with the previous group paradigm, this individual 
one is similar in that its task structure is intrinsically cooperative. Indeed, in this task, 
if individuals do not take others! information into account and do not evaluate 
favourably inconsistent information, they will not be able to appreciate the value of 
those information and will not use them, nor will they consider them along with the 
ones they have in order to derive the optimal solution (i.e. decentring process, Butera 
& Mugny, 2001; Quiamzade, Mugny, & Butera, 2013). In this context, the motivation 
of individuals to decentre from their initial preference and then to consider other 
alternatives is central to solving the task. Thus, it is particularly important to grasp the 
extent to which grades could affect such individual motivation in a cooperative 
context, because holding at an intra-individual level the motivation to cooperate is a 
prerequisite to be motivated to cooperate at a higher and more complex interaction 
levels, and to ultimately be able to achieve in-group cooperation.  
 
 
3.3 Making use of the Cooperative Game to investigate cooperation on inter-
individual coordination 
 
In this sub-section, we turn to develop another view of cooperation. We will 
highlight that cooperation is also viewed as requiring from group members to be able 
to coordinate their actions. Indeed, group cooperation applies not only to intellectual 
processes (e.g., requiring judgments formation, decision making), but also to the 
actions undertaken to achieve cooperation (e.g., coordination). Thus, we will next 
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present a task along with the features that makes it a cooperative task, and which 
therefore necessitates cooperative behaviours to be best achieved. This task will 
allow us to test whether grades could impact group cooperation when cooperation 
requires the coordination of the actions of its members.  
 
Cooperation and inter-individual coordination. For individuals to cooperate, 
they must be able to coordinate their different actions and efforts in the perspective of 
the goal to attain. Indeed, the coordination of individuals! efforts, in the pursuit of a 
same goal, is admitted by researchers from the cooperative learning field to be one of 
the social skills that helps obtaining an efficient cooperation among group members 
(D.W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 2009a). With these principles in mind, a task 
measuring coordination would be of high interest because coordination can be 
conceived as an alternative indicator of cooperation. In the case where individuals 
are not given the chance or the time to explicitly discuss and prepare coordination 
strategies, then coordination is described as being tacit (Hackman & Morris, 1975). 
This is the type of coordination implied for instance when individuals participating in 
an experiment are put in groups to jointly achieve a task. Tacit coordination can be 
defined as “the synchronization of members! actions based on unspoken 
assumptions about what others in the group are likely to do, (Stasser & Wittenbaum, 
1995)”, Wittenbaum et al., (1996, p. 129). In other words, the tacit coordination of 
behaviours during interactions depends on anticipatory processes that individuals 
use to mutually adjust to one another in the achievement of a joint action. 
Wittenbaum et al. (1996) for instance talk about studies supporting that the attempts 
of group members to (tacitly) coordinate begins prior to interaction (Gersick, 1988).  
 
This overall anticipated process concerns individuals forming expectations 
regarding different elements from the whole interactive situation in which they find 
themselves, those expectations have been extensively fleshed out by Wittenbaum et 
al. (1996) in their “anticipatory tacit coordination model”. According to this model, the 
anticipated process of expectations regards several elements of the interactive 
situation. First, expectations about other members (e.g. their level of expertise 
regarding the task to achieve). Second, expectations about the perception of the 
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task, which individuals have about how the task will be assessed, and precisely what 
they perceive is needed to be done so that the task can be successfully achieved 
(the model stresses on the importance that task assessment concerns the subjective 
perception that individuals have of the task assessment and not the objective 
criterion given to them). Thus, task structure, whether being basically cooperative or 
competitive, has its own importance in individuals forming expectations regarding the 
task, because the “nature of coordination may change depending on whether group 
members see successful task completion as involving working together toward a 
common goal, or seeking to benefit individual goals at the expense of other 
members! successful goal completion” (Wittenbaum et al., 1996, p. 132). And third, 
expectations about resource allocation – by identifying the resources available, the 
one needed.  
In the following, we build on this idea of an anticipated process of expectations 
formation based on elements from the overall interactive task situation that would 
help individuals to tacitly coordinate to draw some inferences. Following what is said 
in the model, if at the onset of the interactive situation, individuals perceive that (1) 
the task to achieve necessitates the intervention of all the members, and (2) clearly 
requires their cooperation to be achieved, then individuals of the group should 
perceive the situation as cooperative. They should perceive the need to coordinate, 
and hence they would be expected to be able to coordinate efficiently to achieve their 
joint task. But what would happen, if the salience of grades was triggered at the onset 
of the same interactive situation with the same task? Could they somehow change 
individuals! perception of the cooperative task and the perception of the overall 
interactive situation? Thus, if the cooperative task necessitated the coordination of 
individuals! actions, then wouldn!t it be reasonable to think that grades could affect 
inter-individual coordination? Could grades lead individuals to less coordination 
notwithstanding the inherent cooperative base of the task? Thus, in the following we 
propose to present a task that we have chosen to use because it has that particular 
characteristic of allowing us to observe inter-individual coordination embedded in a 
task that requires cooperation for its achievement.  
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The Cooperative Game. This task developed by Doise and Mugny (1975, 
1981 in Doise & Mugny, 1997) is a hand-eye inter-individual cognitive coordination 
task that was used to study cooperation as a dynamic process in the cognitive 
development of children. It was initially used to address several questions on 
cooperation and coordination from a cognitive-developmental perspective21 . We 
propose to use it to observe cooperation as group members! capacity and willingness 
to successfully coordinate their actions towards the achievement of one same task.  
 
The principle of the Cooperative Game is the following: while positioned 
around the game (cf. picture below), participants have to coordinate their actions by 
playing on the strings, by means of pulleys, in order to move a small mobile device 
forward on the board game. From where participants are positioned, each can pull on 
the string, release it, or hold it back. Hence, it is only if the actions of participants are 
coordinated that the participants will be able to apply a coherent movement to the 
small mobile device. Thus, the cooperative game intrinsically requires for its 
achievement, participants! coordination even if no instructions explicitly demands 
participants to cooperate. In this task, inter-individual cooperation is not merely an 
instruction given to participants but stems from a real need for coordination. 
Therefore the originality of this task comes from the fact that coordination is 
intrinsically needed to achieve the cooperative game22. 
 
                                                
21 We deliberately chose not develop this approach here because it is not in this perspective that we will make 
use of this task (for a review see Chapter 3. in Doise & Mugny, 1997). 
22 Note that the task exists in two versions, a version for 2 players and one for 3 players, but that we will directly 
refer to the version for 3 players, as it is the one that we will use in our experiment to test the effect of grades on 
group members’ capacity to coordinate their different yet complementary actions towards the achievement of 
one same goal. 
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As shown in the picture below, the cooperative game is composed of a board 
game on which is taped a sheet with a path drawn on it (the path comprises a three-
lanes tract: inner, middle, outer lanes, delimited into squares, with a starting and 
finishing square), three pulleys fixed on the board game and connected together by 
strings linked up to a device supporting a ballpoint pen. This ballpoint pen will leave a 
trace on the path whenever the small mobile device moves on the board game, which 
will allow experimenters to keep evidence of the performance and to later calculate 
its relative points. Pulleys could be adjusted in two ways making it more or less hard 
for players to roll/unroll them: when pulleys are tightened they require more effort 
from players to use them compared to when they are loosened. The goal was for 
players to achieve a go on the board game by coordinating the rolling and unrolling of 
their pulleys to move forward the device supporting the ballpoint pen (from the first to 
the last square), whilst ensuring not to draw out of the path!s middle lane. The total 
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score for one group achieving one go was calculated by respectively adding: (+1 
point) if the line drawn was inside the middle lane, (0 point) if it went over-line 
reaching for the inner or outer lane, (-1 point) if it went out of the whole three-lane 
tract figure. 
To better understand how the actions need to be coordinated in the version of 
the game for three players, a representation of the path made by the authors to 
corroborate the different possibilities is presented in Figure 3, along with the 
explanations provided by the authors themselves (please note that the three-lanes do 
not appear on this version for ease of following up). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Graphic presentation of the path (taken from Doise & Mugny, 1997, 
chp.3, p. 53): 
To move from square n°1 to n°2, one has to pull on pulley B, while loosening    
the string with pulley A, and pulling pulley C. 
To move from square n°2 to n°5, one has to pull on pulley C then, loosen the 
string with pulleys A and B to allow the small device to move forward. 
And so on with the remaining squares. 
 72 
 
It is important to note that, similar to the previous tasks used in decision-
making research, this task represents a group situation where individuals working 
together in groups could achieve better outcomes than individuals alone. Indeed, this 
task is based on a similar goal and resources structure as the other tasks described 
previously.  
Precisely and firstly, group members are bound together through positive 
mean interdependence, given that individuals have each a different pulley that they 
need to coordinate with others to move forward the small device. Secondly, group 
members are bound together by positive goal interdependence, given that one same 
goal is given to the players: to successfully achieve a go on the board game without 
drawing out of the paper circuit. Hence, coordination of actions in this game is indeed 
another indicator of cooperation; the more participants coordinate well and the better 
their performance. 
Moreover, this task allows us to investigate the impact of grades on the 
cooperative functioning of group members simultaneously at the two levels of group 
functioning (Oberlé & Ewa-Senkowska, 2006). As we have mentioned earlier in the 
introduction, when investigating or studying groups, it is generally admitted that the 
processes can be observed at two different levels: directed towards task 
achievement or directed towards the relational aspect of group functioning. The level 
of processes directed towards the task (i.e. task-focus level) concerns all processes 
that the group and its members will use to produce the work required. It is defined as 
an operatory level of functioning, directed towards the productive function of groups 
and the actions that are emitted towards the achievement of the task. The level of 
processes directed towards the group (i.e., group-focus level) concerns all processes 
involved with the relational aspect of groups. It relates for instance to the emotional 
dimension of a group and can concern implicit processes of group functioning. 
According to Oberlé and Drozda-Senkowska (2006), research in the social 
psychology field has a tendency, notably for practical questions of accessibility and 
feasibility, to investigate processes more often directed towards the task (i.e. 
performance) while under-investigating the emotional/relational side. Hence, even if 
both levels are not systematically and jointly investigated when addressing group 
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issues, those two levels of group functioning are nevertheless known to co-exist 
(Bales, 1950). However, if research in the field of goals and conflict regulation has 
showed the reality of these two levels (Darnon, Muller, Schrager, Pannuzzo, & 
Butera, 2006), it also showed how leading groups or group members to focus on one 
level (e.g. task) or the other (e.g., relations) affected groups! output and the way a 
conflict could be regulated.  
Thus, with the use of the cooperative game, we undertake the challenge of 
investigating the effect of grades on group cooperation by observing the extent to 
which they could simultaneously affect players! inter-individual coordination at the two 
levels of group functioning. On the one hand, at task-focus level: by observing 
whether group performance could be deteriorated. On the other hand, on group-focus 
level: by observing whether the relational/emotional functioning of the group during 
coordination could be deteriorated. Subsequently, we develop why using this task 
could be particularly interesting to observe the effects of grades at the level of inter-
individual coordination (by referring to Doise & Mugny, 1975, Experiment 2) and 
could lead us to make interesting predictions regarding the two-levels of group 
functioning (particularly, in terms of observing expression of negative social dominant 
behaviours taking place in groups where grades are triggered). 
In their 2nd experiment, Doise & Mugny (1975) show that using the 
Cooperative Game allows observing how the quality of collective products (produced 
by the group as a whole) can differ depending on the nature of the relations that take 
place during partners! interaction. In their study (using the cooperative game adapted 
to 2 players), the authors manipulate the nature of interactions from the onset of the 
game: either by allowing groups to freely organize and structure themselves to play 
the game (i.e. the spontaneous duos), or by imposing different roles where one child 
would be assigned the chief/leader role and the other the follower role (i.e. the 
hierarchical duos). Putting on the role of leader, the individual will have to give 
orders, direct and command actions of the game. On the contrary, in the role of 
follower, the individual will have to strictly obey instructions of the leader. It is 
important to note that the children knew that the roles would be inverted during the 
second go of the game (the one putting on the role of chief would take on the role of 
follower, and vice versa). Given that we are not interested in the cognitive-
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developmental perspective to which the authors were interested, we propose to 
directly focus on results obtained between the spontaneous vs. hierarchical older 
duos, aged 9-10 years, that we now know had achieved the adequate cognitive-
behavioural stages of coordination to play the game. The results showed a difference 
in performance between the two types of duos that nearly reached significance, 
whereby hierarchical duos performed better (+71.63 points) than spontaneous duos 
(+59 points). According to the authors, this enhancement of performance observed in 
hierarchical duos could be attributed to the fact that in this type of duos, individuals in 
turn took responsibility in the proceedings of the interaction. In this perspective, 
organizing duos into a hierarchy is beneficial.  
 
But does it mean that whenever a hierarchy is organized in this game, or 
whenever a leader emerges from duos/groups performance will necessarily be 
enhanced? In other terms, are leadership behaviours (i.e. under the scope of 
dominant behaviours) a must to manage inter-individual coordination during the 
cooperative game, and thus are necessary to better collective performances? We 
now unfold an explanation for why this might not always be the case. We think that in 
hierarchical duos where a chief is designated but where the children know that the 
roles will be inverted, the type of interaction between the two participants is built on a 
positive social interdependence of roles: they will each put on, in turn, the different 
yet complementary roles of leader/follower. Indeed, complementarity of roles is a 
factor known to be part of the pre-requisites for cooperation (Johnson & Johnson, 
2009a). Hence, in itself, the resulting overall situation resembles a social dominant 
situation where a dominant individual (the leader) gives orders to a non-dominant 
individual (the follower) and where the chief!s orders allow organizing work around 
the goal to attain (the collective task to achieve). More particularly, such situations 
resembles the type of pro-social dominant interaction which is a positive type of 
interaction and which differs from the type of negative-dominant interaction (i.e. 
coercive dominance, Hawley, 2002) that we think can also take place in this 
asymmetric type of situation. Before going any further in forming expectations 
regarding to what type of behaviours grades could possibly lead to during the 
cooperative game, let us briefly see how a social dominant individual could be 
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defined, to what social dominance can be related, and furthermore what distinguishes 
the types of pro-social and coercive dominant behaviours.  
 
Social dominance, pro-social vs. coercive behaviours, and grades 
 
Broadly, social dominant individuals can be defined as the ones who 
“successfully manage to control resources in the presence of others, regardless of 
how they do it” (an evolutionary adaptation view of social dominance, a traditional 
view, where social dominance rimes with aggression, Hawley, 2002, p.168). Yet, a 
more modern view of social dominance would differentiate that, in order to control 
those resources, two types of strategies can be used by individuals, either by making 
use of rather pro-social strategies or rather coercive ones. Thus, whereas both types 
of strategies are used by socially dominant individuals, the two differ in terms of: a) 
type of behaviours in relation to others, where coercive behaviours to control 
resources could be described for instance in terms of monopolizing, and where pro-
social behaviours to control resources could be described in terms of reciprocation 
and cooperation; b) successful control over resources, where the pro-social 
behaviours serve as an effective resource control strategy (Hawley, 2002).  
Moreover both types do not reflect in the same way whether an individual can 
be perceived as socially competent or not. Indeed, one can find in the literature that 
social dominance is associated with social competence and that there is a general 
agreement on the fact that a socially competent child is the one who is “able to 
achieve personal goals in social situations while simultaneously maintaining positive 
social relationships (Rubin & Rose-Krasnor, 1992)”, Hawley (2002, p. 167). Thus, 
taking into account by which means (i.e. which type of social dominant behaviours) 
individuals manage to get control over resources and hence direct an interaction, 
does indeed matter. Yet, it is important to note that pro-social behaviours do not rule 
out the possibility that they are supported by motivations that directly involve serving 
the self (e.g., Eisenberg, 1996; Eisenberg & Giallanza, 1984; Hawley 2002). What 
stems from the previous is that it needs to be clearly mentioned that, as there are two 
different types of social dominant behaviours that can be distinguished, only one is 
associated with social competence, and is socially and positively evaluated by peers: 
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pro-social social dominance. On the contrary, only one type can be maladaptive and 
can disrupt cooperation: negative or coercive social dominance. 
In the case of the Cooperative Game, we decide to focus only on the negative 
social dominant behaviour because, as previously presented, it is the type of 
behaviour that is expected to be disruptive for cooperation. Moreover, if grades are 
ego-involving and represent a potential threatening social comparison for 
competence, they should lead individuals to try to put themselves forward during the 
Cooperative game interactions, and therefore try to monopolize the ground and the 
resources which here are represented by the use of pulleys. Hence, these attempts 
to take control over available resources, should take place without necessarily 
waiting to coordinate with other group members and without the others! authorization. 
More to the point, on the one hand cooperation in terms of interaction can be defined 
by positive and respectful interactions among individuals, a situation where acts of 
mutual help are observed (D.W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 1989; Johnson, Johnson, & 
Maruyama, 1983; Roseth et al. 2008). Whereas on the other hand, a disruption of 
cooperation should be observed through less respectful interactions, more tensions 
and lead, in our cooperative game, to a hampered coordination (both at group 
performance level and at the emotional level functioning of the group).  
In sum, negative social dominant behaviours can be observed through 
monopolization while simultaneously holding an essentially negative component that 
reflects on the type of interaction taking place between individuals (in comparison to 
positive social dominant behaviours). Therefore, when analysing the on-going 
interactions during the Cooperative Game, one will need to focus on “floor-taking” 
control indices (i.e. monopolization), but also to focus on whether those floor-taking 
control indices are accompanied by emotional negative tension. In other words, we 
will need to operationalize our variable of negative social dominant behaviours by 
providing an indicator that captures at once, the social dominance part of the 
behaviour but also its negative valence.  
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OVERVIEW OF HYPOTHESES 
 
 
In the up-coming experimental studies, we wish to test the general hypothesis 
according to which grades will hamper cooperation. This general hypothesis can be 
specified as a function of the indices of cooperation that we used in the present 
thesis. 
First, we used an intra-individual variable that conveys individuals! motivation 
to cooperate with others: being willing to cooperate echoes with a reduction of 
individuals! preference effect, as this later is symptomatic of individuals! willingness to 
decentre from their point of view to meet others! point of view (cf., 3.2.). Our 
hypothesis is that grades will reduce individuals! motivation to cooperate with others 
under the form of an increase in the preference effect. As grades are known to 
increase individual social visibility, we furthermore put forward that grades, but not 
individual visibility alone, will produce this effect (H1). Moreover, we hypothesize that 
we will be able to replicate the effect of grades in comparison to other types of 
experimental conditions where individual visibility is manipulated in different ways, 
namely in comparison to conditions of mere presence, visibility, individual 
accountability (H2).  
Second, we used an inter-individual (group-level) variable that depicts 
individuals! actual cooperative behaviour during group information exchange: the 
exchange of information items that others do not have and that are of major 
importance for the task on which the group is working. Our hypothesis is that 
expecting to be graded will reduce individuals! motivation to cooperate with others, 
under the form of a reduction in the exchange of unshared, useful information in 
comparison to other conditions where only individual visibility or no individual visibility 
are manipulated (H3). Moreover, given that we suspect self-evaluation threat, to be 
responsible for this effect, and that this mechanism is deeply anchored in individuals! 
basic needs to received accurate self-evaluation, we hypothesize that we could 
replicate this effect with a different experimental procedure: when grades are only 
primed (H4).  
Third, we used an inter-individual (group-level) variable that depicts 
individuals! actual cooperative behaviour during group coordination: coordinating 
 78 
actions and communicating about these actions. Our hypothesis is that grades will 
reduce individuals! motivation to cooperate with others, under the form of a reduction 
in groups! level of coordination, which in the chosen task will be reflected in a 
deteriorated group performance (H5). 
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OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL CHAPTERS 
 
In the experimental parts of this thesis, we wish to test whether grades could 
be deleterious for cooperation and cooperative group work in tasks that are based on 
a positive interdependence of goals and resources.  
In order to do so, we propose to use two different experimental methods to 
manipulate grades, either with an explicit method (through oral instructions for task 
achievement), or with an implicit method (priming). The underlying idea is that if both 
methods show a negative effect of grades, then one way to interpret this consistency 
throughout the two different methods used would be to think that grades are part of 
our everyday life, such that even when we expose individuals indirectly to them, 
grades still affect cooperative behaviours.  
We also propose to vary dependent variables accounting for the observation of 
cooperative behaviours in a cooperative setting in which grades are expected or 
primed. First, we expect to observe the effects on an intra-individual variable, the 
preference effect, whose decrease would signal a more cooperative behaviour 
towards the evaluation of inconsistent information coming from others. Second, we 
expect to observe the effects of grades on an inter-individual variable intervening at 
group discussions level, i.e., the group!s exchange of unshared information, which 
when exchanged more freely would signal a more cooperative behaviour towards 
other group members. And third, we expect to observe the effects of grades on an 
inter-individual variable of motor type, inter-individual coordination, which is 
necessary to achieve cooperation. These different levels were studied because, at 
some point, we wondered whether the effect of grades would be context dependant 
of a group environment. Else said, we wondered whether grades! effects occur only 
in direct interactions, built on the assumption that threatening social comparison 
enhanced by grades can only be triggered with the presence of others against whom 
to compare. Another possibility is that the effect of grades can also be observed in 
individual work situation and to also impact individual reasoning.  
 
Chapters and their related studies and cooperative behaviours dependent 
variables will be distributed as follow:  
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- Chapter 4 will present two studies conducted with university students that 
investigate grades! effect at an intra-individual level. Across all these three studies, 
the same task was used: the hidden profile task in a fictitious group setting, which 
allows us observing whether grades could lead to an increase of the preference 
effect. A preference effect which decrease at intra-individual level, reflects a 
decentring process, as well as a willingness and motivation to cooperate with others. 
Hence, if grades increase the preference effect instead of decreasing it, it would 
signal individuals! lack of motivation to cooperate with others and appreciate others! 
information value.  
  
- Chapter 5 will present two experiments conducted with university students and 
designed to investigate grades! effect on group processes, particularly on group 
information exchange within groups. These two group experiments investigated 
whether the deleterious effect of grades expected in a cooperative group setting with 
fictitious members (see Chapter 4) could also be obtained in a real cooperative group 
work where live and direct interactions occur. For both experiments the same task is 
used (i.e. the hidden profile task in real group setting). In both studies, the extent to 
which grades affect group cooperation is measured by the extent to which groups are 
reluctant to share information that is crucial to task achievement (called unshared 
information). 
 
- Last but not least, Chapter 6 will present a study conducted with pupils and 
designed to investigate the effect of grades on group processes but this time with a 
different dependent variable than those used in studies presented in Chapter 5. More 
particularly, in this study we tested the effect of grades on inter-individual 
coordination as an indicator of cooperation. If on the one hand, individuals who 
cooperate are the ones who manage to coordinate, and that on the other hand, we 
expect grades to impede cooperation then grades should impede coordination. To 
test this hypothesis, we used the Cooperative Game (Doise & Mugny, 1997) based 
on inter-individual cognitive-motor coordination. The extent to which grades could 
affect group cooperation was measured by the extent to which group coordination 
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could be affected, which in turn should impact the performance of the group. 
Moreover, this study offers the particularity of being conducted with a sample of 
pupils (aged about 10 years old). Thus, it allows investigating grades! effects on a 
younger sample than the previous studies (university students), and therefore should 
give us some insights on the anchoring of grades at an earlier educational stage. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
THE EFFECT OF GRADES ON THE PREFERENCE EFFECT23 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The tendency to look for evidence that supports, rather than questions, one!s 
viewpoint (e.g., preference effect) is a pervasive phenomenon, long known to hamper 
people!s critical thinking. Although one important goal of education is to develop 
critical thinking, the widespread practice of using grades might discourage students 
to look for disconfirming evidence. Thus, in two experiments we tested the hypothesis 
that individual grading increases the preference effect. Experiment 1 showed that 
participants who expected their work to be graded exhibited a higher preference 
effect compared to participants who expected their work to be merely visible. 
Experiment 2 replicated this effect by comparing the grading condition to other 
visibility conditions (mere presence, visibility, accountability), and furthermore 
showed that the grading condition increased participants! perception of a competitive 
social comparison. Implications for educational policies are discussed. 
 
Keywords: preference effect, grades, cooperative group work, visibility 
  
                                                
23 Submitted as Hayek, A.S., Toma, C., Oberlé, D., & Butera, F. (9 april 2014). The effect of grades on the 
preference effect. 
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In many educational systems, students learn that in order to write a convincing 
essay, they must include a thesis, an antithesis and a synthesis in the development 
of their argument. The rationale for this recommendation is that once students have 
stated their main point of view, they should be able to refute it, or to propose an 
alternative point of view, and then to come up with a perspective that includes, 
compares and articulates the opposing points of view. This procedure, however, 
requires from students to be able to decenter from a single idea or hypothesis, i.e., to 
question their own point of view, an ability that is easily impaired when students are 
under some evaluative pressure (Butera & Buchs, 2005). In an environment where 
evaluative pressure is pervasive, as it is the case with grading at school and 
university, it is then possible that students would be motivated to confirm that their 
point of view is right rather than being open to information that might question their 
position. In the present research, we aim at testing the effects of grades on people!s 
tendency to look for evidence that confirms initial preferences. We hypothesized that 
the expectation of being graded will increase this tendency compared to situations in 
which people!s work is simply made visible. 
 
Grades and Properties of Grades  
Grades represent a form of normative assessment, or norm-referenced 
assessment, that allows comparing the performance of the person being evaluated to 
that of other persons (Glaser, 1963), be they other pupils, students, or co-workers. 
The main advantage of grades is the visibility they provide: They summarize 
performance in a number—or a letter, or a judgment—and thereby constitute an 
easily interpretable criterion of success (or failure). This is probably the reason why 
grades constitute the main method of assessment in educational and professional 
settings (Knight & Yorke, 2003).  
The visibility afforded by grades, however, may also originate an undesired by-
product: By making very clear the differences in merit across people, grades 
operates a switch in individuals! interest from a focus on the task to a focus on the 
social comparison of competences, with detrimental consequences for learning and 
performance. Indeed, an impressive amount of research, dating back more than 
twenty years, has shown that normative assessment entails a long list of nefarious 
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effects for learning and performance. Grades hinder improvement from one test to 
the following (Williams, Pollack, & Ferguson, 1975), they reduce interest in the task at 
hand (Harackiewicz, Abrahams, & Wageman, 1987) they impair intrinsic motivation 
and performance (Butler1987, 1988; Butler & Nisan, 1986).  
These results have been replicated and extended by many other research teams, in 
both psychology (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Harter, 1978) and educational sciences (Black 
& Wiliam, 1998; Thomas & Oldfather, 1997). 
 
Grades and Preference Effect 
One might wonder why is it important to understand the effects of grades on 
the tendency to look for confirmation of one!s own point of view. At least two reasons 
can be mentioned. First, confirmation bias—the tendency to look for evidence that 
supports, rather than questions, one!s hypothesis or viewpoint—is a pervasive 
phenomenon, long known to hamper people!s ability to develop critical thinking and 
logical argumentation (Klayman & Ha, 1987). In particular, it has been argued that 
confirmation is mainly used when people need to defend their point of view from an 
opponent or from the risk of being wrong, which impairs the ability to consider 
alternatives (Butera & Mugny, 2001; Mercier & Sperber, 2011). At the same time, 
some results suggest that standard methods of teaching (e.g., encouraging students 
to present reasons for opinions they hold rather than reasons against them) and 
standard methods of evaluation (e.g., using grades) may foster this bias (Nickerson, 
1998). For example, when being graded for written essays students use more claims 
that contain supporting evidence than claims that contain disconfirming evidence 
(Narveson, 1980).  
Second, confirmation bias is frequent in groups, which are often used in 
educational settings. When occurring in groups, this bias (also called preference 
effect) refers to insufficient revisions of individual preference during group 
discussions (Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, Frey, & Schulz-Hardt, 2002). More 
specifically, the preference effect occurs because group members have the tendency 
to evaluate information that is consistent with their initial preferences more favourably 
than information that is inconsistent (Greitemeyer & Schultz-Hardt, 2003). In the 
domain of group decision-making research has shown that the preference effect 
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increases in situations where individuals try to prove themselves in front of others, 
like for example in competition (Toma & Butera, 2009; Toma, Gilles, & Butera, 2013). 
In their recent research, Toma et al. (2013) manipulated members! goals using either 
an individual (negative goal interdependence—i.e., competition) or a group promotion 
(positive goal interdependence—i.e., cooperation) that was offered to group 
members who succeeded in solving the mystery of a car accident case. Participants 
were also told that other (fictitious) members had either dissenting or identical initial 
preferences to their own. Results indicated that the preference effect was higher in 
competition than in cooperation, and especially when participants were facing the 
dissenting preferences of the other group members. This effect was mediated by self-
enhancement strategies, which are known to reflect strivings to raise one!s positive 
self-view and superiority (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009).  
The aim of the present research is to determine whether a similar effect could 
be obtained with grades. At school, students are often defending different points of 
view and competing with one another for better grades, even when working on group 
projects. Such practices, however, can have opposite effects. On the one hand, this 
could be motivating because it increases students! visibility (Cameron & Pierce, 
2002) and signals a situation in which grades are used to produce criterion-
referenced evaluations, that is evaluation of a student in comparison with a pre-set 
standard (e.g., a certain level of knowledge). On the other hand, this could be 
threatening because it increases comparability of one!s work with that of others 
(Marshall & Weinstein, 1984) and signal a situation in which grades are used to 
produce norm-referenced evaluations, that is evaluation of a student in comparison 
with other students. Studies have shown that contexts in which one needs to prove 
oneself in front of others leads to self-evaluative threats (Dickerson, Gruenewald, & 
Kemeny, 2004), which in turn increases the preference effect (Toma et al., 2013). 
This should not be the case when visibility is merely emphasized by the presence of 
a third-person (Dickerson et al., 2008) or when the self-evaluation threat linked to the 
normative facet of grades disappears, e.g., because one is assured of one!s own 
superiority (Muller & Butera, 2007).  
In sum, the visibility afforded by grades may not be a problem in itself, but that 
it is rather the potentially competitive social comparison elicited by grades that may 
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focus individuals on the defence of their own point of view. Therefore in the present 
research we test the hypothesis that in a group situation in which members face the 
dissent of others, expecting one!s work to be graded should increase the preference 
effect compared to expecting one!s work to be merely visible.  
 
Overview of Studies 
Two studies were conducted in order to test this hypothesis. The task used 
was the same as the one used by Toma et al. (2013). In this task participants were 
asked to individually solve a car accident case and to find the person responsible for 
it (initial preference). Then, they were informed that other team members supported 
different initial preferences because of the different information they possessed. 
Participants were asked to read and to rate the importance of the other members! 
information, which was either consistent or inconsistent with their own initial 
preference. The preference effect was calculated as the difference between the 
evaluation of consistent and inconsistent information.  
 
In Experiment 1, we tested our main hypothesis that individual grading during 
group work should increase the preference effect as compared with mere visibility of 
one!s work. To test this hypothesis, we contrasted a condition of evaluation by grades 
with a control condition in which individual work was simply visible, but not graded. 
We also introduced a second control condition without grades or visibility. Indeed, as 
noted above, grades imply both a focus on competitive social comparison and 
increased visibility. If, as hypothesized, grades increase the preference effect 
because of the social comparison component, the condition with individual grades 
should differ from the condition with mere visibility. It is however possible that. 
contrary to our expectation, it is indeed visibility that increases the preference effect; 
in this case both the graded and the mere visibility conditions should induce a higher 
preference effect than the control condition. In Experiment 2, we aimed at replicating 
Experiment 1 and disentangling possible confounds in the manipulation of visibility. 
 
 
 88 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. A total of 61 university students from a Swiss University took 
part in this experiment. Six participants were excluded from the analyses because 
they did not comply with the experimental script (i.e. they did not choose Mr. X as the 
initial preference, to whom the script and clues oriented them). The remaining sample 
included 55 university students (34 women and 20 men, one student did not mention 
her/his gender and age, M = 18.09 years, SD = 1.20). Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of three-experimental conditions: Graded-Visible (N = 13), Non 
Graded-Visible (N = 23) and Non Graded-Non Visible (N = 19). Preliminary analyses 
revealed that gender did not influence our effects and therefore, this variable was not 
included in final analyses. 
Procedure. Participants were told that they would participate in a study on the 
resolution of criminal investigations (for the exact materials, see Toma et al., 2013). 
They worked individually, and then they were led to imagine that they would work in a 
team with two other students. The role-play story had participants pretend they 
worked as police inspectors with two other people in order to identify the party 
responsible for a car accident. Four people were potential suspects, but three of them 
could be exonerated (Mr. X, Mrs. Y, Mr. Z) and the fourth (Mr. X!s son) incriminated 
based on a critical set of nine clues. All participants were oriented toward Mr. X, while 
the two other fictitious members were attributed Mrs. Y and Mr. Z as initial 
preferences. All participants were asked to commit to their initial preference (Mr. X), 
and then they were informed that they did not possess the entire set of information, 
and that for this reason they would be provided with supplementary information given 
by the two other participants.  
The manipulation of grades was introduced at this point. In the Graded-Visible 
condition, participants were told that the Chief would be present and give an 
individual grade (ranging from 1 to 6, which corresponds to the usual grading range 
in Switzerland) to each inspector at the end of the investigation. In the Non Graded-
Visible condition, participants were told that the Chief would be present because he is 
interested to follow the investigation. In the Non Graded-Non Visible condition, 
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participants were told that the Chief of the police inspectors would not be able to 
follow the investigation.  
Subsequently, participants received six items of information, three consistent 
and three inconsistent with their initial preference (Mr. X), supposedly coming from 
the two other people. An example of consistent information was that the person 
responsible for the accident is a man. An example of inconsistent information was 
that the person responsible for the accident is less than 30 years old (participants 
knew that Mr. X is 53 years old). The consistent and inconsistent information was 
presented in random order for each participant. Participants were asked to evaluate 
the items of information with regard to their importance in making an optimal 
decision. Finally, participants were asked to make a final decision based on all the 
pieces of information. At the end, participants were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation.  
 
Measures 
 
Manipulation check. In order to check whether participants correctly 
perceived the Graded-Visible condition compared to the other conditions, they were 
asked to answer the following question: During the investigation, did the Chief tell 
you that you would be individually evaluated? (Yes / No). 
 
Preference for consistent information. Participants evaluated to what extent 
the six items of information they received were important in reaching the optimal 
decision, on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 9 (very important). This 
information included three items consistent and three items inconsistent with the 
participant!s initial preference. One consistent item and one inconsistent item were 
dropped from the analyses as they lowered the reliability test. The preference for 
consistent information was computed by subtracting the ratings of the two 
inconsistent information items (r = .47, p < .001) from the ratings of the two consistent 
information items (r = .55, p < .001), and refers to the extent to which participants 
evaluated information in a way that confirmed their initial preference. A positive score 
indicates that consistent information was considered more valuable than inconsistent 
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information, and a negative score indicates that inconsistent information was 
considered more valuable than consistent information. 
 
Results 
 
Manipulation check. All participants in the Graded-Visible condition 
responded "Yes! and all participants in the other two conditions responded "No! to the 
question regarding the individual evaluation, !2(2, N = 55) = 55.00, p < .001. 
 
Preference for consistent information. To test the preference for consistent 
information, we used two contrasts corresponding to the focal and the alternative 
hypotheses (Judd & McClelland, 1989). The first contrast c1 (1, -1, 0) tested the 
hypothesis that the preference effect is higher in the Graded-Visible condition 
compared to the Non Graded-Visible condition. The orthogonal contrast c2 (1, 1, -2) 
opposes the Non Graded-Non Visible (control) condition to the other two conditions 
and tested the hypothesis that both visibility and grades will enhance the preference 
effect compared to the control condition. This analysis revealed that the contrast c1 
was significant, t(52)= 2.35, p < .05, #p2 = .18, suggesting that the preference effect 
was higher in the Graded-Visible condition (M = 1.46, SD = 2.00) compared to the 
Non Graded-Visible condition (M = -0.24, SD = 2.09), as predicted. The contrast c2 
was not significant, t < 1. However, a post-hoc analysis revealed that the preference 
for consistent-information was marginally higher in the Non Graded-Non Visible 
condition (M = 0.86, SD = 2.13) than in the Non Graded-Visible condition, LSD t(52) = 
1.71, p < .09. The results are presented in Figure 1.24 
 
                                                
24 Supplementary analysis. Although our main interest was to study precisely preference for consistent 
information, it is common practice in the literature on the preference effect to report the existence of 
confirmatory decision on participants’ final decision. Therefore, a dichotomous measure was derived form the 
final decision reported by participants. When the answer was confirming their initial preference (Mr. X), it was 
coded 1, whereas when the answer was not (answering: Mrs. Y, Mr. Z or Mr. X’s son) it was coded (0). It 
appeared that, across all conditions, 49.1% of participants confirmed their initial preference (Mr. X), !2(1, N = 
55) = 0.02, p = .89, ns. No difference between conditions was found !2(2, N = 55) = 2.46, p = .29, ns. 
 91 
 
Figure 1.  Experiment 1: Mean preference for consistent information as a function of 
the experimental conditions. 
 
4.3 Discussion 
 
The results of this experiment provide preliminary evidence for our focal 
hypothesis, tested with the first contrast. Indeed, participants who expected their 
work to be individually graded exhibited a significantly higher preference for 
consistent information compared to participants who expected their work to be only 
visible. The alternative hypothesis that the preference effect should increase as a 
function of visibility, tested with the second contrast, was not supported. 
An interesting, although unexpected and only marginally significant result was 
that the preference effect was marginally higher in the Non Graded-Non Visible 
condition compared to the Non Graded-Visible condition. This may suggest that when 
one!s work is not expected to be visible, individuals are not particularly motivated to 
revise their preferences. This is consistent with research on social loafing showing 
that people reduce their individual contribution to group work when their effort is not 
visible (e.g. Latané, Williams, Harkins, 1979; Karau & Williams, 1993; Williams, 
Harkins & Latané, 1981).  
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Experiment 2 
 
The first aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate the effect found in Experiment 1 
and to confirm that individual grading indeed increases the preference effect. The 
second aim was to test an assumption underlying our general hypothesis. We argued 
in the theoretical introduction that one important component of grading is the focus on 
competitive comparison with other group members; we therefore added a measure of 
perceived competition, in order to test whether participants perceive more 
competition in the Graded-Visible condition compared to other control conditions (see 
below).  
The third aim was to disentangle possible confounds related to the 
manipulation of visibility. In the Non Graded-Visible condition of Experiment 1 
participants were told that their Chief would be present because he was interested to 
follow the investigation. It is therefore difficult to know whether the reduced extent of 
the preference for consistent information was due to the expectation of one!s work 
being visible, or to the mere presence of the Chief. Thus, in this second experiment 
we broke down the former Non Graded-Visible condition into a condition of Visibility 
and a condition of Mere Presence. Visibility, or social visibility, is at stake whenever 
an individual is observed while achieving a task (Zajonc, 1965; Bond & Titus, 1983), 
whereas mere presence of a person occurs when this person is physically present 
during the individual!s performance and the individual knows that this person is not 
interested in watching performance (Cottrell, Wack, Sekerak, & Rittle, 1968). In both 
cases, some extent of visibility of the individual who is performing is at stake, but they 
are conceptually different. Interestingly, such situations that increase individual 
visibility are only deleterious to the extent that the observer!s presence explicitly 
implies the possibility of a negative evaluation (e.g. when a panel of evaluators is 
there to observe in a critical and rejecting manner the individual perform, 
Gruenewald, Kemeny, Aziz, & Fahey, 2004). Otherwise, visibility situations from 
which explicit negative social evaluation is absent do not elicit stress (Dickerson, 
Mycek, & Zaldivar, 2008). Thus, although in both cases of Visibility and Mere 
Presence individual visibility is at stake, we should not expect any deleterious effect, 
that is any increase of the preference effect: Both the Visibility and the Mere 
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Presence conditions should then lead to a lower preference effect compared to the 
Graded-Visible condition. 
Another confound in the Non Graded-Visible condition was due to the 
presence of accountability demands. Individual accountability, defined as the 
“pressure to justify one!s causal interpretation to others” (Tetlock, 1985, p.227), is 
often manipulated by increasing the visibility of one!s judgement or position taken. 
For example, participants may be told that they will have to justify their judgement or 
position to someone else (Tetlock, 1985), which implies both visibility and evaluation. 
However, contrary to a situation of grading, this evaluation is not normative: The 
focus of accountability is not on the comparability of one!s work to that of others, but 
on the underlying reasons that justify one!s own position, on examining and 
evaluating all available information that would help finding the most appropriate 
solution (Johnson & Johnson, 1985). Indeed, the literature investigating individual 
accountability has shown that asking people to be accountable for their judgments 
and decisions has positive effects on several tasks, specifically by reducing 
reasoning biases (Lerner, Goldberg and Tetlock, 1998; Tetlock, 1985; Tetlock, 1983), 
and results, for instance, in individuals producing more integrative complex thoughts 
(Tetlock, 1983; Green, Visser et Tetlock, 2000), or in becoming more responsive to 
additional diagnostic evidence (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989). Thus, compared to a 
grading situation, we expected accountability to reduce the preference effect.  
In sum, we hypothesized that the preference effect will be higher in the 
Graded-Visible condition compared to the other three experimental conditions 
(Visibility, Mere Presence, Accountability). 
 
Method 
 Participants. A total of 61 university students, from a Swiss University 
took part to this experiment (42 women and 19 men, M = 21.31 years, SD = 1.84). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions: 
Graded-Visible (N = 18), Visibility (N = 16), Mere Presence (N = 13), Accountability 
(N = 14). Again gender had no effects and was not included in the final analyses.  
Procedure. The same procedure as in Experiment 1 was used. However, this 
time the experiment was not conducted in the lab, but was part of a class exercise. 
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The instructions used in the experimental conditions were the following: in the 
Graded-Visible condition, participants were told that the Chief would be present and 
give each inspector an individual grade (ranging from 1 to 6) at the end of the 
investigation. In the Visibility condition, participants were told that the Chief would be 
present because he is interested to follow the investigation. In the Mere Presence 
condition, participants were only told that the Chief of the police inspectors would be 
present. In the Accountability condition, participants were told that the Chief would be 
present because the inspectors will have to justify their final decision to him.  
Again, participants evaluated the importance of consistent and inconsistent 
information for the final decision. Finally, they assessed their perception of 
competition, and were debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
 
Measures 
 
Preference for consistent information. This measure was computed as in 
Experiment 1. The correlation between the two items of consistent information was r 
= .39, p < .002, and the correlation between the two items of inconsistent information 
was r = .58, p < .001. 
 
Perceived competition. In order to test whether indeed the Graded-Visible 
condition induced perceived competition to a higher extent than the other 
experimental conditions, participants answered a 2-item questionnaire on a scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (totally). The questions asked whether participants 
perceived a competitive atmosphere, and whether they perceived the other members 
as rivals. The two questions were combined into a single score of perceived 
competition (r = .56, p < .001; M = 3.89, SD = 1.94).  
 
Results 
Preference for consistent information. The impact of experimental conditions on 
preference for consistent information was tested using three contrast codes. The first 
contrast c1 (3 -1 -1 -1) was associated with the four experimental conditions as 
follow: Graded-Visible / Visibility / Mere Presence / Accountability. It corresponds to 
 95 
our hypothesis according to which the preference for consistent information will be 
higher in the Graded-Visible condition compared to the other three conditions. The 
other two orthogonal contrasts were c2 (0 -1 2 -1) and c3 (0 1 0 -1). The analysis 
revealed that the contrast c1 was significant, t(57) = 2.16, p < .035, #p2 = .076, 
suggesting that preference for consistent information was significantly higher in the 
Graded-Visible condition (M = 0.89, SD = 1.72) compared to the other three 
conditions, namely Visibility (M = 0.01, SD = 2.22), Mere Presence (M = -0.23, SD = 
1.82 ), and Accountability (M = -0.71, SD = 2.14 ). The contrasts c2 and c3 were not 
significant  (ts < 1). The results are presented in Figure 2. 25 
 
   
 
Figure 2. Experiment 2: Mean preference for consistent information as a function of 
the experimental conditions 
 
Perceived competition. We tested our hypothesis regarding perceived competition 
with the same three contrast codes we used for the preference for consistent 
information. The analysis revealed that the contrast c1 was significant: t(57) = 2.32, p 
                                                
25 Supplementary analysis. Again, we studied confirmatory decision on participants’ final decision. We found 
that across all conditions, 31.1% confirmed their initial preference (Mr. X), !2(1, N = 61) = 8.67, p < .003. No 
difference between conditions was found !2(3, N = 61) = 1.98, p = 0.58, ns. 
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< .02, #p2 = .086 suggesting that participants in the Graded-Visible condition 
perceived more competition (M = 4.75, SD = 1.96) than participants in the other three 
conditions, namely Visibility (M = 3.81, SD = 2.02), Mere Presence (M = 3.19, SD = 
1.8), and Accountability (M = 3.54, SD = 1.75). The contrasts c2 and c3 were not 
significant (ts < 1). 
 
4.6 Discussion 
  The first aim of this second experiment was fulfilled, as the results replicated 
the effect found in Experiment 1. Indeed, the Graded-Visible condition increased the 
preference for consistent information, compared to the other conditions (Visibility, 
Mere Presence, Accountability). Interestingly, the effects on perceived competition 
mirrored the effects on the preference for consistent information, suggesting that 
participants were more inclined to perceive competition with others when evaluated 
with grades than in the other experimental conditions. This supports our assumption 
that evaluation by grades contains a normative component to a larger extent than the 
other conditions. 
 
General Discussion 
 
In many educational systems, the goal of developing critical thinking and 
logical argumentation among students is often hampered by the use of standard 
methods of teaching and evaluation, in particular normative assessment under the 
form of grades. The practice of using grades was shown to hinder students! ability to 
develop counter-argumentation and to avoid confirmatory tendencies (Nickerson, 
1998). Two experiments tested the hypothesis that the expectation of being graded in 
a group-work situation increases the preference for information that is consistent with 
one!s initial solution.  
Experiment 1 showed that participants who expected their work to be 
individually graded exhibited a higher preference effect compared to participants who 
expected their work to be merely visible in the group. Experiment 2 replicated this 
effect and showed that when participants expect their work to be visible, the 
presence of grades was associated with an increase in the preference effect as 
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compared with the mere visibility of one!s work, the mere presence of an evaluative 
agent, or the expectancy of being accountable for one!s work. This second 
experiment also showed that participants perceived more competition with other 
group members when they expected to be graded than when in the three other 
conditions.  
Taken together, the two experiments point to the fact that the potential of 
grades to elicit a preference effect is not due to their visibility component, as 
suggested by the significant difference between the graded condition and other 
visibility conditions in both experiments. A possible interpretation of this effect is that 
it is due instead to the ability of grades to induce a competitive social comparison, as 
suggested by the result found in Experiment 2 that grades increased the perception 
of a competitive atmosphere, and of others as competitors. To support such an 
interpretation, future research should directly manipulate what we assume to be at 
the core of the facilitating effects of grades on the preference effect, namely a 
threatening social comparison. 
The present research has important theoretical and practical implications. 
First, this research contributes to a better understanding of the effect of grades on 
information processing. By disentangling the effects of grades from the effects of 
visibility, this research showed that the deleterious effects of grades on the 
preference effect are most probably due to their normative facet, i.e. the fact that they 
facilitate competitive social comparison with co-workers, and not to their visibility 
facet. This is consistent with research showing that comparing one!s performance 
against a normative standard, such as the midpoint of a scale or a coactor, may 
trigger a self-evaluation threat that subsequently results in focusing only on the 
central features of the task (Muller & Butera, 2007).  
Second, this research also contributes to the view that confirmation bias is a 
motivated process both at the individual (Butera & Buchs, 2005) and at the group 
level (Toma et al., 2013; Toma, Vasiljevic, Augustinova, Oberlé, & Butera, 2012). We 
know from previous research that confirmation is mainly used when people need to 
defend their point of view from an opponent or from the risk of being wrong (Butera & 
Mugny, 2001). Confirmation is also more often used in groups when individual 
members have competitive, rather than cooperative goals (Toma et al., 2013). In the 
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present research, the expectation of being graded enhanced both the perception of 
competition, and the preference for consistent information.   
Third, this research has important practical implications for educational 
policies. By using grades and ranking, institutions signal their wish to prepare 
students to a future competitive labour market. In this perspective, grades may be 
used as a tool to select promising students who could occupy valued positions in 
society (Arrow, 1973). And indeed, the present research reminds that grades have a 
double function, allowing at the same time the increase in visibility of individual work 
and social comparison with others. Yet, the present results also point to the fact that 
the use of grades, in particular the focus on competition with other group members 
interferes with the capacity of individuals to consider, in an unbiased way, information 
coming from others. This is a highly valued capacity, especially in contexts where 
important decisions need to be made and where, precisely, valuing different 
alternatives can help fighting pressure to conformity and avoiding situations of 
defective group decision-making in which alternative options are often not considered 
or too rapidly rejected, i.e., the well-known groupthink phenomenon (Janis, 1982).  
Hence, the present results show that grades can increase such biased individual 
appreciation of new information presentation, which could intervene in more complex 
group decision-making situations, including cooperative ones; it appears that grades 
may nullify the dynamics of information exchange, a skill that is extremely important 
in group-learning environments (Johnson & Johnson, 1985). 
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CHAPTER 5. 
 
GRADES HAMPER INFORMATION SHARING: 
GRADING HAMPERS COOPERATIVE INFORMATION SHARING IN GROUP PROBLEM 
SOLVING26 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We hypothesized that individual grading in group work, a widespread practice, 
hampers information sharing in cooperative problem solving. Experiment 1 showed 
that a condition in which members! individual contribution was expected to be visible 
and graded, as in most graded work, led to more withholding of relevant, unshared 
information and more pooling of less-relevant, shared information than two control 
conditions where individual contribution was not graded, but either visible or not. 
Experiment 2 conceptually replicated this effect: Group members primed with grades 
pooled less of their unshared information, but more of their shared information, 
compared to group members primed with neutral concepts. Thus, grading can hinder 
cooperative work and lead to strategic information sharing. 
 
 
Keywords: information sharing, grades, hidden profiles, cooperation, mixed-
motives 
  
                                                
26 Submitted as Hayek, A.S., Toma, C., Oberlé, D., & Butera, F. (23 march 2014). Grades Hamper information 
sharing: Grading Hampers cooperative Information Sharing in group problem Solving.  
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Can people genuinely cooperate when their performance is assessed 
individually? This question epitomizes an interesting, albeit problematic societal 
phenomenon whereby cooperation is promoted as a fruitful working structure in both 
educational (e.g., Johnson & Johnson, 2009) and organizational settings (e.g., Wong, 
Tjosvold, & Liu, 2009), while at the same time individual grades are by far the 
dominant assessment tool used in these settings (Knight & Yorke, 2003). Indeed, 
students and workers are often required to cooperate on common projects, tasks, 
assignments and exercises, while being individually assessed with grades. Such 
practices, however, place students and workers in a dilemmatic situation (De Cremer, 
Snyder, & Dewitte, 2001), one in which two demands are to be considered at once: 
Acting in the interest of the group and cooperating, on the one hand, and considering 
self-interest and competing for good grades, on the other hand. The aim of the 
present research is to test the hypothesis that individuals! expectation of being 
evaluated by grades negatively impacts the cooperative information sharing in group 
problem-solving situations. 
  
 
Controversial Effects of Grades 
 
All Western citizens, with the exception of a few countries, share the 
experience of receiving grades (OECD, 2011)—be they numbers, letters or other 
labels that easily allow rank-ordering pupils and their products—right from the 
beginning of their education in primary school and all through their trajectory. It 
should be noted from the outset that, in some cases, grades can be used to produce 
criterion-referenced assessments and measure the degree to which one fulfils the 
goals of a given task (Brookhart, 2004); however the present research is limited to 
grades used to produce normative, or norm-referenced assessments, that is 
measuring people!s performance in relation to others, an average or any other 
standard. Indeed, the latter is by far the most widely used form of assessment in the 
Western world (Ames, 1992; Pope, 2003; Knight & Yorke, 2003).  
The practice of using grades was initially seen by educational scientists as 
extremely positive (Airasian, 1988): Grades were found to be good predictors of 
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achievement tests and ideal tools for summative assessments, to the extent that they 
allow a standardized measure of academic achievement (both on the short and the 
long term), and can also predict the results of some personality tests (De Ketele, 
1993). The positive effects of grades come from their potential to increase students! 
visibility and motivation (Cameron & Pierce, 2002). Indeed, expecting to be graded 
means that one!s performance is identifiable by the person assessing one!s work, 
which has been termed by various authors “visibility of performance” (Marshall & 
Weinstein, 1984), “individual visibility” (Merton, 1968), or “visibility of subjects” (Bond 
& Titus, 1983). Thus, in the present work we will use the term “visibility” to refer to 
individual visibility, i.e. the visibility of one!s own performance.  
At the same time, rewards and grades have been found to alter students! 
intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999), in particular 
through the reduction of perceived autonomy (Pulfrey, Darnon, & Butera, 2013), to 
have negative effects on performance and learning (Garbarino, 1975; Kohn, 1993), in 
particular when comparing groups evaluated with grades to groups evaluated with 
written comments (Butler & Nisan, 1986), and to impair cognitive processing (Meloth 
& Deering, 1992) and creativity (Amabile, 1983). Grades were also found to trigger 
the adoption of performance-avoidance goals, the need to avoid being outperformed 
by others (Pulfrey, Buchs, & Butera, 2011), which are related to the propensity to fear 
social comparison (Elliot & Murayama, 2008); indeed, grades render people!s 
performance more visible among group members, by enhancing the comparability of 
one!s work with that of others, a characteristic that Thorndike called the “relativity” of 
grades (Thorndike, 1913; see also Pulfrey et al., 2011). In sum, grades appear to 
elicit both individual visibility and a potentially threatening social comparison.  
 
Effects of Grades on Cooperative Information Sharing in Groups 
 
What happens, then, when educators and managers want to promote 
cooperation because of its potential for innovation (Wong & Tjosvold. 2009) and 
learning (Roseth, Johnson, & Johnson, 2008), in a system that consistently and 
pervasively assesses group work with individual normative grades? Grades elicit 
individual visibility, which in itself should not impair cooperation. Indeed, research has 
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shown that individual visibility can yield positive effects on group processes, such as 
reducing social loafing, the tendency to avoid individual effort during group work 
(Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 1979; Williams, Harkins, & Latané, 1981). However, 
grades are also involved in the processes of academic and professional selection 
(Randall & Engelhard, 2010), which makes relevant others potentially threatening 
social standards. Research has shown that when social comparison is threatening—
e.g. when relevant others are superior, or even when the others! superiority is just a 
possibility—it distracts individuals during task achievement and consumes attentional 
resources that could have been allocated to the task (Muller & Butera, 2007). The 
ability of grades to generate both normative and social standards of comparison for 
individuals might therefore interfere with cooperation, to the extent that grades might 
motivate individuals to do well personally, instead of keeping their attention focused 
on emitting cooperative behaviours for the sake of group work. 
 Thus, we expect a negative effect of grades on cooperative behaviour; in the 
present research, we study a specific cooperative behaviour, namely information 
sharing in groups that is the sharing with others of information that has the potential 
to benefit the whole group. This seems an appropriate behaviour for the present 
study, as many group work situations require cooperation at the level of group 
information sharing (e.g., the jigsaw task, Aronson, Blaney, Stephan, Sikes, & Snapp, 
1978; Johnson & Johnson, 2009), and an effective way of ensuring that a group is 
cooperating is precisely to check whether its members appropriately exchange the 
information that is the most relevant for the task (Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003; 
Schulz-Hardt, Broebeck, Mojzisch, Kerschreiter, & Frey, 2006).  
 However, the literature on group information sharing suggests that individuals 
are often reluctant to share their critical, most relevant information (e.g., Larson, 
Christensen, Abbot, & Franz, 1996; Stasser & Stewart, 1992; Stasser & Titus, 2003). 
This effect is particularly problematic in situations in which there is an asymmetric 
distribution of information, as it often happens in working groups, and group members 
need to pool their unshared information (information possessed by only one member 
at a time), as opposed to shared information (possessed by all members), in order to 
find the optimal solution (a situation that has been termed “hidden profile” in the 
literature on group decision making; cf. Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987). Indeed, 
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although hidden profiles imply positive interdependence of resources and necessarily 
require cooperation to pool unshared information, the majority of research suggests 
that members do not effectively pool their unshared information (Lu, Yuan, & 
McLeod, 2012), an effect also found with children (Gummerum, Leman, & Hollins, 
2013).  
One important reason is that in such group situations members are facing a 
mixture of cooperative incentives to act in the interest of the group and competitive 
incentives to do well personally (Davis, Laughlin, & Komorita, 1976; Wittenbaum, 
Hollingshead, & Botero, 2004). In this respect, De Dreu, Nijstad and van Knippenberg 
(2008) have suggested that the conflict between collective and self-interests 
generates so-called mixed-motives that negatively impact group processes and 
information sharing. Some studies have shown, for example, that crucial, unshared 
information was shared to a lower extent under competitive than under cooperative 
instructions, a difference that was not found on shared information (Toma & Butera, 
2009; Toma, Vasiljevic, Oberlé, & Butera, 2013). Moreover, it was shown that 
individuals pursuing competitive goals are less open to exchange task-relevant 
information with others, but are prone to show exploitative behaviour (exchanging 
irrelevant information, but using others! relevant information, Poortvliet, Jansen, Van 
Yperen, & Van de Vliert, 2007, Study 2).  
We therefore hypothesize that in a hidden-profile problem-solving situation the 
expectation of individual grades, as compared with no grades, should result in the 
group pooling less unshared information, but not necessarily less shared information. 
 
Experiment 1 
 
5.1 Method 
 
Participants. A total of 162 students (104 women and 57 men, one participant 
did not mention her/his gender, M = 23.60 years, SD = 4.01) from a large Swiss 
university were recruited by email and paid 20 Swiss francs for their participation. 
Participants were randomly assigned to 54 three-person groups, whose discussions 
were videotaped. Twelve groups were removed because of the bad quality of the 
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recording. Therefore, the remaining 42 groups were distributed to different 
experimental conditions as follow: 13 groups in the Non Graded - Non Visible 
condition, 15 groups in the Non Graded – Visible condition, and 14 groups in the 
Graded – Visible condition. 
 
Task. The task used was a problem-solving task concerning a road accident 
structured as a hidden profile (see Toma & Butera, 2009, appendix). Four persons 
were potential suspects in this accident, but three of them were exonerated (Mr. X, 
Mrs. Y, and Mr. Z) and the fourth (Mr. X!s son) incriminated based on a critical set of 
9 clues. The entire set of information contained 28 items: 19 shared and 9 critical 
unshared items. A hidden profile was created by distributing three critical unshared 
items to each of the group members. The 19 shared items described the accident!s 
circumstances and suspects! characteristics (descriptive information). The 9 
unshared items if pooled together, allow for the identification of Mr. X!s son as the 
guilty person (identification information). This task is particularly suited to measure 
cooperative information sharing among group members, because any neglect of 
unshared information can be interpreted as intentional and motivated behaviour. 
Indeed, task characteristics have been pre-tested in several pilot experiments by 
Toma and Butera (2009), which revealed that participants were able to discriminate 
between shared and unshared information, and between important and unimportant 
information; participants also understand that pooling unshared information is needed 
to solve the case.  
 
Procedure. Upon their arrival in the laboratory, participants were told that they 
were taking part in a study on “how people who work in teams get to solve criminal 
cases”. The experimenter explained that the study included two phases. During the 
first phase, the participants were individually provided with the case, and asked to 
identify the person responsible for the car accident. They were each provided with 19 
shared information items and 3 unshared items, orienting each participant toward one 
specific suspect. They had a maximum of three minutes to individually derive who 
was the person responsible for the accident. During the second phase, participants 
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were asked to work as a team and to discuss the case in order to identify the guilty 
person for no more than 15 minutes.  
They were also informed that they did not have the same information and that 
shared information items were presented in the first paragraph of the case 
description page, whilst unshared information items in the second paragraph. The 
groups were instructed to cooperate to reach a common solution, write down their 
final solution once they decided, and call the experimenter to end the session. After 
the introductory instructions, supplementary instructions depending on the 
experimental conditions were given.  
The most ecological manipulation of grades requires a context of both 
individual visibility (because, as shown, grades usually make one!s performance 
visible) and comparison (because, as also shown, grades usually make one!s 
performance comparable to that of others). Thus, the grade condition was contrasted 
with two control conditions, to account for the two possible sources of variation.  
Groups in the Graded – Visible condition, the experimental condition, were told 
that the teamwork was videotaped, and that the experimenter was not only interested 
in the group solution but also in each member!s individual contribution. They were 
told that each contribution would be graded on a scale ranging from 1 to 6, which 
corresponds to the usual grading range in Switzerland.  
Groups in the Non Graded – Visible condition were told that the teamwork was 
videotaped in order to ensure that each group member contributed in finding the 
group solution. They were also told that the experimenter was only interested in the 
group solution, and that the individual contributions were not assessed. 
Groups in the Non Graded - Non Visible condition were told that the teamwork 
was not videotaped and that the experimenter was only interested in the group 
solution.  
All groups were instructed to call the experimenter when the discussion ended. 
The experimenter then explained the purpose and design of the study. The entire 
experiment lasted about 45minutes.  
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Dependent measures: information pooling during groups discussions. 
Every group discussion was videotaped and fully transcribed. Two independent 
coders, blind to the hypotheses and to the type of information (unshared vs. shared), 
analysed the transcriptions. Coders had been especially trained in video coding: 
They were instructed to code the number of times all information items were 
mentioned, which included the unshared and shared items of the description, other 
irrelevant items, and comments of all sorts that participants made while the task was 
carried out. This coding thus allowed having the full group discussions coded. The 
inter-raters reliability was calculated by computing for each item of information an 
intra-class coefficient (ICC) of absolute agreement in a mixed model (McGraw & 
Wong, 1996). When an item had an ICC of minimum value of .4 and a p-value < .05, 
the two scores of the raters were combined into a mean. The disagreements between 
raters were solved by discussion. The intra-class correlation of the coded information 
items had an estimated reliability varying between 0.44 and 1.27 
 
The dependent measures were derived from the coded group discussions. 
Participants had 28 items of information available to solve the case: 19 shared and 9 
unshared information items. If participants were to respect the base-rates, they 
should discuss more shared than unshared information. However, because several 
studies suggested that participants do not follow base rates (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974; Stasser & Stewart, 1992; Toma & Butera, 2009), we computed a measure that 
is closer to the participants! actual behaviour. More specifically, we computed (1) the 
proportion of unshared information by dividing the number of mentioned unshared 
information by the total amount of all items of information actually mentioned, and (2) 
the proportion of shared information by dividing the number of mentioned shared 
information by the total amount of all items of information actually mentioned during 
each group discussion. The overall discussion time of each group was also 
computed, and entered in the analysis as a covariate.28 
                                                
27 Although a correlation of 1 seems very unlikely to happen, it is nevertheless not surprising to have some 
measures with a perfect correlation, for some of the items coded were not prone to subjective coding (e.g., 
concerning measures where coders had to count the number of times where an unshared information was stated). 
28 Discussion Time and its interaction with the two contrasts were added to the information pooling regression 
analysis. Indeed, one can argue that the time spent by the groups to discuss and achieve the task is directly linked 
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5.2 Results 
Overview of analyses. To test our hypothesis we set two orthogonal 
contrasts: C1, the model contrast that describes our hypothesis (+1, +1, -2, 
corresponding respectively to the Non Graded - Non Visible, Non Graded – Visible, 
and Graded – Visible conditions), and C2, its orthogonal contrast (+1, -1, 0) 
corresponding to the residual variance (Abelson & Prentice, 1997).  
Preliminary linear regression analyses on the proportion of pooled information 
included Groups! sexual composition (coded -1 for groups with a minority of women 
and +1 for groups with a majority of women), Discussion Time, as well as the 
interaction between Discussion time and the C1 and C2 contrasts. These analyses 
revealed a main effect of Discussion time, although it did not significantly interact with 
any of our relevant contrasts29. No effect of Groups! sexual composition was found. 
Therefore, Discussion Time as well as its interactions with the C1 and C2 contrasts 
were entered as covariates (Yzerbyt, Muller, & Judd, 2004), while Groups! sexual 
composition was dropped from the final model.  
 
Proportion of unshared information. The model in which the proportion of 
unshared information was regressed on the five predictors revealed a main effect of 
the C1 contrast (+1, +1, -2), b = .02, SE = .006, F(1, 36) = 9.94, p < .003,  #p2 = .22, 
showing that, as predicted, groups in the Graded – Visible condition pooled 
significantly less unshared information (M = 0.46; SD = 0.05) than did groups in the 
Non Graded – Visible condition (M = 0.51; SD = 0.08) and the Non Graded - Non 
Visible condition (M = 0.53; SD = 0.07). The effect of the residual contrast C2 was not 
significant, b = .01, SE = .011, F(1, 36) = 1.49, p = .23.  
                                                                                                                                                   
to the opportunity groups had to share a given amount of information (the more time groups have spent to 
achieve the task, the longer the opportunity to share information). 
29 Controlling for Discussion Time regarding the proportion of Unshared Information, a significant 
main effect of Discussion Time was found, b = .001, SE = .001, F(1, 35) = 14.65, p < .001, !2p = 0.3. A marginal 
interaction between Discussion Time and C1 was also found, b = -4.812E-5, SE = .001, F(1, 35) = 3.05, p < .09, 
!
2
p = 0.08. Therefore Discussion Time and its interactions with the contrasts were kept in the model (Yzerbyt, 
Muller, & Judd, 2004). Controlling for Discussion Time regarding the proportion of Shared Information, a 
significant main effect of Discussion Time was found, b = -.001, SE = .001, F(1, 35) = 9.33, p < .004, !2p = 0.21. 
A marginal interaction between Discussion Time and the residual contrast was found, b = -.001, SE = .001, F(1, 
35) = 3.87, p < .06, !2p = 0.1. Again, Discussion Time and its interactions with the contrasts were kept in the 
model. 
 
 108
  
Proportion of shared information. The model in which the proportion of 
shared information was regressed on the five predictors revealed a main effect of the 
C1 contrast (+1, +1, -2), b = -.02, SE = .008, F(1, 36) = 5.24, p < .03, #p2 = 0.13, 
showing that the amount of shared information pooled during discussion also 
significantly differed between conditions. This time, groups in the Graded – Visible 
condition pooled significantly more shared information (M = 0.29; SD = 0.07) than 
groups in the Non Graded – Visible (M = 0.24; SD = 0.09) and Non Graded - Non 
Visible conditions (M = 0.22; SD = 0.08). The effect of the residual contrast C2 was 
not significant, b = -.01, SE = .014, F(1, 36) = 0.97 p = .33. No other effect reached 
significance. The results are presented in Figure 1.30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Proportions of unshared and shared information pooled as a function of 
experimental conditions (Experiment 1). 
                                                
30 Supplementary analyses. Although our main interest was to study precisely the group information sharing 
process, it is common practice in the literature on hidden profiles to report group performance. Therefore, the 
solutions provided by the groups (Mr. X, Mrs. Y, Mr. Z or Mr. X’s son) were studied; it appeared that 90.7% of 
the groups had found the correct answer (Mr. X’s son), regardless of condition, "2 (6, N = 54) = 8.65, p = .19. 
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5.3 Discussion 
 
The results revealed that information pooling was impacted differently by the 
experimental manipulation depending on whether this information was uniquely or 
jointly held by the group members. More precisely, groups in the Graded – Visible 
condition pooled less critical, unshared information, and more shared information 
compared to groups in the two control conditions. Interestingly, in the two control 
conditions, where individual visibility was either not enhanced, or enhanced but 
without the expectation of grades, groups appeared to be willing to exchange the 
same amount of unshared, relevant information. This suggests that individual visibility 
alone is not detrimental to group information sharing, unless it is accompanied by the 
expectation of being graded.  
Although the results of this experiment were in line with our hypothesis, one 
could argue that the Graded – Visible condition, although closely patterning most 
natural situations of grading, implied negative reward interdependence between 
group members (Deutsch, 1979; Kelley & Thibaut, 1969; Johnson et al., 1981). 
Moreover, this condition also introduced two sources of individual visibility: One 
explicitly stated by the experimenter and one more implicit, inherent to the attribution 
of grades. Thus, the Graded – Visible condition differed from the others with regard to 
attribution of grades, enhanced individual visibility and negative reward 
interdependence.  
 
Experiment 2 
 
We therefore conducted a second study to eliminate the above confounds, 
using a more subtle manipulation of grades with a priming procedure, and we 
hypothesized that groups working in an explicitly cooperative setting will pool less 
unshared information, but not necessarily less shared information, when primed with 
grades than when primed with a neutral concept (control condition).  
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5.4 Method 
 
Participants. A total of 96 students enrolled in a large Swiss university (54 
women and 42 men, M = 21.78 years, SD = 3.34) with different academic 
backgrounds volunteered in this study. They were recruited mainly via email but also 
directly in cafeterias and working areas. Participants were randomly assigned to 32 
three-person groups. Six-groups were removed from the analyses because of the 
poor quality of the recording. Therefore, the remaining 26 groups were distributed to 
different experimental conditions as follow: 14 groups primed with grades, and 12 
primed with a neutral concept.  
 
Procedure. The task used in this second experiment was identical to the one 
used in Experiment 1. In this experiment, however, upon their arrival at the 
laboratory, participants! attention was drawn to a poster hanging in one of the corners 
of the room. They were told that the poster had been previously used for an 
introductory training session devoted to new foreign teaching assistants, and that 
they were not to pay attention to it. Two different posters were presented depending 
on which experimental condition groups were assigned to. The two posters had 
exactly the same format (a vertical axis in the shape of an arrow pointing to the top) 
with a description on its right, but their content differed. In the Grades Prime condition 
the poster was entitled “Grading and ranking students”, and the description displayed 
grades used in the Swiss educational system, ranging from (1) Poor, to (6) Excellent, 
and moving from bottom to top (see Appendix II). For each grade, the percentage of 
success it implied was mentioned. In the Neutral Prime condition the poster was 
entitled “Getting to know one!s work environment”, and the description displayed the 
different organizational structures belonging to the university campus, ranging from 
bottom, the common services provided (student associations, university restaurant), 
to top, the highest authorities (president of university), again in six levels.  
Groups in both conditions received the same experimental instructions as in 
Experiment 1 with regard to group work and the task. They followed the same two-
step procedure: Individual work, then group work. This time the experimenter 
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announced at the beginning of the study that the group work would be recorded, 
implying that in both conditions individual performance would be visible.  
Dependent measures. The same dependent measures as in Experiment 1 
were used, namely the proportion of unshared and shared information over the total 
items of information actually mentioned. The intra-class correlation of the coded 
information items had an estimated reliability varying between 0.71 and 1. 
 
5.5 Results 
 
Overview of analyses. As in Experiment 1, Discussion Time31 was entered 
as a covariate. The Experimental conditions variable was coded (-1) for the Neutral 
Prime condition and (+1) for the Grades Prime condition. Preliminary analyses also 
included Groups! sexual composition, coded (-1) for groups with a minority of women 
and (+1) for groups with a majority of women, but these analyses revealed no effect 
of Groups! sexual composition on the proportion of pooled information. Therefore the 
variable was not retained in the model. 
  
Proportion of unshared information. The linear regression model in which 
the proportion of unshared information was regressed on the three predictors 
revealed a main effect of the experimental conditions variable, b = -.03, SE= .014, 
F(1, 22) = 4.28, p < .05, #2p = .16, showing that groups in the Grades Prime condition 
pooled significantly less unshared information (M = 0.50; SD = 0.05) than did groups 
in the Neutral Prime condition (M = 0.56; SD = 0.07).  
 
Proportion of shared information. The model in which the proportion of 
shared information was regressed on the three predictors revealed a main effect of 
the experimental conditions variable, b = .04, SE = .015, F(1, 22) = 5.76, p < .03, #2p 
= .21, showing that groups in the Grades Prime condition pooled significantly more 
                                                
31 Preliminary analyses revealed that Discussion Time was not normally distributed; therefore it was entered in 
the model after a square root transformation. 
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shared information (M = 0.27; SD = 0.07) than groups in the Neutral Prime condition 
(M = 0.18; SD = 0.06). The results are presented in Figure 2.32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Proportions of unshared and shared information pooled as a function of 
experimental conditions (Experiment 2). 
 
 
 
                                                
32 Supplementary analyses. Again, we studied group performance as a supplementary analysis, but the effect of 
our manipulation on group performance could not be tested, since all groups, irrespective of the condition, found 
the correct solution. 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
Grades Prime Neutral Prime 
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
s
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 p
o
o
le
d
 d
u
ri
n
g
 g
ro
u
p
 
d
is
c
u
s
s
io
n
s
 
Experimental Conditions 
Unshared Information 
Shared Information 
 113 
5.6 Discussion 
 
This second study provides supplementary evidence that in a cooperative 
group situation grades interfere with group!s cooperative behaviour and negatively 
impact the pooling of the most relevant information, namely unshared information. In 
Experiment 1 it was difficult to disentangle whether the effect observed on 
information sharing was due to the presence of grades, or to the negative 
interdependence of reward that the manipulation of grades implied. Therefore, in 
Experiment 2 we rendered the two experimental conditions comparable by proposing 
two cooperative twin-conditions, set with the same positive resource and goal 
interdependences and no negative interdependence of rewards. Results found in this 
second study confirmed our hypothesis showing that groups primed with grades 
pooled significantly less unshared information, but also more shared information, 
than groups in the control condition. 
 
 
General Discussion 
 
The practice of using grades, whatever their form, has been considered for 
many years as a positive feature of performance assessment, because it was 
supposed to increase workers! and learners! visibility and motivation (Cameron & 
Pierce, 2002), and thereby facilitate achievement and cooperation (De Ketele, 1993; 
Johnson & Johnson, 2002). It is therefore common practice to use individual grading 
even for tasks that need to be carried out cooperatively. In the present research, we 
took the perspective of a different line of research pointing out that individual grading 
for cooperative tasks is particularly problematic, because it creates mixed-motives 
situations in which people are in fact required to act in the interest of the group and 
cooperate, and at the same time to consider self-interest and compete for good 
grades. We therefore hypothesized that the expectation of being graded hampers the 
cooperative information sharing behaviour in group problem solving. 
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In two studies we tested the effects of grading on a group cooperative 
behavior, namely on groups! willingness to share relevant, unshared information in 
hidden profiles. In Experiment 1 results revealed that groups in the Graded – Visible 
condition pooled less unshared information, the really valuable information in this 
task, and more shared information than groups in the other two conditions. In 
Experiment 2 we conceptually replicated this effect using a priming manipulation of 
grades: Group members primed with grades pooled less of their unshared, relevant 
information, and more of their shared, irrelevant information compared to group 
members primed with neutral concepts. 
The results of the two studies are complementary and point to a strategic 
sharing of information resulting from the expectation or the mere activation of grades: 
When grades were present, group members withheld useful, unshared information 
and pooled information that the other group members already had. The first study 
highlights that individual visibility in itself has got no deleterious effects, and that it is 
the use of grades that hampers cooperative group work. The second study confirms 
our contention that grades are solely responsible for group members! strategic 
pooling of information, by showing that the mere priming of grades produces similar 
effects to those obtained in Experiment 1 with actual expectation of grades.  
 
This research has important theoretical and practical implications. First, this 
research contributes to questioning the theoretical perspective that grades are ideal 
tools for summative assessments and more broadly, good normative standards for 
evaluation (Butler & Nisan, 1986; Covington & Omelich, 1984; Graham & Golan, 
1991). At least as far as cooperative work is concerned, the present research shows 
that grading leads to suboptimal information sharing. This research also contributes 
to showing the consequences of the view that grades, by increasing students! 
individual visibility, increase their motivation to perform well on tasks (Cameron & 
Pierce, 2002). Indeed, in cooperative tasks, the motivation to perform well may very 
well interfere with the motivation to interact cooperatively. Our results, in particular 
those of Experiment 1, revealed that while individual visibility in itself was not found to 
impair information sharing, individual visibility associated with grades did. Taken 
together, the two studies point to the difficulty to create cooperative group 
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environments when normative evaluative standards are used with the aim to assess 
individuals! contribution. It seems that a cooperative structure can be easily damaged 
when group members expect to be individually graded.  
 
One might ask why grades negatively impact groups! cooperative information 
sharing behaviours, and the lack of mediators in the present research is a limitation 
that calls for future studies. Although not tested in this research, one possibility is that 
grades induce a threatening social comparison with the other group members; the 
priming effect in Experiment 2 suggests indeed that grades may remind group 
members of previous situations in which individual evaluation had resulted in 
differential appreciation of people, as it often happens for instance in school. 
Withholding useful information and pooling useless information may then be a way to 
maximize the chances to be the one who discovers the correct solution and, even 
though the task is cooperative, to receive greater praise for this achievement. In line 
with this idea, a study by Fischer, Kastenmüller, Frey and Peus (2009) showed that 
individuals facing a threatening social comparison are more reluctant to transmit 
high-quality information to their colleagues. Future research should directly test this 
potential underlying mechanism with regard to the effect of grades. 
 
Second, this research also contributes to the recent trend that has started 
considering groups as motivated information processors (De Dreu et al., 2008; Toma 
et al., 2012). This literature suggests that the conflict between collective and self-
interests generates mixed-motives that negatively impact group information sharing 
(e.g., Wittenbaum et al., 2004). Some studies involving information pooling have 
shown, for example, that in competitive situations less unshared information is pooled 
than in cooperative situations, a difference that is not found on shared information 
(Toma & Butera, 2009; Toma et al., 2012). Other studies obtained similar results 
when testing the impact of cooperative and competitive individual traits on group 
decision processes (De Dreu et al., 2006). However, in previous research mixed-
motives were represented by the confrontation of the positive resource 
interdependence elicited by the hidden-profiles task and the negative goal 
interdependence elicited by competition instructions; no study directly used a mixed-
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motive situation combining positive and negative goal interdependence. In the 
present research, we created for the first time a group working context in which 
members are explicitly asked to cooperate—a context of positive goal 
interdependence—, while being individually evaluated by grades—a context that is 
most often one of negative goal interdependence, as students have learned in the 
course of their history of academic selection (Darnon, Dompnier, Delmas, Pulfrey, & 
Butera, 2009). Therefore our research adds to the previous literature on group 
information sharing by showing that in a mixed-motives situation, negative goal 
interdependence takes over positive goal interdependence, with the result of 
reducing the sharing of relevant information.  
 
Finally, this research suggests that grades may represent two dangers for 
actual working groups. The first is to nullify the benefits of cooperation. Recent 
research in the area of cooperative work, and cooperative learning in particular, has 
shown that cooperation is a delicate structure, and that any cue that might imply 
some form of threatening social comparison disrupts the beneficial effects of 
cooperative learning (e.g., Buchs, Butera, & Mugny, 2004; Buchs, Pulfrey, Gabarrot, 
& Butera, 2010; Buchs, Gilles, Dutrévis, & Butera, 2011). Grades might very well be 
one instance of such cues. The second danger is to induce anti-social behaviours, 
even in potentially cooperative settings. Recent research has shown that self-
enhancement values, defined as the pursuit of individual interests, personal success 
and power acquisition (Schwartz, 2006), predict cheating (Pulfrey & Butera, 2013). 
As the expectation of grades may prioritize individual interests and personal success, 
it is also possible that it induces cheating behaviours, even when group members are 
encouraged to cooperate. After all, the withholding of information that we have 
observed in the present two studies in the grading conditions is a form of anti-social 
behaviour, even if it cannot be equated to utter cheating. With this in mind, we can 
only recommend to avoid grading individuals in cooperative groups.  
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CHAPTER 6. 
 
GRADES DEGRADE GROUP COORDINATION:  
DETERIORATED PERFORMANCE AND INTERACTIONS IN A COOPERATIVE 
COGNITIVE-MOTOR TASK33 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
At school pupils often cooperate on common projects and must coordinate 
their different individual actions. However, grades are pervasively used even in 
cooperative situations, which makes the pupils! differences in achievement and their 
relative rank salient and reduce people!s inclination to work constructively with 
others. Thus, we hypothesized that grades would disrupt performance in a 
cooperative cognitive-motor task necessitating inter-individual coordination of 
members. In a study with 5th graders, grades (vs. a neutral concept) were primed at 
the onset of a cooperative group interaction. Results showed that, although pupils 
were set to work cooperatively, priming grades (vs. neutral concepts) harmed inter-
individual coordination by decreasing group performance, and elicited more negative 
dominant behaviours among pupils during interactions. 
 
Keywords: grades, inter-individual coordination, cooperation, dominant 
behaviours. 
  
                                                
33 In preparation as Hayek, A.S., Toma, C., Guidotti, S., Oberlé, D., & Butera, F. (2014). Grades degrade group 
coordination: Performance and interactions deteriorated in a cooperative motor-task. 
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Teachers often require from pupils to cooperate on a common project, which 
may require a certain degree of coordination of the different individual actions. This 
practice is often built on the idea that cooperating on a group work will benefit pupils! 
learning, the quality of their interactions and the final product of the group (Buchs, 
Butera, & Mugny, 2004; Johnson, Johnson, & Smith, 2007; Roseth, Johnson, & 
Johnson, 2008). At the same time, grades are pervasively used in schools to assess 
the work of individual pupils, with the effect of making the pupils! differences in 
achievement and their relative rank salient (Pulfrey, Buchs, & Butera, 2011), which 
may reduce people!s inclination to work constructively with others (Darnon, Muller, 
Schrager, Pannuzzo, & Butera, 2006).  
Thus, whereas a cooperative group work often tacitly implies a coordination of 
its members! actions (McGrath, Arrow, & Berdahl, 1999), it is possible that grades 
alter group!s cooperation, when it is defined by members! capacity to coordinate their 
actions and efforts towards the joint achievement of a task. However, although a fair 
amount of research has shown that grades may yield negative effects on individual 
motivation (e.g., Pulfrey, Darnon, & Butera, 2013), performance and learning (e.g., 
Kohn, 1993), there is a dearth of research studying the effects of grades on group 
work (for an exception, see Hayek, Toma, Oberlé, & Butera, 2014), and virtually no 
research—to the best of our knowledge—on their effect on inter-individual 
coordination. Hence, in the present work, we test the hypothesis that grades could 
undermine group cooperation under the form of inter-individual coordination, in a 
study with 5th graders. 
 
Grades in Educational Settings: Comparative, Ego-involving and 
Threatening  
 
Starting from elementary school, pupils are socialised to be assessed with 
grades, and to understand the importance of grades for their future success 
(Anderman & Midgley, 1997). Indeed, during this process, pupils increase their focus 
on concerns regarding their self-ability or their performance relative to others when 
achieving a task, as opposed to a focus on learning and mastering the task (Pintrich, 
2000a; Anderman & Young, 1993). In other words, pupils discover the importance of 
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achieving relative to other students (e.g. the ranking emphasis), that is the 
importance of norm-referenced assessments (Brookhart, 2004).  
 
In this respect grades hold two entwined characteristics, namely being ego-
involving and enhancing social comparison. Indeed, grades are ego-involving (as 
opposed to task-involving; Nicholls, 1979, 1983) to the extent that they imply 
important consequences in terms of status and selection in the class. They focus 
individual!s “attention on the self by emphasizing outcome or social comparison (or 
both), rather than process or task mastery” (Butler, 1987, p. 475). These two 
characteristics are important for the present research, to the extent that comparison 
to a normative standard may prompt a threatening comparison that has been shown 
to be deleterious for peer relations and learning (Butera, Darnon, Buchs, & Muller, 
2006; Mugny, Butera, Quiamzade, Dragulescu, & Tomei, 2003). Hence, if grades 
highlight the importance of performing well as compared to others, they could be 
pressuring for group performance because “any factor or combination of factors that 
increases the importance of performing well on a particular occasion” (Baumeister, 
1984, p. 610) creates pressure and may result in performance impairment 
(Crouzevialle & Butera, 2013). More to the point, Darnon and Butera (2007) have 
shown that when people disagree and should therefore coordinate their points of 
view, goals that focus people on performing better than others result on the contrary 
in the tendency to affirm one!s own competence over that of the other. Thus, it is 
possible that grades reduce inter-individual coordination in groups. 
 
 
Inter-Individual Coordination, an Indicator of Group Cooperation  
 
Inter-individual coordination can be viewed as the means by which actions of 
individuals are joined towards the successful achievement of a common goal. In 
other words, coordination is an indicator of cooperation in that it supports and 
enhances cooperation when it is finely achieved (Johnson & Johnson, 2009a).  
Hence, in a cooperative task where coordination is necessary for good group 
performance (e.g., The cooperative game, Doise & Mugny, 1981), a finely achieved 
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coordination should impact performance on the task (task-focus level; Bales, 1950). 
Similarly, fine coordination reflecting group cooperation should impact the relational 
level of group functioning (i.e., group-focus level). It is what Barron (2000) observed 
when analysing interactions of 6th-grade boys triads set to work collaboratively on a 
problem-solving task (i.e., a trip-planning problem, cf. Barron, 2000, p. 410). The triad 
in which members coordinated their responses gave complete and accurate 
solutions, its members initiated complementary roles, had comfortable inter-individual 
relations, and treated common material as a “centre of coordination” (ibid. p. 430). 
The triad where coordination failed gave partial solutions, its members struggled with 
lack of control, bad communication, and treated the common material as a “contested 
territory” (p. 430). Hence, to study coordination as an indicator of successful 
cooperation, it is crucial to use a task where inter-individual coordination of actions 
and constructive inter-individual relations are functional to task success.  
 
The Cooperative Game  
 
These features are gathered in the “Cooperative Game” (Doise & Mugny, 
1981), a cognitive-motor task initially created to study cooperation as a dynamic 
process of cognitive development in children. In its version for three players, the 
device requires from players to use pulleys to coordinate their hand-eye movements 
in order to successfully achieve a go on a board game (cf. Methods and Appendix 
III). Hence, the better they coordinate their movements, the higher the group 
performance. Furthermore, to coordinate, players are allowed to speak, gesticulate, 
but not to leave their position. Therefore, speech and gesture are prevailing modes of 
communication (Schmid Mast, 2002; Tusing & Dillard, 2000) as they facilitate 
monitoring one another!s work (Foreman & Cazden, 1985), and the better they 
communicate, the higher the group performance.  
 
Thus, in the present task, performance is dependent upon coordination at two 
levels. At task-focus level, performance is the direct expression of motor 
coordination, to the extent that the movement of the ball pen requires that the three 
partners roll and unroll their pulleys at the same time. All actions that attempt to show 
 121 
one!s superiority over the others, as for instance pulling all the time, may therefore 
impair performance. At group-focus level, performance depends on positive relations 
and communication of relevant information and action intentions. All communications 
that reveal a struggle for control, such as for instance giving orders to others, in terms 
of negative dominant behaviours may therefore impair performance. Indeed, socially 
dominant individuals can be defined as the ones who “successfully manage to control 
resources in the presence of others, regardless of how they do it” (Hawley, 2002, 
p.168). However in order to control resources, socially dominant individuals can use 
two types of strategies: Make use of rather pro-social strategies (i.e. use of pro-social 
behaviours as an effective resource control strategy), or use rather coercive 
strategies (i.e. monopolizing to control resources). Between the two types of social 
dominant behaviours, only the pro-social behaviour is associated with social 
competence and is positively evaluated by peers. On the contrary, negative or 
coercive social dominance can be maladaptive and can disrupt cooperation (Rubin & 
Rose-Krasnor, 1992). Indeed, several studies suggest that negative social 
dominance may interfere with group performance, under the form of behaviours such 
as interruptions in discussions (Brody & Smith-Lovin, 1989), authoritarian gestures 
(Dunbar & Burgoon, 2005), and intrusive behaviours (touching and pointing at others; 
Leffler, Gillespie, & Conaty, 1982).  
 
Thus, we decided to focus only on the negative social dominant behaviours 
because, as previously mentioned, this is the type of behaviours that are expected to 
disrupt cooperation. More precisely, if grades are ego-involving and represent a 
potentially competitive social comparison, they should lead individuals to try to put 
themselves forward during the Cooperative Game interactions, and therefore to try to 
monopolize the action. In sum, negative social dominant behaviours can be 
operationalized by “floor-taking” control indices (i.e. monopolization), as well as 
indices of emotional negative tension, thereby capturing at once the social 
dominance part of the behaviour and its negative valence. 
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Hypotheses 
 
We have shown in the first section of this introduction that grades create an 
evaluative pressure that focuses individuals on performance relative to others (Butler, 
1987), which is known to promote assertion of one!s own competence over that of the 
other (Darnon & Butera, 2007). We have also shown in the last section how 
performance at a cooperative task relying upon inter-individual coordination would be 
impaired by such a dominant behaviour, both at the motor coordination and at the 
communication level. Thus, we hypothesise that the presence of grades should 
deteriorate group performance in the cooperative game (Hypothesis 1), as well as 
interactions among individuals, under the form of negative dominant behaviours 
(Hypothesis 2) in comparison to groups working in a grades-free environment. 
 
6.1 Method 
 
Participants and design 
Participants were 132 5th-grade pupils enrolled in two elementary schools in 
the Italian-speaking canton in Switzerland; before the experiment we obtained the 
agreement of the school!s headmaster and the teachers, as well as the signed 
authorization of the children!s parents. Participants were randomly assigned to 44 
three-person groups; 2 groups were excluded, one because a member had a motor 
disability, and another because a member had concentration problems. The 42 
groups were randomly assigned to the two experimental conditions: 20 in the Neutral 
Priming condition, and 22 in the Grades Priming condition (M = 10.22 years, SD = 
0.23). Among the 42 groups, 26 were composed of a majority of girls and 16 by a 
majority of boys. 
 
Materials and procedure 
 
Materials. The “cooperative game” device was composed of a board game 
(comprising a three-lane trail: inner, middle, outer lanes, delimited into squares, with 
a start/finish square; cf. Appendix III, panel B), 3 pulleys fixed on the board game and 
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connected together by strings linked to a device supporting a ballpoint pen (cf. 
Appendix III. panel A). Pulleys could be adjusted in two ways making it more or less 
hard for players to roll/unroll them: pulleys loosened vs. strengthened34. Therefore, 
groups performed two goes: one with loosened pulleys, another with them 
strengthened (the order was counter-balanced). The two adjustment modes have 
been used to follow the original features of Doise and Mugny!s materials. 
 
Procedure. Pupils were randomly sent by their teacher to the classroom 
where the experiment was taking place in groups of three. Once inside, they were 
placed around the Cooperative Game, each standing behind a pulley. The 
experimenter explained that their goal was to move forward the pen, from the first to 
the last square, without drawing out the middle lane; to this effect, they would have to 
only use the pulleys and to coordinate them. The experimenter added that the label 
taped on the side of the board game concerned a previous experiment and that it 
was not to be removed (supraliminal priming35), following the method set by Hayek et 
al. (2014, experiment 2). In the Grades Priming condition, the label depicted a scale 
of grades ranging from 2 (very bad) to 6 (excellent), which is the range of grades 
used in the Swiss educational system (cf. Appendix III, panel C). In the Neutral 
Priming condition, the label had the same graphical appearance as in the other 
condition, but it represented a scale converting 1 meter into different units (ranging 
from millimetres to kilometres). As discussed by Hayek et al. (2014) this method has 
the advantage of activating grades without incurring the risk that the actual 
distribution of grades creates a negative goals interdependence among group 
members in a task that is supposed to be based on cooperation, that is positive goals 
interdependence. 
                                                
34 The first setting (pulleys strengthened), initially designed to restrict players’ non-intentional movements (cf. 
Doise & Mugny, 1997), required from players to intentionally release their pulley to allow other players to pull, 
making it impossible for other players to pull strong enough on their own pulley and control the others’ pulley’s 
release. In the second setting (pulleys loosened), the pulleys are not locked, allowing players to unroll the others’ 
pulley simply by pulling.
 
 
35 In supraliminal priming or conscious priming, the participant is exposed to the priming stimuli as part of a 
conscious task. That is, the individual is fully aware of the priming stimuli itself, but is not aware of some 
underlying pattern that serves to prime the construct (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). 
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Then, the experimenter demonstrated on one pulley how the device worked, 
pointing out that when pulleys were tightened they were difficult to roll and one had to 
intentionally roll and unroll one!s own pulley, making it useless to pull in order to 
unroll someone else!s pulley. On the reverse, when loosened, rolling one!s pulley 
could exert an indirect control on the pulley of another participants. After these 
instructions, the experimenter withdrew to a corner of the room, leaving participants 
to perform the first go. Then, the experimenter inverted the pulleys! setting 
(strengthening or loosening them) and leaving participants to achieve their second 
go. The experiment ended when groups finished the second go. The overall 
experiment lasted about 20 minutes per group (exact time to perform each go was 
recorded, see below) and interactions were videotaped. The participants were 
thanked and debriefed; at the end of the experiment the teachers received a full 
written account of the experiment, to be shared with the pupils and the parents. 
 
 
Dependent Measures 
 
Overview of dependent measures. All dependent measures presented 
below were repeated measures, measured and computed for each go.  
 
Performance. Group performance scores for each go were calculated by 
respectively adding +1 point for each square when the drawn line was inside the 
middle lane; 0 point, when it went over-line and entered the inner or outer lane; and -
1 point, when it went out of the whole three-lane trail figure.  
The task was new to the participants and likely to display an increase in 
performance throughout the experiment, whereby with time the group members 
become more acquainted with the task and with their fellow group members, and 
more effective at coordinating their work. To investigate the evolution of group 
performance during each go, the path was divided in three parts (Beginning, Middle, 
End). Given that the three parts did not hold an equal number of squares, sub-scores 
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of performance based on raw data were not comparable36; therefore, we calculated a 
percentage of performance for each part, dividing the actual performance sub-score 
obtained on each part by the maximum performance score that could have been 
theoretically expected on each part (that is, 48 points for Beginning and Middle parts, 
47 points for the End part), and multiplying by 100. 
 
Amount of Negative Dominant Behaviours (NDBs). Regarding the 
observation of social dominance behaviours, we decided to focus only on the 
emission of negative dominance behaviours, as contrary to positive dominance 
behaviours, they are the ones expected to disrupt cooperation. We decided to 
operationalize the NDB variable by computing an indicator that captures at the same 
time the social dominance part of the behaviour and the negative affects. We 
computed the amount of NBDs produced at group level, based on the observation of 
both verbal and non-verbal micro-level behaviours. Indeed, negative dominant 
behaviours can be measured by “floor-taking” indices, such as the number of oral 
interventions to give orders to others, and the voice intonation used (Bales, 1950).  
Three micro-level behaviours were coded by two coders; disagreements were 
resolved by discussion. The final score consists of the sum of (a) the number of 
verbal orders addressed to others to tell them what to do (e.g. “Pull forward now!”), 
(b) the number of verbal orders simultaneously expressed with intrusive behaviours 
to tell others what to do (e.g., One participant telling another “Pull the pulley!” while 
simultaneously dropping his/her own pulley in order to mime the action), and (c) 
verbal interventions with tones of emotional negative tension (i.e. annoyed and 
scornful tones, e.g. “arrggggghhhh, no, not that way!”, “are you stupid or what?”).  
 
 
                                                
36 The Start/Finish square was not included in the coding of group performance because we realized afterwards 
that the instructions were ambiguous as to whether the Start square was to be considered as the Finish, and some 
groups stopped before reaching this last square. Thus, the Beginning (from square n°1 to square n°48) and 
Middle of the game (from square n°49 to square n°96) both contained an equal subtotal of 48 squares, whereas 
the End of the game (from square n°97 to square n°143) contained a subtotal of 47 squares. 
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6.2 Results 
 
Overview of Analyses 
Age of participants and their school affiliation were introduced in preliminary 
analyses, but, as no effect was found, they were removed from the final analysis. 
Preliminary analysis on group performance and negative dominant behaviours 
revealed a significant main effect of Time to perform the 1st go. Therefore, Time to 
perform each go was kept in the model. No main effect of Order of goes or Group 
gender composition was found; thus, to the extent that they were only control 
variables, we removed Order and Group gender composition from the model. Thus, 
both the Performance and the Negative Dominant Behaviours variables were 
analysed with a 2 (Experimental manipulations: Grades Priming, Neutral Priming) x 2 
(Goes: 1st go, 2nd go) GLM with repeated measures on the last factor and Time to 
perform each go as covariates.  
 
Performance 
In the mixed-model GLM that we ran, we added the within-participants contrast 
(-1, 0, +1) to the above model to investigate the evolution of performance on the 
Parts of the Game, where (-1) related to the Beginning, (0) the Middle and (+1) the 
End parts of the Game, a contrast that should be significant if—as it could be 
expected—practicing the Game produces an increase in performance. The mixed-
model GLM revealed, however, that no significant main effect of the linear contrast 
testing the evolution of performance across the Parts of the game was found, F (1, 
38) = 0.16, p = .69. Moreover, neither the effect of the experimental manipulation F 
(1, 38) = 0.07, p = .80, nor the effect of the goes, F (1, 38) = 0.59, p = .45, nor the 
interaction effect was significant, F (2, 76) = 0.31, p = .74. The only significant effect 
was that of the covariate Time to perform the 1st go, F(1, 38) = 7.12, p< .01, #p2 = 
.16, which confirms what was found in the preliminary analyses.  
Notwithstanding the general lack of effects, it is interesting to note that we did 
not observe a significant increase in performance from one phase to another, and 
from one go to the other, which would have been reasonable to expect because of 
the increased familiarity with the task as the game progresses. If anything, the means 
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show a non-significant performance decrement between the Beginning and the End 
parts of the game (see Figure1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of groups! proportional performance across the three main parts 
of the game, as a function of experimental manipulations. 
 
A possible interpretation of this decrease in performance, present in both 
goes, could be that pressure to achieve increases towards the end of the game and 
disrupts coordination and therefore performance. In order to study this possibility in 
more details, we divided the End part of the game in two sub-parts: the Before-Home 
Straight, and the Home Straight. Then, we run the same analyses with a within-
participants variable comprising four parts: Beginning, Middle, Before-Home Straight 
and Home Straight. As the four parts do not include the same number of squares, the 
analyses were again run on the proportional performance during each phase; the 
percentages for the Beginning and Middle parts remained the same, and we 
computed the score for the two new parts by again dividing the raw score of 
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performance obtained on each part by the maximum performance score, namely 30 
points for the Before-Home-Straight (square n°97 to square n°126) and 17 points for 
the Home-Straight (square n° 127 to square n°146), and multiplying it by 100. 
In the same GLM model previously run, we entered the within-participant 
Helmert contrast (+3 -1 -1 -1), where (+3) related to the Beginning, (-1) the Middle, (-
1) the Before-Home Straight, and (-1) the Home Straight. Again, a significant main 
effect of the covariate Time to perform on the 1st Go was found, F(1, 38) = 5.89, p < 
.02, #p2 = .13. More importantly, the analysis showed a significant multivariate 
interaction effect between the contrast (the four Parts of the Game) and the 
Experimental Manipulations, F (3, 36) = 4.34, p < .01, #p2 = .27. Inspection of the 
means suggest that this effect may be due to the differences in performance 
occurring within the End part of the game (see Figure 2), which was confirmed by the 
significant interaction effect between the within-participant contrast opposing the two 
last parts of the Game and the Experimental manipulation, F(1, 38) = 12.33, p < .001, 
#p2 = .25.  
 129 
 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of groups! proportional performance across the four parts of the 
game, as a function of experimental manipulations. 
 
It appeared indeed that groups in the Grades Priming condition decreased 
their performance from Before-Home-Straight (M = 57.05; SD = 0.18) to the Home-
Straight (M = 42.78; SD = 0.19), whereas groups in the Neutral Priming condition 
increased their performance from Before-Home-Straight (M = 47.08; SD = 0.16) to 
the Home-Straight (M = 54.41 ; SD = 0.22). Finally, it is important to note that, during 
the Home-Straight phase, groups in the Grades Priming condition performed 
significantly worse than groups in the Neutral Priming condition, F (1, 38) = 5.59, p < 
.023, #p2 = .13.   
 
Amount of Negative Dominant Behaviours 
The same model was applied to analyse negative dominant behaviours. 
However, one group was detected as an outlier (with a Studentized Deleted Residual 
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removed from the analysis. The remaining sample included 41 groups, 22 in the 
Grades Priming condition, and 19 in the Neutral Priming condition. The analyses 
revealed a main effect of time to perform on the first Go, F(1, 37) = 33.23, p < .001, 
#p2 = .47, and an interaction effect of the within-variable Goes with Time showing 
that the effect was stronger on the first Go, F(1, 37) = 115. 44, p < .001, #p2 = .76, 
than on the second Go, F (1, 37) = 86.53, p < .001, #p2 = .70. More importantly, the 
model revealed a main effect of the priming manipulation, indicating that groups in 
the Grades Priming condition used significantly more negative dominant behaviours 
when interacting with others (M = 89.27; SD = 44.14) than groups in the Neutral 
Priming condition (M = 58.92; SD = 24.17), F(1, 37) = 3.91, p < .056, "2p = .10, 
thereby supporting Hypothesis 2. 
 
6.3 Discussion 
 
The present study investigated, on a sample of 5th grade pupils, the effects of 
merely activating grades prior to a cooperative task on group members! subsequent 
interpersonal coordination. The effect of grading individuals on individual 
performance has been widely studied (e.g. Butler, 1987), and so has the effect of 
grading groups on individual performance (for a discussion, see Buchs, Gilles, 
Dutrévis, & Butera, 2011), but Social and Educational Psychology have remained 
silent on the effects of grading on group performance. This is an important gap in the 
literature, to the extent that it leaves unstudied a rather frequent situation, namely 
that of group work at school, where grading is pervasive. 
To address this question, we selected a task, the cooperative game (Doise & 
Mugny, 1984), which requires from individual group members to coordinate the 
actions of their pulleys and move a ball pen along a trail, thereby making cooperation 
necessary to good performance. Because grades are known to produce an 
evaluative pressure likely to be threatening and requiring to enhance one!s 
competence over that of the others (e.g. Butera et al., 2006), we hypothesised that 
the presence of grades, as compared to the absence of grades, would hamper group 
performance (Hypothesis 1), as well as interactions among individuals, under the 
form of negative dominant behaviours (Hypothesis 2).  
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The results showed that priming the pupils with grades from the onset of the 
game (in comparison to a neutral priming) indeed resulted in lower group 
performance, which supported our first hypothesis. However, the results also showed 
that this difference is not significant for the total performance across the three parts of 
the game, but—after dividing the game in four, rather than three parts—only for the 
very last part, which we have called the Home-Straight. This is, admittedly, an 
unexpected result. However, we decided to report both the non-significant results 
obtained with the a priori division in three parts and the significant results obtained 
with the post-hoc division in four parts, not only for reasons of clarity and 
transparency, but also because we believe that this unexpected result supports—
rather than undermines—the theoretical rationale of our Hypothesis 1.  
Let us see how this might be. The evolution of the measure of performance 
across the parts of the game showed that—instead of increasing, as it would be 
reasonable to expect when participants become more and more acquainted with the 
task—it stagnated from the beginning to the end of the task (it even slightly, but non-
significantly decreased). We reasoned that this could be an indicator of some threat, 
or other form of difficulty, occurring toward the end of the game; thus, we decided to 
further divide the trail in four parts, so as to single out the final part that goes straight 
to the arrival: the Home-Straight. The results showed that the performance of the 
groups in the Grades Priming condition decreased their performance as they moved 
into the Home-Straight, a decrease that was not observed in the Neutral Priming 
condition; moreover, it is indeed during the Home-Straight that the groups! 
performance is significantly lower in the Grades Priming than in the Neutral Priming 
condition. We interpret this result as strong support to our hypothesis, as we 
hypothesized that grading may impair group coordination because it has the potential 
to create a threatening evaluative pressure (e.g. Pulfrey et al., 2011), and the 
expected impairment occurred precisely in the part of the game where the pressure is 
likely to be the highest. 
 
Finally, results showed that priming the pupils with grades (in comparison to a 
neutral priming) resulted in tenser relations during the game, and more floor-taking 
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control and intrusive behaviours to direct others, which supported our second 
hypothesis.  
 These results allow discussing two important theoretical consequences. 
Firstly, this study shows that although work instructions called for group 
cooperation—and actually the very task structure required coordinating actions —the 
mere mention of grades in a peripheral area of the board managed to weaken that 
cooperative structure. The written mention of grades reduced both inter-individual 
coordination and the potential for group relations to be constructive. A limitation of 
this study is the absence of possible mediators of these effects, and future studies 
should definitely focus on the role of threat and achievement goals; however, this 
study suggests that the self-evaluation threat implied by grades is so rooted in pupils 
that the mere mention of grades may activate the threat, and impair group 
performance and intra-group relations.  
Secondly, we note that the deleterious effect of grades was obtained on a 
sample of young participants:  pupils in the 5th grade of elementary school. It would 
be interesting to investigate the effect of grades on samples drawn from higher 
academic levels where the emphasis on performance goals is even higher (Midgley, 
Anderman, & Hicks, 1995; Harackiewicz et al., 1998), in order to see whether grades 
could elicit more accentuated effects. But it would also be interesting to replicate this 
experiment with younger samples, to discover how many years of acquaintance with 
the grading system are sufficient to produce the same effect observed in the present 
study. 
Finally, these results allow discussing the understanding of dominant 
behaviours in terms of resource control strategies (coercive-dominant or pro-social) 
as studied by developmental psychologists like Hawley (1999; 2002). According to 
this author, the use of one type of control strategy or another depends on personal 
orientation and stage of cognitive development: At different ages, children!s personal 
social orientation and their goal structure can orient towards one strategy over the 
other (coercive-dominant or pro-social strategies) to control others! resources (e.g. 
“coercive children may be less motivated by personal relationships or motivated 
largely by instrumental goals such as access to material goods or power”; Hawley, 
1999, p. 116). The present results showed how an environmental factor (i.e. grades) 
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could elicit negative-dominant behaviours. This underlines the importance of taking 
into account structural factors that may be taken for granted, such as the use of 
grading, when studying group behaviour and performance. 
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CHAPTER 7.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
At the onset of this thesis, we wondered whether the practice of using grades 
to produce norm-referenced assessment (Brookhart, 2004) could put a curb on in-
group cooperation. More precisely, we wondered whether having recourse to grades 
in a cooperative group setting could elicit less cooperative behaviours among group 
members. Indeed, it had occurred to us that a complex graded-cooperative group 
situation resembles a mixed-motive conflict situation (Drolet & Morris, 2000) whereby 
the motive triggered in individuals, by grades! announcement, could be in 
contradiction with the motive triggered by the cooperative requirements of group work 
(De Dreu et al., 2008), making it tempting for individuals of the group not to 
cooperate. Hence, we proposed to experimentally address the question of the impact 
of grades on group cooperation. For that purpose, we had outlined that grades, used 
as a norm-referenced assessment tool, have two effects when given, or expected, in 
the open setting of a group. First, they highlight the work achieved by an individual by 
making it, as well as the individual, more visible. The second stems from the 
previous, whereby grades increasing individual visibility also favour social 
comparison between graded individuals; a competitive comparison likely to induce 
self-evaluation threat for individuals. Seen from this angle, we wondered whether 
grades could be problematic for cooperation in groups setting. Precisely, the present 
work aimed at testing whether grades could affect cooperative processes between 
individuals of a group, be these processes the reduction of individual preference for 
consistent information (Chapter 4), group information exchange and the sharing of 
crucial information for task-achievement with other group members (Chapter 5), or 
inter-individual coordination and the willingness of members to jointly coordinate their 
actions (Chapter 6).  
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7.1 Main results 
 
Throughout experiments reported in Chapter 4, we have mainly opposed 
grades to conditions where individuals were experimentally made visible, in an 
attempt to overrule that those visibility situations, where visibility alone was 
manipulated, will not affect group cooperation, whereas grades, which contain both 
components of visibility and threatening social comparison, will. Hence, Chapter 4 
presented two studies were conducted with the aim of understanding under which 
conditions, visibility of one!s performance could alter one!s task-information 
processing. This was tested on an intra-individual variable, individual preference for 
consistent (vs. inconsistent) information in the setting of a fictitious cooperative group 
work. The main results consistently showed that emphasizing work visibility was 
deleterious for cooperation (i.e., increasing individual preference effect), only in 
conditions where the purpose behind making the individual work visible was to grade 
and evaluate the contributions of the different individuals of the group. Moreover, the 
second study showed that grades expected in a cooperative situation increase 
individuals! perception of competition towards other co-workers. Together, those 
results call for future studies and point to the possibility that the previous deleterious 
effect of grades is due to the emphasis put on comparing performances across 
members, an emphasis that relates to the function of grades when used to produce 
norm-referenced assessments. A mediation hypothesis, that urges us to conduct 
further experimental testing to investigate this potential mediator, but also others that 
could intervene in this process.  
To summarize, the main results of this first experimental chapter showed that 
grades increased individual preference effect, which is problematic for individuals 
who are required and expected to cooperate. Indeed, grades led individuals to be 
biased towards information coming from other individuals of the group, whereas 
cooperating with others should have made individuals more open to the different 
opinions held by other members, but also to be open to appreciate the different 
arguments sustaining them, including when such information is in contradiction with 
individuals! own opinions. 
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The present results represent an interesting contribution to the understanding 
of conditions under which individuals manage to decentre and take other!s 
perspective or alternative point of view into consideration, in particular when they are 
facing individuals who have conflicting points of views, while being in this complex 
mixed-motive setting. On the one hand, in this scenario, all respondents had to 
evaluate information coming from other fictitious police officers, that is, others with 
whom respondents share the same status. Sharing the same status, and being faced 
in this cooperative situation with an aptitude task to solve, should have led individuals 
to easily decentre, and to be willing to consider favourably new inconsistent 
information that could have led them to consider new alternatives to problem solving 
(Butera & Mugny, 2001). But when expecting to be graded, this occurred significantly 
less than under other conditions. It is particularly in this experimental condition that 
individuals exhibited the highest preference effect suggesting a decentring failure.  
 
Indeed, following the conflict elaboration theory, this result could be interpreted 
by supposing that the expectation of being graded might have raised in respondents 
a perception of conflict of competence, which typically occurs when a threat or a 
potential threat to competence is triggered. Thus, we have evidence that when 
conflict of competence occurs (Butera, Gardair, Maggi, & Mugny, 1998) individuals 
can be found to be busy with confirming, defending their point of view, looking to 
prove that they are better than others (i.e. hold better view points than others, as 
aptitude tasks are diagnostic of competence). Thus, it seems plausible that the 
present mixed-motive fictitious setting has resulted in decreasing individuals! 
motivation to decentre, keeping them focused on relational matters (Legrenzi, Girotto, 
& Johnson-Laird, 1993). However, if under particular conditions, decentring is the 
way to fight confirmation because it can increase the use of disconfirmation 
strategies (Butera, Gardair, & Maggi, 1998), the results of chapter 4 obtained on 
preference for consistent vs. inconsistent information were not replicated on the 
confirmatory decision. We suggest to subsequently discussing this discrepancy in the 
limitations part of the manuscript.  
 
 138
Chapter 5 presented two studies conducted with the aim of uncovering 
whether the previous effect of grades obtained on an intra-individual variable in a 
fictitious cooperative group setting could be obtained in a real group setting, at an 
inter-individual level. Indeed, because in a real group setting, interactions between 
individuals are live and direct, comparing to others should be spontaneous given the 
direct presence of others. Hence, if the deleterious effect of grades found in Chapter 
4 is due to a threatening social comparison component, then we furthermore 
expected grades to be deleterious in the setting of a real group, where the social 
comparison potentially triggered by grades is even more salient. Thus, in Chapter 5, 
the effect of being visible and graded was measured during group discussions, on the 
process of group information exchange as another indicator of group cooperation.  
Indeed, in the hidden profile task, measuring the quantity and type of 
information exchanged during group discussion allows depicting a cooperative 
behaviour whereby behaviours of information exchange could be considered as 
cooperative whenever individuals freely exchange with others information that is 
crucial to task-achievement. On the reverse, withholding such crucial information 
would depict less cooperative behaviours. The main results obtained in this chapter 
consistently pointed to a negative effect of grades on group cooperation. This 
occurred in conditions where, from the onset of group work, grades were made 
salient, either when individuals received oral instructions announcing that each of 
their contributions would be graded (Study 1), or when individuals were primed with 
grades, hence making the presence of grades incidental with regards to the 
cooperative work instructions (Study 2). In both studies, grades led individuals to 
withhold unshared information from others and to exchange more extensively shared 
information with others. An effect that, interestingly, was not observed under other 
experimental conditions, namely when individuals expected their work to be only 
visible, or did not expect any grades (Study 1), or when individuals were primed with 
a neutral concept (Study 2). The main effect of grades obtained on information 
sharing, shows that expecting grades in a real cooperative group setting lowers 
significantly the possibilities of observing members process crucial task-information 
in a cooperative way. Nevertheless, it could be objected that the manipulation of 
grades might have been ambiguous for participants. Indeed, the instructions given to 
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groups in the graded condition of Study 1 stated that individuals would be visible 
during group work and that they would each receive a grade. However, instructions 
did not clearly mentioned whether grades would be (or would not be) given back 
publically, in front of the other individuals of the group. In other terms, this implies that 
the visibility of the social comparison information that is conveyed by grades when 
they are given publicly (Monteil, 1981) is not clearly at stake. However, the visibility of 
the social comparison information is not the only and core factor that could be 
responsible for the effect of grades that we expected and observed. Rather, it is the 
potential threat to competence or self-evaluation threat that stems from the 
expectation of being evaluated with grades that is (Muller & Butera, 2007; Pulfrey et 
al., 2011). It is worth considering that if, instead, instructions had made clear that 
grades would be made public, then this could have strengthened the effects we have 
obtained, and perhaps would have led to affect the ceiling effect that we have 
obtained on group resolution, for instance. Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
this ambiguity does not call into question the results obtained regarding grades! effect 
as they have been replicated with a priming procedure in study 2, which dispels 
doubt on the possible effect that this ambiguity might have played in Study1. 
 
Hence, we expected grades to affect group information sharing by relying on 
the explanatory mechanism according to which, when expecting to be graded, the 
individuals set to work in groups will find themselves in situations that cast doubt on 
their own level of competence in comparison to others. This could possibly happen, 
either because the expectation of grades would trigger an inner self-evaluation threat 
linked to the fear of the individual to not be able to meet the usual normative standard 
required (e.g. reaching the mid-point of the scale that in practice one needs to reach 
in order to pass, 4points/6 in Switzerland or 10/20 in France); or, because individuals 
do not know what is the level of competence of the other persons of the group with 
whom they are working. Either ways, both situations cast doubt on the individuals! 
own competence and have been shown to be threatening, precisely leading to self-
evaluation threat (Muller & Butera, 2007). If we postulate that threat perception is the 
explanatory mechanism responsible for the effect of grades in this cooperative 
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context, precisely why should self-evaluation threat have a deleterious effect on 
group information exchange?  
 
A possible explanation is the following. We know that threat resulting from the 
concern about not reaching given standards or the goals set (Muller & Butera, 2007) 
can affect the individuals! working memory and its available resources (e.g., 
Crouzevialle & Butera, 2013); such concern produces intrusive thoughts that the 
individual will ruminate, and such rumination will consume a part of the attentional 
resources (Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999) that the individual 
would have otherwise allocated to the processing of the task (in the case of our 
experiments, the processing of information). It is therefore possible that grades, that 
potentially have this capacity to trigger goal attainment and self-evaluation threat 
concerns, have resulted in a different exchange of information depending on whether 
this information is share or unshared. A difference that would come from the fact that, 
when expecting grades different amount of cognitive resources remained available to 
be allocated to the two types of information, in comparison to the other conditions.  
One could argue that this could happen precisely because shared information 
can be considered as the dominant ones (i.e. information that is jointly possessed by 
all members, in comparison to unshared information that is less dominant in the 
interaction). In this perspective, individuals of the group would process more shared 
information when expecting to be graded because shared information would be the 
most available information in individuals! working memory. On the contrary, unshared 
information would be less exchanged, because less cognitive resources will remain 
available in the working memory after a threat perception? But could this explanation 
be valid for the results obtained in our experimental group settings? This 
interpretation would stem from a mix of results obtained in the field of Social 
Facilitation-Inhibition (SFI): the theory of Zajonc!s Dominant Drive Theory (1965) and 
results obtained by Muller & Butera (2007) regarding the attentional focusing 
produced by self-evaluation threat, and precisely conditions under which such threat 
can arise. Hereunder, I suggest developing and discussing the validity of this 
interpretation with regards to the main aspects of the aforementioned work. We 
suggest to do so, on one side, by referring to Zajonc!s Dominant Drive theory (1965), 
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which namely makes use of the “dominant” term to explain the effect produced on an 
individual!s performance by the presence of a third party while performing (i.e. the co-
action effect). On another side, by referring to the results obtained by Muller & Butera 
(2007) who conducted work to explain the co-action effect in terms of attentional 
focusing and who contributed to the distraction-conflict theory (Baron, 1986; Geen, 
1976; Muller & Butera, 2004) by showing that what is destabilizing or enhancing in 
the presence of a co-actor is not the presence itself but rather the threat to self-
evaluation that the presence represents to the person who is engaged in task 
achievement. Thus, in both cases, we will try to see to what extent this theory and 
this late work can serve our interpretation in terms of dominant response (where 
shared information are viewed as the dominant available information) and in terms of 
different cognitive available resources allocated to information sharing. 
  
Before going any further, it is important to bear in mind the particularity of 
experimental frames in which the social facilitation-inhibition (SFI) effects are 
generally observed, measured and discussed, which are different in our experimental 
settings, and which therefore point to the necessity of being precautious when 
referring to SFI to interpret the present effects on group information sharing. In the 
broad framework of SFI, studies usually take place in the context of co-action, are 
interested with individual performance and often experimentally compare co-action 
situations to ones where the individual is performing alone. In the case of studies 
conducted in our Chapter 5, the dynamics are not alike: studies are taking place in a 
group setting and individuals are not in co-action but in cooperation. Moreover, not 
only are individuals working in groups but they are also tied together by a positive 
social interdependence making them in need to cooperate with other persons of the 
group. Hence, relations between individuals are totally different from the relations 
found in the broad setting of SFI experimental contexts. One last, yet major, 
difference: the tasks used. In SFI studies the tasks are usually perceptual cognitive 
type of tasks (e.g. Stroop task, McLeod, 1991; detection tasks concerning illusory 
effects, Treisman, 1998, Muller & Butera, 2007) but to my knowledge, they are not 
what we used here, namely verbal, information sharing tasks. Those are differences 
that one needs to keep in mind while going through the up-coming lines.   
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Positing that shared information is the dominant type of information in our task 
triggers in our mind Zajonc!s Dominant Drive theory (1965), which postulates that the 
presence of a co-actor will raise the level of drive of the individual. This rise will 
accentuate the hierarchy of behaviours available in the behavioural directory of the 
individual, and thus will make more salient the access to the dominant response. 
Hence, the dominant response will not be the same in a simple vs. complex type of 
task and therefore individual performance will be impacted differently in a complex 
vs. simple task. The theory states that in the case of simple (or well-known) tasks, 
the dominant response is usually the correct one, thus if accessibility to the dominant 
response is increased, individuals will retrieve it easily and this is why individual 
performance in presence of a co-actor will be improved. In the case of complex tasks 
(or in novel tasks), the theory states that the correct response is not necessarily the 
dominant one, thus increasing accessibility of the dominant response will not be 
beneficial to individual performance because the tendency to retrieve the dominant 
response will mislead the individual, and individual performance will be impaired in 
presence of a co-actor.  
Applied to the current results of Chapter 5, the use of a hidden profile task 
should make this task fall (according to the dominant drive theory) in the category of 
complex tasks, as the task is novel to individuals and the correct response is hidden 
from each individual. Hence, in a hidden profile, shared information items are the 
dominant ones and unshared information items the non-dominant ones. Following 
Zajonc!s theory, if the threat raised by grades (expectation or priming) leads 
individuals to favour the access to the dominant response and hence favour access 
to dominant information (shared information), then this should imply to 
consequences: a) in grades conditions shared information will be more exchanged 
than in the other conditions, and precisely, b) within the grades conditions more 
shared than unshared information should have been exchanged. But we only partially 
observed this pattern of result: a) was observed, but b) was not. Hence given the 
present limitations, it is difficult to use, solely, Zajonc!s theory to explain how threat 
might have operated on group information sharing. The dominant response in terms 
of shared information is not fully satisfying given the ceiling effect obtained on group 
decision-making.  
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The work produced by Muller & Butera (2007) brings a socio-cognitive understanding 
of what might have happened. Indeed, in our experimental setting it is possible that 
grades could have raised a self-evaluation threat which itself could have affected 
information sharing by narrowing attention on the most dominant type of information, 
a phenomenon called attentional focusing. Indeed, we know from their work that a 
“threatening social comparison” could lead to attentional focusing (Muller & Butera, 
2007; cf. Introduction). According to Muller & Butera (2007) what is responsible for 
the threatening effect of a social comparison is not necessarily the object of 
comparison, but rather the uncertainty that stems from such comparative situations in 
which the individuals! self-evaluation (regarding their competences) remains unsure. 
In our case, grades could have affected group information sharing because of a 
similar perception of threat that could have developed in this group context where 
social comparison is latent and where individuals! competences are not clearly 
established. 
So far, results showed that grades, not only affected an intra-individual 
variable (Chapter 4), but that they were also able to affect an inter-individual variable, 
be grades manipulated with oral instructions or a priming procedure (Chapter 5).  
 
Chapter 6 presented a study conducted with the aim of testing the impact of 
grades on another indicator of cooperation, namely inter-individual coordination. 
Indeed, a successful inter-individual coordination is necessary for individuals who 
wish to cooperate (McGrath, Arrow, & Berdahl, 1999). In this perspective, 
cooperation is defined as the capacity of individuals to coordinate their actions 
towards the achievement of one common goal (D.W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 2009a). 
Thus, the study reported in this chapter used a grades priming procedure and had 
furthermore two advantages in comparison to the previous ones. First, it allowed us 
to work on a younger sample of participants, elementary school pupils, in comparison 
to previous chapters, which reported studies conducted with university students. 
Second, it allowed us to test the effect of grades simultaneously on variables 
accounting for the two co-existing levels of functioning in a group (Oberlé & Drozda-
Senkowska, 2006): the task-focus level, by allowing to observe the effect on group 
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performance, and at the same time on the group-focus level, by allowing to observe 
the behaviours triggered between individuals. Results of this chapter pointed to the 
fact that showcasing grades hampered once more cooperation. On the one hand, this 
was observed on individuals failing to coordinate well, especially on the last part of 
the motor task, which resulted in a drop of group performance that we proposed to 
interpret as a choking-under-pressure reaction to grades. On the other hand, this was 
observed on individuals emitting more coercive-dominant behaviours during the 
interaction exchanges that were undertaken to coordinate with others. Broadly 
speaking, this chapter highlights that grades can also affect activities requiring inter-
individual motor-coordination. Furthermore, the fact that the results of this study 
replicated again a deleterious effect of grades, with pupils, and that the results were 
obtained by means of an indirect manipulation of grades (i.e., priming procedure), 
could support the idea that grades are heavily present in our society and are 
emphasized throughout the different layers of our educational settings, starting with 
elementary school. Indeed, authors have suggested that this emphasis regarding the 
valuing of grades and performance is increasingly enhanced as children move on 
through to the higher levels of school degrees (Midgley, Anderman, & Hicks, 1995; 
Harackiewicz et al., 1998; Midgley et al., 2001). Thus, the results presently obtained 
seem to support the view of an early influence of grades in educational settings. 
 
7.2 Overall limitations  
 
Although a deleterious effect of grades was consistently obtained on various 
types of dependant variables, a first limitation that applies to all studies concerns the 
need to know how participants have perceived the overall graded-cooperative 
situation that we posited, from the onset of this thesis, would fall in the category of 
mixed-motives situations. Indeed, we had opened this thesis by arguing that the 
graded-cooperative situation described must be dilemmatic from the point of view of 
individuals because in this case, individuals face at once two contradictory demands. 
A situation triggering different motivations within the individual is what the literature 
refers to, as a mixed-motives situation (De Dreu et al., 2008). Yet, the studies that we 
have presented never aimed at testing whether the experimental situations were 
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indeed perceived as mixed-motives by participants. Such perception would need to 
be clarified in order to rule out the possibility that grades led to deleterious effects 
because participants perceived it as purely competitive. Indeed, the subjective 
perception that individuals have of the situation in which they are, determines in turn 
the behaviour that they choose to emit in this particular situation. Hence determining 
how participants subjectively perceived our graded-cooperative situation is of utmost 
importance because, as D.W. Johnson & R. Johnson (2005a, p. 293) argue “the 
appropriate action (that will be emitted) depends on the perception of goal 
interdependence, which is a person!s cognitive representation of the situational 
context (…) not how objective observers define the situation”. Accordingly, the 
experiments that we have conducted jointly failed to measure the perception that 
participants had of this situation as being dilemmatic and triggering mixed-motives in 
individuals, a parameter that future studies could take into account and try to 
measure.  
Hence, if we get confirmation that the graded-cooperative situation was 
perceived from the start as a mixed-motive and dilemmatic situation, then the fact 
that grades gained the upper hand on cooperation and elicited non-cooperative 
behaviours will furthermore reflect a powerful impact of grades. Indeed, in that case, 
individuals would have emitted non-cooperative behaviours that they knew would be 
in opposition with the cooperation instructions given by the experimenter. Thus, the 
previous leads us to think that emitting such behaviours must have been a costly 
move to undertake. There again, future research could investigate how individuals, 
who have emitted such behaviours in a dilemmatic situation, cope with emitting such 
behaviours and explain it.  
 
The second common limitation that we wish to tackle concerns the fact that all 
experiments took place in educational settings. What could be problematic is that 
universities and schools are contexts in which the system of grades is well anchored 
and where there is a longstanding tradition of using grades. Hence, one could object 
that testing the effect of grades, specifically in educational settings, might have 
helped the appearance of grades! effect given that the overall experimental context 
was congruent with what grades refer to and trigger, in terms of ranking, comparing 
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and achieving excellence. For example, university policies (as grades, when used to 
produce norm-referenced assessment) are turned towards comparison and selection, 
when hiring the best researchers, or when praising the best achiever among 
students. Hence, this congruence might have facilitated the fact that grades have 
ended-up gaining the upper hand on cooperation in this mixed-motive situation. 
Therefore, conducting further studies in other non-educational settings could be a 
way to confirm that the results obtained are ecological and can be generalized to 
other contexts. For instance, this could be tested in an organizational setting where 
grades are generally not used as such, and where, yet, comparison between 
employees is frequent in management.  
 
Third and last common limitation. Whilst the literature review made on visibility 
and social comparison showed that they both sometimes affected performance, we 
could have expected grades to affect and hamper not only cooperative behaviours 
but also group performance (i.e., the product of group work). Yet, as results show, 
group performance was only hindered in the study using the Cooperative Game 
(Chapter 6), whereas group performance (in terms of task solution and precisely in 
terms of uncovering the suspect to correctly incriminate) remained unaltered by the 
experimental manipulations of grades in the studies using Hidden Profiles (Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5). In fact, in both chapters and in all conditions, a majority of 
participants managed to successfully uncover the hidden profile although the 
cooperative behaviours were significantly diminished in the graded experimental 
conditions when comparing them with the other experimental conditions (whether 
relative to the information sharing or appreciation of others! information items through 
the preference effect). Subsequently, we discuss reasons for why this might have 
occurred. 
Firstly, one should note that cooperation, in those tasks, is a necessity that 
stems from the core nature of the task (i.e. its positively interdependent structure). 
The structure of HP-tasks used links group members by a positive interdependence 
of resources whereby group members need to exchange and take in consideration all 
the unshared information that is scattered among group members in order to uncover 
the correct profile. Thus, based partly on the videos that allowed us to review group 
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discussions, what literally happened is that once all items of unshared information 
had been stated in group discussions, the profile of the suspect became so visible 
and obvious that it was difficult to group members to avoid recognizing it was THE 
one, as all evidences pointed straight at it. This observation echoes with Davis! 
(1973) alternative cases of social decision scheme in situations of group decision-
making called “truth wins”. As Davis describes it, the “truth wins” model is a 
combination of the (intuitively known) “majority wins” rule with some features of the 
expression of the Lorge-Solomon (1955) Model A, the later was built to provide a 
theoretical model that can generate the theoretical level of performance that is 
expected at group vs. individual level when one!s aims at studying and comparing 
performance discrepancies between groups and individuals performance. Thus, it is 
plausible that the “truth wins” rule has been applied in our groups, as Davis describes 
it as likely to happen whenever “the desirability of the decision is uniformly self-
evident in that once proposed, such a response is so persuasive that the other group 
members agree to its adoption” (Davis, 1973, p. 107). The equivalent might have 
occurred at individual level in Chapter 4: where, on the one hand, individuals 
expressed preferences for consistent information, but where, on the other hand, the 
obviousness of the correct solution made it hard on participants to willingly and 
intentionally avoid it. Pushing this interpretation to the extreme, one can suppose that 
in such a paradoxical graded-cooperative situation, individuals might even have 
perceived that not recognizing the obviousness of the correct solution could have 
casted doubt on their own competence. This later point furthermore highlights the 
need to understand the extent to which individuals might have perceived this situation 
as paradoxical and mixed-motive one.  
Yet, if this is an interpretation of what has happened and can be regarded as a 
potential explanation for the lack of effect of grades on performances, one could 
object that it cannot utterly be attributed to the particularity of the HP-task that we 
have chosen to use. Indeed, if the only responsible factor was task particularity, 
shouldn!t we have observed the same type of ceiling effect on performance in the 
results of other studies previously conducted in literature and that have used the 
same HP-task (Toma & Butera, 2009; Toma, Gilles, & Butera, 2011; Toma, Bry, & 
Butera, 2013)? But this is not their case; in their studies no ceiling effect on task 
 148
solution was observed and, more to the point, the experimental manipulations of 
cooperation vs. competition did lead to differential effects in terms of task-solution. 
This leads us to think that instead of viewing this problem as a lack of effect of 
grades! manipulation on group performances, we can potentially propose a slightly 
different interpretation, and instead view this absence of effect on group performance 
as being a ceiling effect of cooperation on group performance. This slightly yet 
important view allows considering the possibility that the mixed-motives context 
created in our experimental settings might have been the reason why no effect of 
grades on group performance has emerged. Given that the task and the instructions 
of the experimenter rendered crystal clear the location and highlighted the 
importance of each type of information to the case resolution, it is possible that the 
overall situation in which participants found themselves made it hard on them to 
completely avoid exchanging unshared information. Indeed, if individuals were 
sensitive to the experimenter!s instructions (i.e. highlighting how important it is to 
exchange the unshared information), and if they had retained that the experimenter is 
the person who will be attributing grades; then, not exchanging unshared information 
as recommended, could have been perceived as an indicator of incompetence. This 
point of view could lead us to think that a) the type of task was not the most suitable, 
and b) that grades! manipulation might not have been strong enough to fully disrupt 
cooperation (i.e. to disrupt not only the emission of cooperative behaviours, but also 
task-solution).  Further studies would need to experimentally challenge it and find 
supporting evidence. To dispel doubts, a suggestion could be to test the effect of 
grades on another hidden profile task that is more difficult to solve, and where, 
although all unshared information are out in group discussion, unveiling the hidden 
profile remains less evident in comparison to the hidden profile task we have 
presently used. 
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7.3 Contributions 
 
Subsequently, we propose to briefly discuss contributions of the present work 
to the already existing literature regarding to: first, regarding assessments, second, 
regarding cooperation, and third, regarding information sharing. 
 
Firstly, as we have outlined it from the beginning of this manuscript, we know 
from literature that Grades, as assessment tools, are generally used with two main 
purposes. On the one hand, to produce criterion-referenced evaluation that is when 
they are used to evaluate the extent to which individuals! work have met a given 
standard. On the second hand, to evaluate the extent to which individuals! outputs 
are better/ worse/ equal to one another, in which case they are used to produce a 
norm-referenced type of evaluation (Brookhart, 2004). In the present studies, the 
experimental work adopted the perspective in which grades are used in the purpose 
of producing an inter-individual comparison type of assessment. That is, broadly, 
when grades allow comparing and rank-ordering individuals. Indeed, we argued that 
it is precisely when they are used in an inter-individual comparative purpose that they 
will be deleterious in the open of a cooperative group setting. Although this is what 
we have observed, we now know more about the nature and functioning of grades. 
Indeed, it is interesting to note that we have obtained similar negative effects when 
grades were expected but also when they were primed, thus obtaining those effects 
with an implicit method suggests that individuals have perceived grades under their 
inter-personal comparison aspect. This common result suggests a first contribution to 
understand the functioning of grades: the negative effect of grades occurs even when 
they are not explicitly used with the goal of undertaking inter-personal comparison. 
Moreover, this result also suggests that individuals have a historical experience with 
grades that can possibly explains why mere priming has produced similar effects 
than open expectation of grades. And it suggests that grades must have triggered a 
mechanism deeply anchored individuals! functioning: by endangering their need for 
an accurate self-evaluation that would preferably be positive (Festinger, 1954), or 
endangering their need for obtaining a positive self-evaluation that would be self-
enhancing (Steele, 1988; Tesser, 1988; Muller & Fayant, 2010). Hence, this 
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methodological difference in grades! manipulation that led to similar effects backs up 
the explanatory mechanism on which we have relied to build our expectations 
regarding grades! negative effects (and we remind it, that awaits for direct 
experimental proofing): that grades have probably triggered the perception of a 
competence threat (Mugny et al., 2003).  
However, if neither social comparison nor threat has been manipulated, it is 
noteworthy that grades have been manipulated in different ways, and their effects 
observed on different types of dependent variables. The results have consistently 
pointed to a general negative pattern, showing that grades are deleterious for 
cooperation. Hence, this point allows us to draw some inferences regarding what, 
within grades, has the potential to induce deleterious effects in cooperative situations 
where individuals are visible and evaluated. Indeed, observations derived from 
experimental manipulations where cooperative situations compared graded and 
visible individual work, to other various cooperative situations where individual work 
was expected to be visible allows ruling out that is it not the mere visibility component 
of grades that seems to be involved in triggering the negative effect of grades. Thus, 
this brings furthermore support to the first contribution to grades! functioning, 
whereby the negative effect of grades occurs even when they are not explicitly used 
with the goal of undertaking inter-personal comparison, and distinctively leads to a 
second one. One that relates to the understanding of how grades function. Indeed, in 
line with research investigating the effects of mere presence on individual 
performance (e.g. Cottrell, Wack, Sekerak, & Rittle, 1968), the results (in comparison 
to conditions of visibility) suggest that grades are not deleterious when expected in 
the open of a cooperative group setting mainly because of their capacity to enhance 
individual!s social visibility. Rather, the results allow us to infer that grades are 
deleterious when they open the possibility for individuals to obtain a negative self-
evaluation (Gruenewald, Kemeny, Aziz, & Fahey, 2004).   
 
Secondly, regarding cooperation. Earlier in Chapter 2, we had underlined our 
interest in studying situations of cooperation in which grades would intervene to see 
the extent to which they would interfere with cooperation. Thus, in our will to study 
cooperation, we have relied on two preconceptions: firstly, that group work is 
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expected to be superior to individual work; secondly, that cooperation is a positive 
phenomenon. It is important to note that in the psychological literature, cooperation 
(often compared to competition, e.g., Ames, 1981) does not systematically result in a 
positive type of situation (e.g., Stanne, et al., 1999; Johnson & Johnson, 2005a; 
2009a). Similarly, group work does not systematically result in a superior output to 
that provided by individuals alone (e.g. Hill, 1982; Kerr, McCoun, & Kramer, 1996; 
Kerr, Niedermeier, & Kaplan, 2000; Lorge, Fox, Davitz, & Brenner, 1958; Stasser & 
Titus, 1985; Stasser & Titus, 2003). Thus, both preconceptions are bound to be valid 
only under certain conditions (i.e. the case of positive social interdependence); it is 
under these conditions that we wished to test grades! effect on cooperation.  
Hence it is important to note that the present work subscribes to the approach 
that tries to grasp the factors that help or hinder cooperation, under different forms: 
inter-individual information sharing; reduction of one!s tendency to prefer information 
that are consistent with a previously made choice rather than inconsistent ones; or 
inter-individual coordination. Indeed, in our studies, more than being a simple value 
or a norm to follow, cooperation is a necessity that stems from the nature of the tasks 
used. In other words, we have particularly focused on studying cooperation when it is 
conceptualized as binding individuals (of a group) together through a positive social 
interdependence. This means that we have circumscribed our experimental 
investigations to situations where individuals have the necessity to share the 
complementary resources they possess (i.e. positive resource/mean 
interdependence) in order to reach the common goal they are given to thrive for (i.e. 
positive goal interdependence). In other words, cooperation is obligatory because if 
individuals do not actively cooperate (e.g. by sharing their complementary resources, 
by coordinating, by decentring to take other!s information into account even though 
they are inconsistent with their own choice) they will not be able to reach their goal; in 
that they are strongly positively interdependent. Hence, it is specifically in such tasks, 
and under such conditions of positive interdependence, that the two preconceptions 
(i.e. group work is superior to individual work, and cooperation is positive) are valid, 
or shall we say, can be valid (as literature still discusses what factors need to be 
gathered in order to best achieve cooperation, Buchs, Butera, & Mugny, 2004; 
Buchs, Gilles, Dutrévis, & Butera, 2011; D.W. Johnson & R. Johnson, 2009a).  
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In this context, the present results contribute to the understanding of what 
factors can obstruct inter-individual cooperation and suggest that grades have this 
capacity. Precisely, the results show that raising a positive interdependence of goals 
and resources among individuals of a group (Deutsch, 1949) is not sufficient to 
maintain cooperation in the face of grades! expectation. Hence, in such situations, 
grades ended-up gaining the upper hand on the cooperative structure of group work. 
Why did grades prevail over cooperation? Did they reduce the beneficial effect of 
cooperation? Or did they break the positive interdependence that was established 
between individuals? Or, did something happen in between? This is what we now 
undertake to discuss. 
From all the results we have obtained, we observed on the one hand that the 
graded cooperative situations have led to less cooperative behaviours but not to their 
absolute disappearance (e.g. groups ended up exchanging less unshared information 
than in the other conditions, and more shared information; but did not totally avoid 
unshared information). Taken alone, such result would suggest that grades rather led 
to a reduction of cooperation. On the other hand, in such graded cooperative 
situations, individuals have reported perceiving others more like competitors than in 
the other conditions. Taken alone, such indicator would rather suggest that grades 
have possibly resulted in breaking the positive social interdependence of the task, 
since others are no longer viewed as co-operators or partners. However, when taken 
together (e.g. grades in cooperative graded situations leading to reduced cooperation 
but not to its disappearance, but also leading to more perceptions of competition), the 
results suggest another, more plausible explanation. In the present cooperative 
situations, grades have led individuals to perceive two distinct requirements with 
which they simultaneously had to deal: having to cooperate and having to be better 
ranked than others. In fact, this could have resulted in a different perception of the 
situation than that of being purely cooperative; Deutsch (1949, 1962, 1973) had 
already remarked that what influences human behaviour is not the mere structure of 
the interaction but individuals! actual perception of the situation. Hence, grades in 
cooperative tasks might have resulted in being perceived as a mixed-motives 
situation (De Dreu et al., 2008), in which two goals at once were to be fulfilled.  
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Indeed, the vast educational research literature that studies learning through 
the scope of motivation and achievement goals (i.e. why students want to achieve 
performance/ learning at school) has lately developed to highlight that individuals in 
educational contexts might not be endorsing one type of goal (e.g. mastery) rather 
than another (e.g. performance) in given situations, but that individuals can endorse 
multiple goals at once (Darnon, et al., 2010). Moreover, literature suggests a wider 
categorization of the goals that adolescents endorse at school (Boekaerts, Koning, & 
Vedder, 2006; Mansfield, 2012; Pintrich, 2000b; for a recent, brief introduction and 
historical perspective on goals in learning contexts, see the editorial introduction of 
Wosnitza & Volet, 2012).  
It is for instance the case of Mansfield (2012) who puts forward the interesting 
perspective according to which multiple goals are furthermore related to four 
domains. Thus, she reorganizes goals endorsed by adolescents into 4 distinct types 
of goals: First, achievement goals (mentioned above). Second, future/instrumental 
goals that link present activities to a visualised future (e.g., obtaining a high salary, a 
good job position, helping to make the world a better place; Phalet, Andriessen, & 
Lens, 2004). Third, social goals (Urdan & Maehr, 1995) defined as the social reasons 
underpinning student!s desire to achieve at school (e.g., the desire to establish and 
maintain positive relationships with others, Wentzel, 1996; or the desire to cooperate 
and be helpful, also called social goals, Spera & Wentzel, 2003; or to be well 
regarded by others, also called status goals, Levy, Kaplan, & Patrick, 2004). Fourth, 
personal well-being goals that are positive goals precisely related to the self (e.g., 
wanting to enhance self-confidence, self-esteem; Salmela-Aro & Nurmi, 1997).  
Following this typology of goals, it would furthermore be interesting to 
investigate whether this mixed-motive situation might not have triggered other types 
of goals which could be relevant to investigate given the paradoxical overall situation 
in which this graded-cooperative situation results: precisely, investigating whether 
social goals have also been triggered along with the dual mastery/performance type 
of achievement goals. Could it be that our graded cooperative situations have 
triggered at the same time performance goals (related to questions of competence 
that one wants to prove in comparisons to others or, precisely, to avoid being 
incompetent in comparison to others; Ames, 1992b; Elliot, 1999), pro-social goals 
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(defined as linked to the desire to cooperate with others and being helpful; Spera & 
Wentzel, 2003) but also status-goals such as the goal of being well-regarded (Levy, 
Kaplan, & Patrick, 2004) by the experimenter? 
 And if so, could it be that one type of goals has dominated the others and 
could this domination possibly explain why the mixed-motives graded-cooperative 
situation has led to a decreased cooperation?  
 
Finally, another complementary explanation could be provided to understand 
this overall hybrid situation in which the present graded-cooperative context seem to 
have resulted in.  Instead of considering that grades have led to a reduction of 
cooperation, one could also consider that grades have not been deleterious enough 
to totally eliminate cooperation, or precisely, should one say to totally eliminate, the 
ceiling effect of cooperation on performance. This idea stems from the following.  
On the one hand, Pulfrey, Buchs, & Butera (2011) have shown that 
expectation of grade-only situations of assessment have been found to increase 
individuals! adoption of performance avoidance goals (PAV) in comparison to no-
grade assessment situations (Experiment 1). On the other hand, the comparison of 
conditions where individuals expected a grade-only type of assessment vs. where 
they expected a mixed-type of assessment situation (i.e., grades are concomitantly 
expected with formative comment-based feedback) showed no significant effect on 
the adoption of PAV goals. However, the comparison of the two types of graded 
situations (grade-only and grade & comment) vs. comment-only situation showed that 
the graded-types of situations increased significantly the adoption of PAV goals 
(Experiment 2, 3). In short, grades increased adoption of PAV goals; both types of 
graded situations increased the adoption of PAV in comparison to the comment-only 
situation; but no significant difference were observed between the two graded types 
of conditions on the adoption of PAV goals.  
This suggest that it is possible that in the condition where individuals expected 
the mixed-type of evaluation (grade & comment), grades might have gained the 
upper hand on the comment-only type of situation because the grade & comment 
situation (along with the graded situation) still revealed an increase in PAV goals in 
comparison to a comment-only condition. Indeed, in their experiments the graded-
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only and the graded-comment conditions produced similar levels of PAV adoption, 
thus one can infer that the two situations were perceived as equally avoidable, and 
that in the same vein, one should expect a graded-cooperative situation to be viewed 
as avoidable. With regards to our results, this would support the possibility that 
grades, in our experiments, might not have been deleterious enough to eliminate all 
cooperative behaviours between individuals, or cooperative attitudes within 
individuals. 
 
Thirdly, regarding the literature on group information sharing and precisely the 
central question of the pooling of unshared information. The literature on hidden 
profiles (for a recent review see Toma et al., 2012; Lu, Yuan, & McLeod, 2012; 
Stasser & Titus, 2003) was initiated (Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987) to investigate the 
reasons for group!s failure to pool new relevant information when individuals give it 
during group discussion in order to take a group decision, which is particularly 
problematic when this information is crucial to task achievement or to taking better 
group decisions (e.g., Larson, Christensen, Abbot, & Franz, 1996; Stasser & Stewart, 
1992; Stasser & Titus, 2003).  
Indeed, in a group setting where individuals hold different resources, one 
would expect individuals of the group to be interested in hearing and receiving new 
information, because it could be expected to sound more convincing than information 
already commonly shared by all individuals of the group (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1997). 
Lately, Toma and her colleagues have shown that groups could be motivated 
information processors and that this reluctance to pool unshared information could 
vary depending on the goals that the group and its individuals were led to pursue. 
They showed that setting groups with competitive goals during the hidden profile task 
increased the tendency of groups to under-use unshared information in comparison 
to when groups were given cooperative goals (Toma & Butera, 2009). This result was 
particularly interesting and puzzling at the same time, because groups were explicitly 
told (1) that they did not possess the same information to solve the task and (2) 
where such information was located in their materials (i.e. “unshared information is 
located at the bottom of the second sheet”). However, competitive motives gained the 
upper hand on the cooperative task that necessitated unshared information to be 
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sufficiently exchanged between individuals, leading groups to taking bad decisions, 
thus wrongfully solving the task. Moreover, this difference regarding unshared 
information in competition (vs. cooperation) did not affect shared information (Toma & 
Butera, 2009; Toma, Vasiljevic, Oberlé, & Butera, 2013). This result was interesting 
because it allowed making a step forward into explaining that the aforementioned 
tendency could be of motivational concern, and that the reluctance to exchange 
unshared information with others could be a strategic intentional “withholding” of 
information, driven by mistrust, a defensive mechanism (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004). In 
the same vein, the same pattern of result regarding unshared information pooling 
was replicated when expertise assignment was moreover manipulated, by showing 
that in competition unshared information was even less shared in groups where 
experts where assigned than when none was assigned (Toma, Vasiljevic, Oberlé, & 
Butera, 2011), which typically suggests that a threat to competence might be beneath 
the tendency to withhold unshared information in groups. 
 
After this rapid yet recent historical overview, the present results bring the 
following contributions regarding unshared information exchange. (1) They replicate 
this tendency in the setting of a mixed-motive setting where cooperation instructions 
are accompanied by grades! expectation, a result that is replicated when grades are 
primed (a distinction already previously discussed). A result that is interesting to be 
interpreted in line with the fact that grades are known to be predictive of performance 
avoidance goals (Pulfrey et al., 2011), performance avoidance goals that are 
negatively predicted by perceived competence (Cury et al., 2006). Thus, we suggest 
that the present result contribute to the idea that withholding unshared information 
could be a protective/defensive motivated mechanism that is observed when 
individuals perceive that their competence is under evaluation, and is thus potentially 
incurring the risk of obtaining a negative evaluation. (2) Unlike previous results by 
Toma and colleagues, a reverse significant effect was found on shared information, a 
new result that could be considered as being of less importance because shared 
information are less crucial to the solving of hidden profile, but which--taken along 
with the fact that cooperative-graded situation did not impact group decision--could 
make us wonder whether it is not a specificity due to the mixed-motive situation. 
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Indeed, it could have been that groups in the graded-cooperative situation have 
reacted to the mixed-motive situation by trying to look active, trying to show one!s 
best behaviour in comparison to the contribution of others individuals of the group, by 
at the same time withholding unshared information and giving other the illusion that 
they were actively participating in decision making. 
 
7.4 Future research perspectives  
 
When we first initiated this thesis work, the purpose was to investigate whether 
grades could impact cooperation and cooperative behaviours. In the short term, it 
would be interesting to conduct future studies to extend and complete our 
understanding as to why grades actually did hamper cooperation. Future work would 
need to gather more proofs of the underlying processes that provoked that 
deleterious effect. Precisely, our main hypothesis was directed by the argument that 
in such cooperative context, grades (or their expectation) would trigger a threatening 
social comparison putting at stake the competence of individuals, and that it is 
indirectly or directly, this threat perception that would have been at the origins of the 
negative impact of grades found on cooperation. Thus, we think that it should be 
particularly promising to set future research to experimentally demonstrate that self-
evaluation threat to one!s competence is fully, or in part, responsible for grades 
leading to a cooperation drop in cooperative group contexts.  
One way to undertake this future step could be to measure threat perception 
and trying to confirm the possibility that this threat refers explicitly to competence 
threat matters in this cooperative context. For example, if a threat is indeed 
perceived, are individuals aware of it? How do they actually define it? And, could we 
bring proof that it is, namely this perceived threat, which during the interaction 
process, is reported on relations with others? Finally, does it modify the perception 
that individuals have of other group members? These questions would necessitate 
experimental evidence. Moreover, we think it could be interesting to follow the 
rational that self-competence threat is at the basis of the deleterious effect of grades 
obtained on cooperation, and to link it with the results of Monteil!s studies (1988, 
study 1 and study 2) that exhibit that visibility of the social comparison information 
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can be deleterious whenever it puts at stake the reputation of individuals. Particularly, 
it would be interesting to test the moderating role of low self-perceived competence 
(e.g. the subjective perception that individuals have regarding their competence in 
achieving a given task) on the negative relation found between grades and 
cooperation. In order to replicate previous results obtained by Monteil (1988, study 
2), it would be furthermore interesting to oppose: a condition where self-perceived 
competence is measured, to a condition where competence is attributed (in terms of 
bogus feedback) in order to investigate the moderating role of low competence 
perception on the negative relation between grades and cooperation. Relying on the 
results previously obtained by Monteil (1988, study1 & study2), we could expect:  
Firstly, that broadly competence (whether self-perceived competence, as 
dependent variable, or attributed-competence, as independent variable) will play a 
moderating role on the negative relation between grades and cooperation, but only 
when competence is perceived to be low or to be endangered. Secondly, we could 
expect that both perceived low self-competence and low attributed-competence 
would both equally (no statistical differences) lead to a hampered cooperation. 
Thirdly, we relied on the assumption that namely self-evaluation threat (cf. Chapter 1) 
can be the core variable and reason why grades have led to cooperation drop in such 
cooperative contexts. Thus, the present suggestion of experimental testing will allow 
to start bringing contributions to this hypothesis by possibly showing the moderating 
role that self-competence can play in the grades-to-cooperation negative relation. In 
sum, the idea will be to try to understand whether the following relations could be 
experimentally tested (see figure below). From a larger perspective, the previous will 
allow to capture the role played by self-competence, when grades are expected in a 
cooperative situation. Which in turn, will bring contributions to understanding the role 
that reputation (or the fear of avoiding bad reputation) can sometime play in 
normative-evaluative situations, and thus contribute to understanding why grades can 
sometimes lead to a hampered cooperation. 
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In parallel, a possible continuity for the present work could be to use threat 
measurements to start creating and developing a database listing different 
behavioural threat evidences, at individual level, and at interaction level. This could 
be done by using EEG measurements, individual measures of perceived threat and 
anxiety scales (e.g., the Palmar Sweat Index that allows measuring the level of 
physiological arousal in individuals, Johnson & Dabbs, 1065; Martens, 1969, Cohen 
& Davis, 1973), and looking to identify emotional reactions to threat. On the short and 
long term, it would be interesting to conduct research in which we would vary the 
sources of threat and the contexts in which this threat occurs, to see to what extent 
the type of threats vary accordingly. Conducting research in academic field for 
experimental purposes, and in parallel, in more applied fields where the question of 
threat and threat detection is of central importance (e.g., in national and 
governmental defence services) to contribute to already existing practices and 
trainings could be particularly thrilling. 
 
Up to this point, the previous subsection has permitted to outline studies that 
we will need to conduct in the continuity of the present work. Next, we propose to 
discuss implications that the present results could have for educational settings using 
teaching practices that rely on the use of cooperative tasks and for organizational 
- Self-evaluation threat 
- Low perceived 
self-competence 
- Low attributed 
self-competence 
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settings, in situations where managers are exhorted to initiate joint actions and 
shared goals among employees. 
 
 
7.5 Implications 
 
Educational settings 
 
The present work shows that cooperation and grades do not work well 
together. Precisely, it seems that grades in a cooperative context, when expecting to 
receive them or when made salient, led to a decrement in cooperation, affecting intra-
individual but also inter-individual variables. These results have three key-
implications for educational settings.  
 
Firstly, the results of Chapter 4 cast doubt on the optimal conditions under 
which teaching exercise ought to be conducted with pupils and students. They show 
that grades can hamper one of the most central and basic processes concerned with 
learning, namely the use of decentring and perspective taking that are at stake, for 
instance, in exercises of hypothesis/antithesis building and defending. This suggests 
that even when individuals work on their own, the expectation of being graded can 
affect their propensity to properly evaluate and appreciate the diagnostic value of 
new information, as grades seem to interfere with their motivation to consider 
diverging points of view. In other words, grades are not only problematic to be used 
in direct interactions but also when individuals work on their own. 
  
Secondly, the results of Chapter 5 have a direct implication for schools 
adopting cooperative learning methods as a means to increase the learning and 
achievement of students, while the general functioning comprises an individual 
evaluation. To corroborate our argument we propose to take for example the general 
functioning of the STAD method (i.e., Student Team Achievement Divisions; Slavin, 
1990). STAD is a cooperative method used in classrooms, that encourages students 
to work in small groups with the goal of making sure that all the members of the 
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group have mastered a given number of course concepts previously explained by the 
teacher. Students know from the onset of group work that beyond group work itself, 
the level of mastering will be assessed with a weekly individual examination. One of 
the strengths of this method is its capacity to provide, at individual level, an overall 
score for each individual that will take in consideration each weekly individual score 
examination and the progress achieved by each student regarding the previous 
individual weekly scores. Nevertheless, our results highlight that using STAD as a 
cooperative learning method to encourage active learning might not lead individuals 
to elicit cooperative and helpful behaviours between individuals of a same group who 
are supposed to make sure that each person has mastered all the concepts. The 
drawback of this method (and other similar cooperative tasks) could be that 
foreseeing individual evaluation from the beginning of the cooperative group work 
could encourage individuals to elicit strategic anti-cooperative behaviours during 
interactions. A way to overcome such inconvenient in the use of STAD could be to 
make a weekly group examination with a common group grade (instead of a weekly 
individual examination), and to provide an individual follow up focused on issues that 
individuals might have encountered during their learning. 
 
Thirdly, though not the least, the results of Chapter 6, which replicated the 
nefarious effect of grades on cooperation with 10-years-old pupils, show how early 
the effect can be triggered. Moreover, replicating this effect on an inter-individual 
socio-cognitive-coordination task suggests that purely intellective tasks are not the 
only ones to be hampered by grade expectation, and that other types of tasks, which 
require a coordination of cognitive and motor functions, but also those that require 
inter-individual communication, can also be affected by grades. Thus, a broad range 
of instructors, tutors, teachers and professors are to be concerned with the present 
results.  
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Organizational settings: Implications for managers exhorted to manage 
employees by initiating joint actions and shared goals  
 
The main results obtained in our studies, according to which grades decrease 
in-group cooperation, has interesting implications regarding management techniques 
not to use in given contexts. On the one hand, as Luscher, Lewis and Ingram (2006) 
have highlighted: “(managers) particularly in times of change, are challenged to apply 
competing best practices, such as (…) prescriptions to build trust by initiating joint 
action as quickly as possible and by first developing shared goals and 
understandings” (pp. 494). Accordingly, if managers want to follow the challenges 
given to them, a possibility would be to consider cooperative group work as a working 
structure to initiate joint actions and shared goals between employees. On the other 
hand, managers have a tendency to prefer using already-established practices that 
promote “individual productivity and efficiency” (Luscher, Lewis, & Ingram, 2006, pp. 
492), such as having recourse to management evaluation techniques based on 
individual grading or ranking in order to promote individual productivity by increasing 
competition among employees. It is the case for example of companies wrongfully 
using the Benchmark technique (Voss et al., 1997) to compare employees of one 
same branch and where employees are aware of such practice.  
Thus, our results point to the fact that it could be problematic for managers to 
decide using cooperative group work and simultaneously maintaining the use of 
evaluation techniques (e.g. grades) to assess individual productivity. In fact, using 
individual grading in the environment of a cooperative group work will probably 
degrade all the benefits that the manager was initially expecting (e.g. raising trust 
through shared goals and actions) and that could have been raised with initiating 
cooperation among employees. Hence, it could be useful to run preventative 
interventions among general managers, their N+1, managing partners and CEOs, or 
more generally, among organization and their directors, to alert them to the problems 
that could stem from the use of such evaluation practices in cooperative teamwork.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Returning to the essential aspects, this work has demonstrated that the use of 
grades to assess contributions of individuals to a cooperative work hinders 
cooperation as such, as well as it hinders the emergence of certain cooperative 
behaviours which usually take place in cooperative contexts (i.e. behaviours related 
to: sharing resources, being open to the opinions of others, coordinating with others). 
Thus, to conclude this thesis, we suggest discussing this general result with respect 
to the existing views on the functional use of grades in Education. If this thesis did not 
aim at testing and comparing methods of evaluation: however, it would be difficult for 
us to conclude without asking ourselves what could be the consequences of its 
results on the practice of using grades within the scope of educational environments. 
If assigning individual grades within a cooperative context seems harmful, does it 
roughly mean that they should be banned? 
     
In educational environments where grades are used as comparative tools to 
rank-order pupils and select the most competent ones, two ideas are implicitly (or 
explicitly) shared. On the one hand, the idea that grades allow students to experience 
the competition they will later face upon entering the labour market. In this 
perspective, using grades as a comparative tool, and hence experiencing them as 
such, would enable students to better cope with future situations of competition. This 
idea, but also the upcoming one are conveyed, for instance, in Deutsch (1979), or in 
Harackiewicz, Barron, & Elliot (1998). On the other hand, there is the idea according 
to which grades are relatively harmful when used for purposes of comparison. In this 
scope, grades would increase competition among students, a competition that would 
lead them to having antisocial behaviours, especially toward each other, such as 
cheating behaviours (cf. Chapter 4 in L!évaluation, une menace?), or such as 
delinquency behaviours, which then become “a rational choice (…) for students who 
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find school frustrating or difficult” (Felson, Liska, South, & McNulty, 1994, p. 169) 
especially when norms of the competitive climate are not integrated by students, and 
when pressure and frustration are experienced.  
Between these two stances, what can be concluded from the results of the 
work conducted in this thesis? That grades should be banned within a cooperative 
context? This idea seems somewhat extreme, unrealistic and disconnected from 
reality where, as we have previously seen it, grades are strongly and traditionally 
rooted in the educational practices in particular (Midgley, Anderman, & Hicks, 1995; 
Midgley, 1993; Harackiewicz et al., 1998, Midgley et al., 2001) and in the functioning 
system of our society in general. Consequently, the revolution of grades will probably 
not take place tomorrow. However, we believe that there might be an intermediate 
stance to adopt and that it would be possible to try to alleviate this effect. Since we 
cannot change the functioning of the system, we might lead individuals to have other 
types of behaviour when faced with such mixed-motives situations. 
 
Indeed, individuals are used to being assessed and compared with others; this 
is a reality that they are not likely to escape from. However, the fact that being 
evaluated and compared with others generally leads them to adopt certain types of 
anti-cooperative or anti- social behaviours is another reality on which we believe it is 
possible to act. Therefore, would it be possible to train individuals to have another 
vision of grades, without preventing them from experiencing comparative-assessment 
situations? Could both school and university students "learn" that this wild chase for 
grades does not have to systematically lead them to having anti-social behaviours? 
Let!s take for instance and by extension, a more significant context, that of 
competition. Although rare, it is a fact that not all competitions have to be negative; a 
competition can take place within a positive competitive state of mind, where the 
objective is not necessarily to destroy the other, but where competition occurs while 
showing respect to the other and surpassing oneself (see Stanne, Johnson & 
Johnson, 1999; Johnson & Johnson, 2009a, p. 370, on Conditions for constructive 
competition). Let us put this thought in our context; would it be possible to promote 
such a state of mind within the context of a work individually graded and yet 
cooperative at the same time? In other words, would it be possible to put individuals 
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in situations of comparative assessment and lead them not to react with each other in 
an anti-cooperative manner? And if so, how can this be done? 
 
On the one hand, what would happen if, for example, we taught individuals 
from an early age, and throughout their school curricula, to become aware of the 
impacts that grades can have on them and provoke in them? What would happen if 
we warned them, for example, that anti-cooperative behaviours are harmful to them, 
to their cooperative work and to the quality of their relationships with others? Could 
this awareness reduce the appearance of anti-cooperative behaviours? An 
experimental study could well try to test this hypothesis.  
More precisely, what if, after placing individuals in a context of graded 
cooperative work, similarly to some studies carried out in the scope of this thesis, we 
drew their attention to the fact that a very useful piece of information will be 
communicated to them? Information according to which, when individuals know that 
they are being graded during a cooperative group work, they mostly start to act in a 
less cooperative way, etc. If we presented this information as being in their best 
learning interest, hence promoting a mastery oriented goal, would it allow to hinder 
the effect of this graded-cooperative situation that seems to result more in a 
performance oriented assessment (Smeding, Darnon, Souchal, Toczek-Capelle, & 
Butera, 2013)? Would this statement allow them to reduce the occurrence of these 
behaviours?  
Even more, and from a preventive point of view, what would happen if we 
raised their awareness to the fact that these anti-cooperative behaviours are not the 
only behaviours they can use in comparative-assessment situations, but that they 
can also choose to be more fair play in their behaviours and attitudes? For example, 
that they can do their best to cooperate with others and sportively accept the grade 
that will be given to them. Could this awareness help them reduce the appearance of 
anti-cooperative behaviours in a comparative-assessment situation within a 
cooperative group work? 
 
On the other hand, and as previously highlighted in the theoretical part of this 
thesis, the interest of cooperative work for individuals is to be able to take advantage 
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of their differences (in terms of experiences, resources, etc.). But if the practice of 
individual grading jeopardizes this cooperation, what other option can we choose in 
order to strengthen the cooperation within such a mixed-motives context? As 
mentioned in the recent publications of Johnson & Johnson (2009a), we believe that 
it is important to develop in individuals the social skills that would allow individuals 
who cooperate to better manage the relationships with others, relationships of 
coordination and communication that sustain and promote cooperation. In fact, these 
skills are not innate and learning them appears for us today to be essential in order to 
bolster together the structural factors of cooperation (e.g. the concept of positive 
social interdependence that may be structured in terms of goal and resources given 
to individuals in a group).  
 
Thus, experimental works could be conducted to support and promote 
prevention approaches against the effect of grades! practice when used in a 
comparative way in the context of cooperative group work. All in order to better 
prepare individuals to face situations of comparative assessments, teaching them to 
hinder non-cooperative and antisocial behaviours in such contexts. Finally, if Albert 
Einstein said "I never teach my pupils. I only attempt to provide the conditions in 
which they can learn", why not show pupils that under certain conditions and 
situations, their choice of behavioural response is not predetermined, and that as 
individuals, they have the freedom to use other types of behaviour?  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX I - Material used in Chapter 4  
(NB: reporting the one exhibiting the graded-visibility instructions) 
 
Etude sur la résolution d!enquête en sciences criminelles 
 
 
Vous trouverez ci-dessous la description d!un accident de la route issue d!un rapport 
de la police routière. Conformément à ce rapport, plusieurs personnes sont 
impliquées dans l!accident et plusieurs informations relatives à ces personnes ont pu 
être recueillies. 
Vous allez devoir jouer le rôle d!un policier. Vous allez lire la description de l!accident 
et vous allez déterminer, à partir des informations fournies, et uniquement à partir de 
ces informations quelle est la personne, et une seule, qui a produit l!accident. 
 
Collision lundi soir à 19h00, au carrefour Saint Georges. La chaussée est étroite et 
non éclairée. Deux voitures et une moto sont impliquées. Dans une des voitures, 
Monsieur X, 53 ans, 30 ans d!expérience de conduite et son fils, 17 ans, rentrent chez 
eux. Le père vient de consommer plusieurs verres d!alcool lors d!un dîner avec ses 
amis. Dans l!autre voiture, Madame Y, 27 ans, titulaire du permis de conduire depuis 
seulement 1 an, va faire ses courses. Les feux avant de sa voiture sont déficients. En 
moto, Monsieur Z, 28 ans, titulaire du permis de moto depuis 5 ans, va retrouver son 
père gravement malade qui l!a sommé de venir. Il conduit à vive allure sur la N13. 
La personne responsable conduisait une voiture. Lors du contrôle de la police, la 
personne propriétaire du véhicule en tort avait une alcoolémie de 1,5g/l sang. La 
personne en tort affirme avoir manqué de vigilance au moment de la collision. 
 
Quelle est la personne, et une seule, qui a produit l!accident ? 
 
_________________________ 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tournez la page après avoir répondu ! 
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Imaginez maintenant qu!on vous mette en équipe avec deux autres policiers afin de 
trouver la personne qui a produit l!accident. Pendant la première réunion de travail, 
vous discutez du cas présenté antérieurement. Les deux autres policiers disposent 
d!informations identiques aux vôtres (informations communes), mais aussi 
d!informations différentes de celles dont vous disposez (informations uniques). Au vu 
de la totalité des informations dont votre équipe dispose, une seule solution est 
possible quant à la personne qui a produit l!accident. 
 
 
Sur la base des informations fournies avant la formation de l!équipe, l!un des 
policiers a trouvé que la personne qui a produit l!accident est Madame Y, et l!autre a 
trouvé que c!est Monsieur Z. 
 
 
Votre chef annonce que pour résoudre cette enquête, il va falloir faire un travail 
d!équipe. Vous, ainsi que les deux autres policiers allez donc devoir travailler 
ensemble pour trouver le responsable de l!accident.  
Votre chef annonce également, qu!il sera présent et qu!à l!issue de l!enquête, il 
attribuera à chacun une note individuelle (allant de 1 à 6).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tournez la page après avoir lu attentivement ce scénario !  
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Rappelez-vous que vous travaillez en équipe avec les deux autres policiers, et 
que vous allez également recevoir une note individuelle à l!issue de l!enquête !  
 
A présent, voici les informations uniques dont vous disposez.  
 
Veuillez évaluer la pertinence de ces informations : Indiquez pour chaque information 
dans quelle mesure elle vous semble importante pour déterminer la personne qui a 
produit l!accident, en entourant le chiffre qui correspond. 
 
- « La personne responsable conduisait une voiture » 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Peu importante        Très importante 
 
- « Lors du contrôle de police, la personne propriétaire du véhicule en tort avait une 
alcoolémie de 1,5g/l sang » 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Peu importante        Très importante 
 
- « La personne en tort affirme avoir manqué de vigilance au moment de la collision » 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Peu importante        Très importante 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tournez la page après avoir évalué les informations !  
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Rappelez-vous que vous travaillez en équipe avec les deux autres policiers, et 
que vous allez également recevoir une note individuelle à l!issue de l!enquête ! 
Voici les informations uniques, différentes des vôtres, que les deux autres vous ont 
communiqué pendant la réunion de travail. Veuillez indiquer la mesure dans laquelle 
chaque information vous semble importante pour déterminer la personne qui a 
produit l!accident. 
 
- « La personne responsable a moins de 30 ans » 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Peu importante        Très importante 
 
- « En raison de son inexpérience, la personne fautive n!arrive pas à éviter la 
collision » 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Peu importante        Très importante 
 
- « La personne en tort affirme ne pas avoir vu les autres s!approcher du carrefour » 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Peu importante        Très importante 
 
- « Le responsable est un homme »  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Peu importante        Très importante 
 
- « C!est un père qui semble être impliqué dans cet accident » 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Peu importante        Très importante 
 
- « La personne responsable conduisait à une vitesse de 110 Km/h »  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Peu importante        Très importante 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tournez la page après avoir évalué les informations !   
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En somme, voici la totalité des informations dont vous disposez, après que les deux 
autres policiers vous aient donné leurs informations :  
 
 
Collision lundi soir à 19h00, au carrefour Saint Georges. La chaussée est étroite et 
non éclairée. Deux voitures et une moto sont impliquées. Dans une des voitures, 
Monsieur X, 53 ans, 30 ans d!expérience de conduite et son fils, 17 ans, rentrent 
chez eux. Le père vient de consommer plusieurs verres d!alcool lors d!un dîner avec 
ses amis. Dans l!autre voiture, Madame Y, 27 ans, titulaire du permis de conduire 
depuis seulement 1 an, va faire ses courses. Les feux avant de sa voiture sont 
déficients. En moto, Monsieur Z, 28 ans, titulaire du permis moto depuis 5 ans, va 
retrouver son père gravement malade, qui l!a sommé de venir. Il conduit à vive allure 
sur la N13. 
 
 
- La personne responsable conduisait une voiture. 
- Lors du contrôle de la police, la personne propriétaire du véhicule en tort avait une 
alcoolémie de 1,5 g/l sang. 
- La personne en tort affirme avoir manqué de vigilance au moment de la collision. 
- La personne responsable a moins de 30 ans. 
- En raison de son inexpérience, la personne fautive n!arrive pas à éviter la collision. 
- La personne en tort affirme ne pas avoir vu les autres s!approcher du carrefour. 
- Le responsable est un homme. 
- C!est un père qui semble être impliqué dans cet accident. 
- La personne responsable conduisait à une vitesse de 110 Km/h. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tournez la page après avoir lu attentivement toutes les informations !  
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Répondez de nouveau à la question : 
 
 
 
Quelle est la personne, et une seule, qui a produit l!accident ? 
 
………………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tournez la page après avoir répondu ! 
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Dans le questionnaire suivant, nous nous intéressons à savoir comment vous avez 
perçu le déroulement de l!enquête.  
Répondez aux questions suivantes en entourant le chiffre correspondant : 
 
 
(Below manipulation check of Experiment 1) 
 
- Est-ce que dans le déroulement de l!enquête, votre chef vous a annoncé que vous 
seriez évalué(e) individuellement ? 
    OUI  NON  
 
(Below items of perceived competition of Experiment 2, also manipulation 
check of Experiment 3) 
 
- Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que dans une situation identique lors d!un travail 
d!équipe réel, il y aurait eu une atmosphère de compétition ?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Pas du tout        Tout à fait 
 
- Dans quelle mesure avez-vous perçu les autres policiers comme des rivaux ?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Pas du tout        Tout à fait 
 
(Below manipulation check of Experiment 2) 
 
- Votre chef, vous a-t-il précisé : 
a) Qu!il sera présent pour suivre les investigations ?  
OUI  NON 
b) Qu!il donnera à chacun une note individuelle pour son travail 
d!investigation ?  
OUI  NON 
c) Que vous aurez, par la suite, à lui signifier les raisons qui vous auront 
amené à choisir votre propre suspect ? 
OUI  NON 
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APPENDIX II - Material used in Chapter 5  
 
(Phase 1: Case individually provided before group discussion) 
 
Etude sur la perception des accidents de la route 
 
 Vous trouverez ci-dessous la description d'un accident de la route issu d'un 
rapport de la police routière. Conformément à ce rapport, plusieurs personnes sont 
impliquées dans l'accident et plusieurs informations relatives à ces personnes ont pu 
être recueillies.  
 
Vous allez devoir jouer le rôle d'un enquêteur. Vous allez lire la description de 
l'accident et vous allez déterminer, à partir des informations fournies, et uniquement 
à partir de ces informations quelle est la personne, et une seule, qui a produit 
l'accident. 
 
(Below shared information items) 
Collision lundi soir à 19h00, au carrefour Saint Georges. La chaussée est 
étroite et non éclairée. Deux voitures et une moto sont impliquées. Dans une des 
voitures, Monsieur X, 53 ans, 30 ans d!expérience de conduite et son fils, 17 ans 
rentrent chez eux. Le père vient de consommer plusieurs verres d'alcool lors d'un 
dîner avec ses amis. Dans l!autre voiture, Madame Y, 27 ans, titulaire du permis de 
conduire depuis seulement 1 an, va faire ses courses. Les feux avant de sa voiture 
sont déficients. En moto, Monsieur Z, 28 ans, titulaire du permis moto depuis 5 ans, 
va retrouver son père gravement malade qui l!a sommé de venir. Il conduit à vive 
allure sur la N13.  
 
(Below 3 unshared information items provided per participant) 
 
(Unshared information pointing to Mr. X) 
La personne responsable conduisait une voiture. Lors du contrôle de la police, 
la personne propriétaire du véhicule en tort avait une alcoolémie de 1,5 g/l sang. La 
personne en tort affirme avoir manqué de vigilance au moment de la collision.  
 
(Unshared information pointing to Mrs. Y) 
La personne responsable a moins de 30 ans. En raison de son inexpérience, 
la personne fautive n!arrive pas à éviter la collision. La personne en tort affirme de ne 
pas avoir vu les autres s!approcher du carrefour.  
 
(Unshared information pointing to Mr. Z) 
Le responsable est un homme. C!est son père qui est indirectement 
responsable de l!accident. La personne responsable conduisait à une vitesse de 110 
Km/h. 
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Quelle est la personne, et une seule,  qui a produit l'accident ?   
 
…………………………. 
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(Phase 2: Final group solution sheet) 
 
 
SOLUTION DU GROUPE 
 
 
 
Quelle est la personne, et une seule qui a produit l'accident ?   
 
…………………………. 
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(Poster for the Grades priming condition of Experiment 2) 
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APPENDIX III - Material used in Chapter 6  
 
Picture of the Cooperative Game (adapted from Doise & Mugny, 1984), kindly lent by 
Gabriel Mugny. Panel A: the device. Panel B: the trail. Panel C: the Grades 
prime.  
 
 
A 
 
 
 
 
B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6 Excellent 
(Ottimo) 
 5,5 Very good 
(Molto buono) 
5 Good 
(Buono) 
4,5 Average 
(Discreto) 
4 Pass 
(Sufficiente) 
3,5 Unsatisfactory 
(Insufficiente) 
3 Very 
Unsatisfactory 
(Molto 
insufficiente) 
2,5 Bad 
(Male) 
2 Very bad 
(Molto male) 
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